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Introduction: India’s Crisis of Unity: Defining the “All India” Phenomenon 
India has been an independent country for more than sixty years and yet the question of 
Indian unity continues to be a matter of almost universal concern. In March of 2008, in 
the midst of attacks on people from the northern state of Bihar living in Mumbai, The 
Hindu newspaper printed a cartoon depicting a map of India with the states demarcated 
and inside each state was a map of India. In the cartoon one man asks another, “and you 
want to remove Bihar from Maharashtra?!”.1 The cartoon was attempting to argue that 
each Indian state both existed as part of the Indian nation and also fully and 
fundamentally encompassed the unity of the Indian nation. It argued for a cessation of the 
violence against Biharis in Mumbai by claiming that because each state inseparable from 
the nation, it would be impossible to remove what was Bihar from what was Maharashtra 
and the characteristics of Marathis from the characteristics of Biharis. Yet that the 
question of separating out one state or identity from another could be raised, indicates the 
strength of regional identities in India and the uncertainty of the national identity, which 
could allow for the possibility of the separation of “essential Bihari-ness” from the 
quality of being that describes the Marathi.2 Moreover, if there is something that defines 
Maharashtra as fundamentally different from Bihar—a regional identity that cannot be 
                                                 
1
 “National Unity,” The Hindu, March 10, 2008. The harassment and violence toward Biharis in Mumbai is 
almost endemic at this point, with stories about continued harassment in 2010 in India Today. See, for 
example, “Won’t Allow Bar on Migrants in Maharashtra: Rahul,” India Today, (February 2, 2010); “Rahul 
Attacks Sena, MNS for Tirade against North Indians,” India Today, (February 1, 2010). While the problem 
of harassment against North Indians is almost entirely blamed on Marathi chauvinists attempting to stir up 
trouble in Mumbai, it has historic precedents in the fight to define Maharashtra, Bombay, and Gujarat in the 
1950s and 60s. See Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest 
Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 197-208. 
2
 And perhaps even what defines this essential Bihari-ness is hard to understand, as the state itself has 
recently been refigured with the creation of Jharkhand state in late 2000. The question certainly becomes 
more difficult when the city of Mumbai (one of the world’s largest metropolises) is the site of defining 
Marathi identity, despite its ambivalent historical relationship with Maharashtra, and which includes 
permanent residents from not only every state in the Indian nation, but many other countries as well. 
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easily reconciled with the national identity—then the concept of a unifying Indian 
identity that holds both Bihar and Maharashtra must be more complicated than merely 
declarative. Indian unity continues to be a nearly universal watchword in Indian politics, 
although the meaning of that unity is, as it was just before independence, uncertain.  
In its sixty years of independent existence, India has never been able to articulate 
a singular vision of what it means to be Indian, though it has tried. Nothing about the 
national presentation of itself has remained static. In addition to wars with Pakistan and 
China that have resulted in the changing of international borders, there are several 
regional movements looking for some kind of division either from the states the area 
belongs to or from the nation entirely.3 There are active separatist movements in the 
Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Kashmir. Sikh movements for an independent 
Khalistan, although small, are still active both in India and abroad. It is possible, based on 
Indian Government announcements, that by the end of 2010 a separate Telangana state, 
carved out of the inland areas of Andhra Pradesh (including Hyderabad), may finally be 
accomplished.4 The Telangana movement, as much a socio-economic movement as a 
linguistic one, has been agitating for separate statehood since before the advent of the 
Indian nation—first fighting the Hyderabad princely state, and later fighting the 
government of India.5 Excluding territorial disagreements about the structure of Indian 
national unity, religious and caste-based organizations have sought to define Indian unity 
                                                 
3
 Indeed the borders with China and Pakistan are both still disputed with no nation agreeing to make the 
‘lines of control’ permanent demarcations of national territory. 
4
 Aparna Alluri, “Victim of History,” Frontline 26, no. 26 (2009); S. Nagesh Kumar, “Talking Peace” 
Frontline 27, no. 2 (2010); Jim Yardley, “A Politican Goes Hungry to Redraw India’s Map” New York 
Times, December 11, 2009; Yardley, “Bid to Partition Indian State Intensifies in India,” New York Times, 
December 14, 2009. 
5
 P. Sundarayya, Telengana People's Struggle and Its Lessons (Calcutta: Communist Party India: Marxist, 
1972). 
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as exclusively benefits their cause. Hindu nationalism, which has had a large political 
voice in India, has sought to define India as a Hindu nation to the exclusion of other 
religions. At the same time, other national movements have asked whether national unity 
is defined by the way that the nation treats its citizens, leaving poor, rural, and minority 
citizens as mere victims of the nation. In either case, the idea of Indian unity, so 
flippantly defined as “unity in diversity,” is just as much under question now as it was 
before independence. Independent India, obsessed with its unity, is still trying to decide 
what unity means. 
A Crisis of Unity: Defining National Unity for India 
One of the things that the national independence programs of the 1920s and early 30s 
taught anti-colonial groups was that in order to make an impact, there needed to be some 
kind of gesture toward the indivisibility of the Indian nation, whether it be through 
history (as was most usual), geography, or common suffering under colonial rule. Both 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru wrote extensively about the 
indivisible history of India. In Discovery of India, Nehru wrote that India, though 
seemingly rife with difference, was actually a palimpsest where diversity overlaid a 
fundamental and historical unity, “Though outwardly there was infinite variety among 
our people, everywhere there was that tremendous impress of oneness, which had held us 
together for ages past.”6 Gandhi emphasized the importance of building out of raw 
                                                 
6
 The Discovery of India, follows Indian history from the beginning of time until 1942. Jawaharlal Nehru, 
The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2004), 51-52. Nehru also published a volume of his essays 
written from 1937-1940 about the meaning and sites of Indian unity. See Nehru, The Unity of India: 
Collected Essays, 1937-1940 (New York: John Day Company, 1942). 
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history a long national story that emphasized the fundamental unity of India.7 Nehru and 
Gandhi were not alone in the repetition of a historical record that defined India’s 
fundamental unity. In 1942, the Indian History Organization (which also called itself the 
Bharatiya Itihas Parishad and Anjuman-i-Tarikh-i-Hind), planned and announced “the 
writing of a comprehensive History of India in 20 volumes,” which explained the history 
of India from “Pre-history” through the “Struggle for National Independence,” effectively 
defining all the history from the subcontinent as a lead up to the eventual unified Indian 
nation.8  
While a history of Indian unity written by historians falls well within common 
nationalist attempts to create a unified national identity, and into the broadly statist 
mission of historical studies in general, the historicizing of Indian unity was not confined 
to the pens of historians.9 Discussions of literature, music, and art often began with the 
                                                 
7
 Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, in Hind Swaraj and Other Writings, ed. Anthony Parel (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
8
 “Indian Historians’ History of India” The Modern Review 71,  no.1 (January 22, 1942): 20. This history, 
which emphasizes the way that the separate kingdoms and provinces in the historical India resembled each 
other and worked together, tends to ignore much of the inter-India fighting, or when it cannot be ignored, 
defines it as fights between brothers. 
9
 The connection between history and the production of the state has been long postulated for precisely the 
reason that Indian history was complicit in the discussion of state building. National identities are not 
natural, but drawing them back to time long past makes them feel as if they are. The problem with history 
as a statist enterprise is that writing history to define the nation fundamentally writes some people out of 
history. In the last several decades, Indian historians, especially those associated with Subaltern Studies, 
have attempted to de-link history from its nationalist, or statist, past. In one of the group’s most famous 
essays, Ranajit Guha pushed scholars to listen to the ‘small’ voice of history by paying attention to the 
ways that nationalist history leave out subaltern voices. Ranajit Guha, “The Small Voice of History,” in 
Subaltern Studies 9: Writings on South Asian History and Society, ed. Shahid Amin and Dipesh 
Chakrabarty (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1-12. Also in this volume see, Kamala Visweswaran, 
“Small Speeches, Subaltern Gender: Nationalist Ideology and its Historiography,” in Subaltern Studies 9, 
ed. Amin and Chakrabarty, 83-125.  Guha followed this discussion of the need for an expansive history 
with another more rousing call for it in his book, History at the Limit of World-History (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003). Other authors in the group, notably Shahid Amin, Event, Memory, 
Metaphor: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995) and Gyanendra 
Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), have put pressure on nationalist constructions of the nation and its pivotal 
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long history of India’s culture.10 At the same time, political causes, like women’s rights 
and reform, couched their own demands and concerns with Indian life in a discussion of 
“ancient” India and life today.11 Each of the organizations featured in this dissertation had 
an expression of Indian unity as one of the key tenets in their constitution, despite not 
being primarily organized for the purpose of seeking independence. To many anti-
colonial activists in the 1940s, national independence, if it could be achieved well, 
seemed like the solution to the problems of repression, injustice, and poverty that plagued 
the country.12 Yet it was clear to many that the success of the nation and the achievement 
of a “good” independence depended on the near universal decision that India was capable 
of being unified in the colonial present, hence the number of repetitions of the 
fundamental historic unity of India.13 
                                                                                                                                                 
movements. There have been many other discussions of history’s statist past, especially as it acted as a 
cover for colonial domination and later as a ploy of nationalism. One need only read Hegel’s Introduction 
to the Philosophy of History, with its global historical explanation for European colonial domination, to 
understand the power of history as a tool for defining national power. G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the 
Philosophy of History, trans. Leo Rauch (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988). The English should 
not have been surprised when their colonial subjects used the British history trick on the British themselves. 
For more on this subject see: Richard Roberts “History and Memory: The Power of Statist Narratives” The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 33, no. 3 (2000): 513-522, Jacques Ranciere, The 
Names of History, trans. Hassan Melehy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition  
(London: Verso, 1991).   
10
 R.R. Diwakar, “Forward,” in An Anthology of Indian Literatures, ed. K. Santhanam. (Bombay: Bharatiya 
Vidya Bhavan, 1969); Indian Literatures of Today, ed. Bharatan Kumarappa (Bombay: All India PEN 
Centre, 1947); Indian Writers in Council Proceedings of the First All-India Writers’ Conference, Jaipur 
1945, ed. K.R. Srinivasa Iyengar (Bombay: International Bookhouse Ltd., 1945); Aspects of Indian Music: 
A series of special articles and papers read at the Music symposia arranged by All India Radio (New 
Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1957); Kamaladevi Chattopadhey, Toward a National 
Theatre (Aundh: Aundh Publishing Trust, 1945). 
11
 Renuka Ray, “The All India Conference as a National Forum,” All India Women's Conference Souvenir: 
1927-1970 (New Delhi: All India Women’s Conference, 1971). 
12
 The question of what a good independence would look like was contentious. 
13
 Jyotsna G. Singh, Colonial Narratives/ Cultural Dialogues: “Discoveries” of India in the Language of 
Colonialism (London: Routledge, 1996), 155-157; Nizar Ahmed, “A Note on Gandhi, Nation and 
Modernity” Social Scientist 34, no. 5/6 (May/June 2000): 50-69. 
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The repetitions and requirements for reiteration of the fundamental unity of India 
originated from a deep insecurity about what could constitute unity in India. Although 
Indian anti-colonial leaders were not willing to agree with the British that India’s 
differences essentially disabled its ability to create a unified national identity, there could 
be no disputing that strong regional, religious, class, caste, and linguistic differences 
made it difficult to pinpoint the affect that described Indian unity. Additionally, political 
movements that attempted to represent the needs of various minority groups as separate 
from the “national” needs had gained popularity beginning in the 1930s and expanding in 
the 1940s, during the height of the anti-colonial movement. These “separatist” tendencies 
worried anti-colonial leaders, who were concerned that the fight for independence would 
be undermined by the multiplicity of agendas and descriptions of the nation. The crisis of 
unity was the fear that in the face of many national agendas, and without the constant 
recourse to the myth of eternal Indian unity, there would be nothing that particularly 
defined Indian unity. The push among minorities, attempting to define their role in 
national life, only exacerbated the crisis. 
The cause of rights for Untouchables and the recognition of India’s many 
languages were both singled out as important but potentially divisive causes. B.R. 
Ambedkar, the leader of the Untouchable political movement, began his campaign to 
redefine the Untouchables as a separate political concern from caste Hindus in the late 
1920s. By the 1940s, his claim of minority status for Untouchables—while generally 
bemoaned by the All India Congress Committee as a divisive move—was accepted, if 
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reluctantly, by most anti-colonial activists.14 As an important step to woo regional 
activists toward national anti-colonial agitation, the Congress Party organized its 
branches based on linguistic regions. Still, there were many anti-colonial leaders who 
feared that language would be an easy way to divide the country. Gandhi, among others, 
while accepting the idea of linguistic difference and local language traditions as an 
important organizing tool for politics, strongly supported Hindi/Urdu as a national 
language. The stated intention of naming Hindi/Urdu to be the national language 
alienated anti-colonial activists in the South, who felt that their own linguistic traditions 
were being sublimated to northern dominance.  
For the mainstream, especially Congress and the independence activists, the most 
troubling “separatist” movement was that of the All India Muslim League (AIML). The 
AIML had been arguing from very early in the anti-colonial struggle that mainstream 
nationalist agitations, which focused on Hindu signs and symbols, alienated Muslims as 
part of the definition of India. The moves by Hindu nationalist organizations associated 
with the mainstream National Congress Party, like the Hindu Mahasabha, to define 
Muslims as the “outsiders” added to the disconnect between Muslim anti-colonial 
activists and the nation they were fighting for. After a series of attempts to create 
safeguards for minority populations in Congress rhetoric throughout the 1920s and 30s, 
the AIML become more and more convinced that Indian Muslims needed to redefine 
                                                 
14
 Though not by Gandhi, who seemed to take as a personal affront the idea that untouchables were a 
separate group from Caste Hindus. 
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their relationship to Hindu India.15 At the 1940 Lahore meeting of the All India Muslim 
League AIML President Mohammad Ali Jinnah argued that, “The Mussalmans are not a 
minority. The Mussalmans are a nation by any definition.”16 The declaration of Indian 
Muslims as constituting a nation rather than a minority, and the subsequent push for a 
separate Muslim state of Pakistan undermined the concept of simple, fundamental Indian 
unity.17 
In one of the best discussions against the 1940s push for Indian unity, B.R 
Ambedkar’s Pakistan or the Partition of India, discusses the function of a national idea 
with respect to Indian unity.18 Specifically, following Ernest Renan, Ambedkar 
systematically dismantled the idea that India, as a single or indivisible nation, existed. 
Taking seriously Renan’s idea that a nation is structured by two things—a cache of 
common memories and “present-day consent, the desire to live together,”19 Ambedkar 
contended that no matter how much nationalists argued that India was united by specific 
cultural currency, nationally they were already divided by the Muslim demand for 
Pakistan. Ambedkar maintained that India had no common language, no common 
religion, only specious common geography, and encompassed several competing empires 
                                                 
15
 Some attempts, like the Lucknow pact, were relatively short-lived. By the 1930s the Presidential address 
at All India Muslim League conferences routinely addressed the problem of the Congress’s unwillingness 
to engage with the Muslim League as equals.  
16
 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement  (Lahore: Publishers 
United, 1970), 377. 
17
 There are many sources about Muslim politics in the 1940s. One of most well-regarded, is Ayesha Jalal, 
The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Press, 1994). In the book, Jalal convincingly argues that the AIML and Jinnah were not exactly 
agitating for Pakistan as it stands, but that in face of internal and external pressures were forced to adopt the 
British partition plan. 
18
 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India (Bombay: Thacker, 1946); Ernesto Renan “What 
is a Nation?” in Becoming National: A Reader, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny  (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 41-55 
19
 Renan, “What is a Nation?” 52. 
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and princely states. For this reason, India was a nation only insofar as the people involved 
desired it to be so, and the Muslim demand for Pakistan deemed their declared intention 
of being a nation to be already fulfilled. 
 In part, the concerns about Indian unity functioned as an effective rallying tool for 
anti-colonial activists trying to create a more effective argument against British colonial 
rule. Congress and its allies argued that British policies (like the census and land taxes) as 
well as British politics encouraged religious and regional groups to organize separately in 
order to more effectively negotiate with the government.20 Further, Congress, the 
majority party, argued that as Indians were granted limited voting rights in the 1920s and 
30s, the British took the chance to enact separate electorates and governmental quota 
systems that further encouraged religious and regional groups to organize for the purpose 
of vote banking.21 Congress argued that British policies were built to define people by 
their differences, so that various groups would be less likely to work together to fight 
against the British, a policy known as “divide and rule.” 
 Congress and other anti-colonial activists often cited divide-and-rule tactics to 
describe communal and regional disputes. It was an especially well-used argument 
against the claim, often made by the British, that any measure of peace in India was due 
                                                 
20
 Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); Cohn, “Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture,” in An 
Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 136-
171; Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1996). 
21
 Interestingly, while Congress complained vigorously about separate electorates and the harm they did to 
unity in India, they were careful not to criticize all of the British colonial states’ divisive practices. Most 
glaringly, they were careful not rail against the enactment of religion specific personal laws, probably 
because they were popular with their right-leaning Hindu constituency. 
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to the restraining and civilizing influence of British rule.22 For example, a December 19, 
1940 cartoon in the Hindustan Times depicts the then viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, arms 
outstretched, each hand holding a noose attached to a Hindu man on the left and a 
Muslim man on the right. On his arms is written the words, “divide and rule.” The 
caption to the cartoon is a quote from Lord Linlithgow, “we are entitled to claim, we do 
claim, and I claim today that it is for the Indian parties themselves; for those 
communities, interests, and political leaders concerned to get together and to see what 
they can do by way of reaching accommodation with one another.”23 The cartoonist was 
pointing to the hypocrisy of British officials who, while making it nearly impossible for 
communities to coordinate and unify, argued that based on continued communal mistrust 
India was not ready to be a unified and independent nation. Implicitly, the argument 
made by anti-colonial activists was that recognizing divide-and-rule tactics for what they 
were then allowed for “communities, interests, and political leaders” to put divisive 
colonial practices aside and affirm their commitment to Indian independence.24 
 The problem with this argument is two-fold. First, it suggested that the best 
chance to witness India unity was the fight for Independence, and second it assumed that 
because the British helped to manufacture and encourage separate life-worlds in 
communities, regions, and political affiliations of India, these differences were superficial 
                                                 
22
 R.J. Moore, “The Problem of Freedom with Unity: London’s India Policy, 1917-1947,” in Congress and 
the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle 1917-47, ed. D.A. Low (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
375-404; Dipesh Chakrabarty, “‘In the Name of Politics’: Democracy and the Power of the Multitude in 
India,” Public Culture 19, no. 1 (2007): 35- 57, esp 41-47. 
23
 “The Indian Axis at Work,” Hindustan Times, December 19, 1940, page 4. 
24
 “Dr. Khan Saheb on the Unity of India,” The Modern Review 75 no. 2 (1944): 95. For an interesting look 
at the idea of divide-and-rule in the African colonial context see Patricia Lorcin, “Imperialism, Colonial 
Identity, and Race in Algeria, 1830-1870: The Role of the French Medical Corp,” Isis 90, no. 4 (December 
1999): 653-679. 
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and ultimately scurrilous. The concern that the movement for Independence was the only 
way to effectively describe Indian unity was one of the major contributing factors to the 
“crisis of unity.” When independence failed to produce a clear vision of India as a unified 
nation, nationalist historians and politicians were forced to wrestle with the causes of this 
failure. The easy answer was that the failure to recognize Indian unity was the result of 
the after-effects of colonial domination. This claim, while certainly at least partially true, 
threatened to make any attempt to be more interested in minority political expression into 
a move that re-inscribed colonialism into the nation. That is, it defined minority 
nationalisms as fundamentally misguided and colonial. Because some Indian nationalist 
organizations, and especially Congress, could not think about ways that unity could be 
defined that allowed difference to be fundamental, has allowed the “crisis of unity” to 
continue as a national motif.25 
Democracy and Minority 
One of the problems with mainstream nationalistic articulations of Indian unity was they 
created a vision of Indian-ness that either failed to consider minority ideas of the nation, 
or failed to conceive of minorities in the national story. The historic view of Indian 
nationalism often started with Aryans, Sanskrit, and Vedic Hinduism, and ended with 
present-day India. In this vision, people living in the South, speaking non-Sanskrit 
derived languages, and non-Hindus just did not fit in the Indian imagery. Still, the 
nationalist movement tried to include these outliers as part of the rhetoric of the Indian 
nation by arguing that India had “diversity in unity.” The problem was that the nationalist 
                                                 
25
 There are still publications written every year reaffirming the fundamental unity of India. Including 
books like, Facets of Indian Unity (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965), that were 
written for the government. 
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vision of unity was a conflation between a fundamental homogeneity, though admittedly 
overlaid by diversity, and the idea of unity.26 In the Indian nationalist vision of the nation, 
minorities were Indians disguised as something else, but in the minority reading of these 
nationalist histories, minorities were “not-quite” Indians, defined as much by their ill-fit 
into the national story as by their commitment to the nation that story was supporting.27 
In a sense, the national minority could only be defined as “the remainder” of the Indian 
nation, part of the nation, but outside the nation’s own mythos.28 
Scholars have often recognized that nationalism constitutes exclusion and that this 
exclusion is often made in terms that are broadly recognized as “majority constitutive 
group” and “minority other.”29 This is certainly the most common way that Indian 
nationalism has been described. Focusing on contemporary (or historical) effusions of 
Hindu nationalism, scholars have pointed to the way that Indian-ness was prefaced on 
making the majority national.30 National identity is therefore often defined as “majority 
identity,” expansively defined. This is as much the case in India as elsewhere, and the 
Indian citizen continues to be imagined as northern, light-skinned, male, and caste 
                                                 
26
 Gyandendra Pandey, Remembering Partition, 154. 
27
 Madhava Prasad writes interestingly about the idea of commitment that allows a person to hold one 
position and think critically about it at the same time. Madhava Prasad, “On the Question of a Theory of 
(Third) World Literature,” in Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives, eds. 
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Hindu.31 Still this does not mean that men and women outside this picture were unable or 
uninterested in the project of building the nation that could include them more intimately. 
Minority attempts to create an Indian nation inclusive of minority identities were seen 
both in their rejection of the trite Indian unity and in the challenge to establish a 
democracy that was interested in unity defined by both minority and majority. 
The inability of Congress and other mainstream nationalist political organizations 
to imagine an Indian unity that did not relegate minorities to “not-quite” status promoted 
a rethinking of what kind of democracy would be suitable for the Indian context. The 
rethinking of democracy (the national political method of choice) to be more responsive 
to minorities’ call for responsibility promoted a columnist in the AIML newspaper 
Dawn’s minority corner column to ask, “is the Anglo-Saxon type of democracy suited to 
Indian conditions or not?”32 The column and the question were part of the larger 
conversation asking how could the Indian national ideal, and by extension the Indian 
national government, be expanded to accommodate national minorities. 
The questions of how majority and minority are defined with regard to religious 
and socio-economic status has long been a concern for those categorized as minor. The 
fight for independence saw many shifts in the way that the concept of minority was 
mobilized. The structure of minority often thought of as numerical or about statistics has 
several other valences, including the minor as child, the minor as unable to support or 
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represent itself, and the minor as less important.33 As Chakrabarty points out, “numerical 
advantage is by itself no guarantor of major/majority status.”34 The definition of majority 
in India was the ability to define the structure of national unity, and by extension, the 
identity of the nation. When considered this way, the structure of majority as 
representative and therefore defining, and minority as protected and defined by its 
relation to the majority, created a system whereby minority actors were either pushed to 
the margins of national life, or created strategies to define Indian unity differently. 
“All India” as a Description of Alternative Indian Unity 
One of the most intriguing phenomena of early twentieth century India was the 
flourishing of organizations named with the prefix “All India.” Not a momentary blip in 
the politics of naming, the “All India” prefix has remained a staple of Indian 
organizations attempting to assert their contribution to and assertion of Indian unity. In 
1941, The Hindu, one of the most well-respected moderate newspapers in India began to 
evaluate the year’s crop of new and recurring “All India” conferences as part of their 
January year in review.35 Less seriously, Pothan Joseph, the well-known editor of the 
Indian Express newspapers quipped that, “The Bombay police have been directed to 
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learn Hindi and discard English. They expect full cooperation from criminals, whose all-
India federation has given the assurance that they too will use only Hindi in their 
operations in the future.”36 Both of these examples show that the prefix “All India” was 
common, even to the point of being comical, but both also suggest a valence to the 
naming strategy that goes beyond mere familiarity. The article in The Hindu questions if 
something is “all,” how could there be so many different articulations of it. The Pothan 
Joseph quip, beyond the comical idea of the existence of a guild of criminals, suggests 
that the “All India” naming strategy was a common and important way to connect 
marginal and minority actors to the recognized actors of the nation. In the quote, the 
criminals, almost the archetypical marginal member of society, communicate to the 
Bombay police, the state actor, through their “All India” guild.  
In both of these ways the “All India” naming strategy was used to embrace 
differences that constituted India for those outside the majority. Specifically, the “All 
India” prefix indicated a commitment to the unity of India without giving in to the urge 
that would create that unity by smoothing over difference. That is the “All” in “All India” 
could indicate two contradictory ideas of unity, the first broadly expansive and the second 
exclusive. The more radical of these political assertions were often unspoken, or more 
commonly spoken only in the delineation of the kind of policies specific “All India” 
organizations supported as “All India” organizations. This dissertation explores the way 
that several of these “All India” organizations, especially in the midst of the final push for 
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independence, used their idea of the meaning of the “All India” in their name to commit 
to a kind of politics that argued for a more inclusive kind of unity not often thought with 
respect to scholarship on nationalism. 
As the crisis of unity began to be more pronounced in the 1930s, organizations 
began to preface in their mission statements, and anti-colonial activists in their speeches, 
the importance of pushing for a unified India. The “All India” ethos was part of this 
effort. “All India” as prefix suggested unity broadly while still privileging the main 
concern, Indian nationality. Perhaps the best articulation of the promise of “All India” 
politics was described by a fervent detractor of the idea of Indian unity (and the name all 
India itself.) In 1933, Choudhary Rahmat Ali published a pamphlet entitled “What Does 
the Pakistan National Movement Stand For?” in which he argued that the varied nations 
of South Asia had been unwittingly co-opted into what he calls “Indianism.” The main 
marker of the virulent Indianism was the “high-sounding title of ‘All India’.” More 
specifically, he argued that, “Now this preposterous prefix of ‘All-India’ [affixed] to the 
names of their organizations meant, if it meant anything at all, that though they were 
Muslims, Sikhs, or Rajpoots, yet they were all ‘Indians’.”37 Ali, imagining that inexpert 
groups had been duped into following the lead of the All India National Congress Party 
in their naming strategy, points out precisely the stakes involved in choosing the “All 
India” prefix. The name signaled a commitment to the idea of India that was added to the 
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already present commitment to the community or issue that the organization primarily 
addressed. In this sense, the “All” was a way for organizations to put aside criticisms of 
communalism or narrow particularity, while the “India” expressed both a national 
aspiration and a commitment to the future of the nation at work. Thus, “All India” named 
the commitment while the organizational suffix named the constituency. Together they 
offer insight on minority organizational politics, because they point to the attempt, often 
dismissed in the traditional national narrative, to include minority concerns in the 
negotiation of nationality and citizenship. 
For this reason, the “All India” prefix, when read against the grain, offered an 
acknowledgement of the tension between unity and minority in India. Minority is the 
“other” required for the construction of a majority, and the terms “minority” and 
“majority” within the context of the nation are often shorthand to define the complete 
picture of national identity.38 The problem with this structure in India is not only the 
preponderance of minority identities, or the shifting identification with these identities, 
but also that the failure to properly name the national minority creates a structure in 
which minority and unity, rather than minority and majority, are antonymic.39 In the 
Indian case, where many minorities were claiming a stake in the definition of the nation 
through the identification of their concerns as part of an “All India” movement, the stable 
footing on which Indian unity could be defined was questioned. The multitude of 
minority concerns pushed the majority to argue that majority and unity were 
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synonymous, and any attempt to defend minorities as an active partner in national 
negotiation was seen as an attempt to derail unity.  
Implicitly the problem was that minority demands for a good faith effort to 
include their voices in the negotiation of the national idea and governmental structure 
during the movement for national independence and directly afterward seemed to 
undermine the majority’s story of fundamental equivalences in the needs and desires of 
the entirety of the Indian population. Minority commitment to the nation and minority 
difference, as well as organizational attempts to actively define Indian-ness as inclusive 
of difference, fractured the uncomplicated national unity story that majority nationalism 
was trying to create. As the 1940s progressed, minorities were asked to commit either to 
nation and national unity as defined by the majority, or to remain a “non-national,” 
communal force. Many organizations chose to reiterate their commitment to both the 
nation through a redefinition of their “All India” prefix and the dedication to their 
constituency. 
 The commitment to the nation suggested by the “All India” prefix was not the 
same for each organization, nor did it indicate a sublimation of organizational policies 
and politics to the majority’s goals for the nation. Indeed, at the same time that the “All 
India” prefix indicated a commitment to the nation, it also indicated an argument for the 
meaningful inclusion of each party in the work of nation building. The “All” may have 
indicated that the group was incomplete without the nation, but it also argued 
compellingly that the nation could not be constructed without the groups represented by 
these “All India” organizations. Indeed Dhanvanti Rama Rau, the president of the All 
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India Women’s Conference (AIWC) in thinking about the All India commitment of her 
organization argued,  
Our Conference can guide not only our members, but women generally, to 
formulate views on matters of vital importance. At this critical time in our 
history with political freedom must come great changes in our economic and 
social life and the task of regeneration will fall on the shoulders of men and 
women alike. The majority of our women are so ignorant of the great currents of 
progress, that the work of educating them to accept the ideals of nationalism and 
internationalism, of social justice, economic and educational rights will fall on 
progressive organizations like the All India Women's Conference [which] will 
play an inspired part an awaken our women to their responsibilities so that they 
may help to overcome superstition and illiteracy and strive to contribute their 
share to the general rebuilding of our nation.40 
Rama Rau argued that while it was the AIWC’s responsibility to commit to the nation, 
the nation would be incomplete without the work of women for its prosperity. Moreover, 
for organizations like the AIWC, it was important to note that the responsibility to the 
nation was not wholly fulfilled by a responsible majority. The “All” for these minority 
organizations indicated an argument about the need to recognize themselves both as 
actors with responsibility (and not just rights) to nation. Thus, organizations like the All 
India Muslim League argued that they could speak to issues outside of the representation 
of Muslims, because their commitment to the nation included a commitment to 
safeguarding national spaces for minorities. In this sense, the idea of the “All” in the “All 
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India” naming strategy is always in excess of its ability to define an organization. The 
excessive “all” in some “All India” organizations’ names defines the organization and 
their national commitment, but only with the recognition that they remain an “all” among 
other “alls,” each with claims to India. 
Interestingly, the “All India” naming strategy was only available as description of 
Indian unity, defined simply or in a more complex way, in English. Any translation of the 
words “All India” into an Indian language automatically undermined the universal 
availability of the sentiment for the whole nation, as it made the organization’s name 
illegible to a large portion of the country. Even an organization devoted to a particular 
language, like the All India Hindi Sammelan, used the English words, “All India” in 
place of some Hindi language translation. Moreover, the decision that the translator 
makes to translate the very word “India” often gave a sense of the communal, regional, or 
political affiliations of that translation. As such, most “All India” organizations, when 
translating their name, attempted to incorporate the idea of their “All India” commitment 
while dropping the prefix. For example, All India Radio, when it decided to adopt a 
Hindi-language name, adopted from the radio network’s initials AIR to decide on the 
name Akashvani, meaning “airways” in Hindi. Other organizations, like the All India 
Progressive Writers Association, simply dropped the prefix altogether, choosing to expect 
that readers of Indian languages would be able to assume at least the “Indian” portion of 
the prefix, if not the “All.” In some ways, the “All India” naming strategy was only 
available because of the shared colonial history that made English the most common 
bridge language for India in the 1940s and 50s. As such it is important to remember that 
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the “All India” naming strategy, developed as much against the continued British colonial 
occupation as for assertions of Indian unity, works in large measure because it can 
imagine an “outside” to the unity defined by both the “All” and the “India” in the prefix. 
 The “All India” concept is significantly less straightforward than it gets credit for 
being. In part this is because the term “all” is both inclusionary and exclusionary 
depending on the terms of its use. “All” has this contradictory nature because it suggests 
something that is already completed. That is to say, “all” is inclusive because it gathers 
together everything of a sort, but “all” is also exclusive because it defines everything that 
fits as Self and every thing else as Other. When scholars have considered the ‘All’ (and 
only schematically) they have pointed to organizations like the All India Newspaper 
Editors’ Conference as an example of “all” politics that are functionally exclusive groups, 
and organizations like the All India National Congress Committee as groups that are 
functionally inclusive. The argument for this assumption is clear; the AINEC had an 
exclusionary membership policy that only allowed newspaper editors to join, whereas the 
All India National Congress Committee was available to anyone willing to pay a small 
fee.  
The All India National Congress Committee (AINCC), because of its 
comprehensive mission and expansive membership, saw themselves as able to define the 
meaning of national organizations for India, and to police the “All India” prefix. 
Jawaharlal Nehru argued that, “Whatever the shortcomings and errors of Congress might 
be it is in conception and even in practice a national movement… It is essential that there 
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be such an organization. There is no other.”41 His argument was that by presenting 
themselves as a universal, rather than particular advocacy group, AINCC was the only 
organization that was fully able to live the “All India” prefix. Indeed, the argument that 
the AINCC made is perhaps the most conventional (and in my view least compelling) 
way to understand the “All India” naming strategy. For Congress, the “All” in “All India” 
meant the whole nation in no uncertain terms. If organizations like the All India Muslim 
League had to wrestle with the name “All India” in light of exclusionary membership 
policies, the Congress had an open membership. If groups like the All India Rajput 
Conference had to define their all around a geographic restriction, Congress had branches 
open in every province. If groups like the All India Women’s Conference used their “All” 
to underline the centrality of minorities to the nation, the Congress merely pointed 
directly to the center of the independence movement. Still, it seems, if not fair, at least 
textually correct to point out that Nehru’s comments made the All India National 
Congress Committee’s “all” much more exclusionary than that of many other 
organizations.  
 The AINCC, often seen as the most inclusively national organization of any “All 
India” organization, also presented the most restrictive, and in some ways exclusive, 
vision of the national project defined by the “All India” prefix. For most other “All India” 
organizations the “All” was, by necessity, a commitment larger than themselves. For “All 
India” organizations like, for example, the All India Women’s Conference, there could be 
no doubt that their members were, at most, engaged in only a fragment of the national 
                                                 
41
 Jinnah- Nehru Correspondence including Gandhi-Jinnah and Nehru Nawab Ismail Correspondence 
(Lahore: Accurate Printers, 1948). In several letters, Nehru actively questioned the right of the All India 
Muslim League to use the prefix ‘All India’ because of their exclusive membership. 
  23 
vision of India. They neither wanted nor could envision a nation where women were the 
only people responsible for the rebuilding of the nation. The AINCC never framed their 
commitment to the nation in this way. Nehru’s statement that the Congress was the 
organization that ran the only national movement was not an isolated verbal spar. The 
AINCC did not have to be one of many national actors engaged in working alongside 
other groups who made commitments to the nation. Congress was the nation. Under their 
rubric, any group willing to be part of the nation should submit themselves to the 
Congress. Their “All” is the least difficult to decode, and their “India” is certainly the one 
which came out the victor in the drive to define the nation. This is not to say that 
Congress’s “All India” commitment was insincere or unproductive, but when compared 
to the meaning of all in some other organizations, theirs was less clearly a symptom of a 
radical rethinking of the structure and content of the nation.  
Therefore, it is important to read both the “All” and the “India” components in the 
“All India” prefix. For organizations functioning from the seat of the majority and the 
power that status brings, the “India” could act as a way to describe the organization itself. 
As I have argued with Congress, the “All India” in their name described their own vision 
of a nation. The vision was a wide-ranging one, anyone who wanted to be part of the 
Congress vision could hitch their wagon to the party, but Congress could not imagine or 
commit to an Indian nation in which its vision negotiated with (and sometimes lost to) 
competing Indian national plans. Because, in the mind of the majority, the “India” that 
followed the “All” in the All India Congress Committee defined the organization itself, 
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the “All” bounded acceptable visions and programs for the nation to those groups that 
function through or with Congress in some way.42  
 In contrast, the “India” in the “All India” of groups that functioned as minorities 
was key to describing their inclusive nationalism. The difference between the exclusivity 
of their constituency (for example Muslims) and the inclusivity of their prefix (“All 
India”) meant these organizations could only be, at best, a part of the Indian unity, and 
could not dictate its content or function. For these organizations the “All” described both 
“India” and the constituency, with the idea being that the All India Sikh League was an 
organization for “all” Sikhs and “All” of India. The Sikh population was no less a part of 
Indian unity for being Sikh. As such, these organizations, by their very commitment to 
interior and exterior unity, had to recognize and respond seriously other “All India” 
groups who claimed both difference and inclusion.  
 Indeed, the need to engage beyond their constituencies forced these organizations 
to ask pointed questions about whether liberal democracy, the type of democracy 
practiced in a country like England, was the best way to encourage Indian unity. They 
argued that their organizations, by their “All India” commitment, had the right to be 
considered in more than just an ancillary position. At the same time, their awareness of 
their own inability to create the “All India” that defined the whole of India caused several 
of these “All India” groups to propose new kinds of democratic politics in order to define 
unity along more broadly ideological lines. Some “All India” organizations couched their 
commitment to the nation as a focus on local action, while others suggested a democracy 
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was created not in the actual end result of legislation but in the commitment to constant 
negotiation based on a commitment to freedom and unity expansively defined. 
Underlying each of these attempts to redefine the nature of democracy was an argument 
about the way India, differently defined, could be reborn as “All India.” 
Chapter Outline 
My dissertation consists of case studies of four “All India” organizations, each with a 
different strategy for creating Indian unity without falling back on the more exclusionary 
majority unity defined by the AINCC. The first chapter, “Listening to the Nation: Local 
and National Valences of All India Radio,” focuses on the different strategies for running 
a unifying and nationalizing radio network taken by the two most influential early leaders 
of Indian radio, A.S. Bokhari, director from 1940-1946 and B.V. Keskar, director from 
1950-1962. In this chapter, I argue that Bokhari succeeded in making the radio a 
successful national asset by encouraging local production and transmission of radio 
content and by focusing on a dispersed or locally determined Indian unity. When Keskar 
took over the running of All India Radio, he began focusing on centralizing radio 
production and content, broadcasting a directed or centrally determined Indian unity. The 
move from promoting a local vision of national identity to using radio to define the ideal 
Indian identity transformed All India Radio from a dynamic national resource to a radio 
network that came across as governmental and pedantic. 
 In “National Unity, Freedom of the Press, and All India Organizing: The Rise and 
Fall of the All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference,” my second chapter, I follow the 
founding and eventual loss of power of the All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference 
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(AINEC). The AINEC was founded in 1940 by Indian newspaper editors to fight against 
escalating attempts by the British colonial government to censor Indian news about 
World War II and the anti-colonial movement. The AINEC saw itself as pivotal to the 
fight for Indian national ideals, emphasizing the news media’s role as representing the 
nation, its citizens, and India’s national unity. In an effort to define Indian and 
organizational unity in a way that included any newspaper editor who wanted to join, the 
AINEC defined unity on the basis of a single shared ideological position in favor of 
freedom of the press. This position allowed the AINEC to make representational claims 
on behalf of the entire newspaper industry while welcoming the expression of dissent 
from organizational action. At the same time, the AINEC argued that in order to represent 
the newspaper industry to the government in negotiations, they needed the illusion of 
unanimous intent on behalf of the whole organization, or unity defined as unanimity. My 
chapter follows the organization as it negotiates these two contradictory definitions of 
Indian unity. 
 The third chapter, “An All India Organization for All Indian Women: The All 
India Women’s Conference and Federated Unity,” considers the All India Women’s 
Conference’s (AIWC) definition of “All India” as separate from local and national 
conceptions of Indian womanhood. In the first decade after its founding in 1927, the 
AIWC focused on building an “All India” organization on the basis of being an umbrella 
association for already-established women’s groups. The AIWC’s goal was to bring 
national focus to local women as active participants in the attempt to create and 
reconstruct an independent India. Yet from 1939, the AIWC began shifting both its focus 
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and organizational structure to accommodate an agenda almost solely focused on national 
legislative goals to provide government safeguard protections for women and away from 
the spotlighting of local women workers as active national citizens. 
 In the final chapter, “The Unmade Nations of the All India Progressive Writers’ 
Association,” I explore the All India Progressive Writers’ Association’s (AIPWA) 
commitment to a vision of national unity told through the voices of the many 
unrecognized Indians. Using the writing of three prominent writers associated with the 
AIPWA--Premchand, Ahmed Ali, and Krishan Chander--I argue that the writers of the 
AIPWA, though often decried as foreign and anti-national, were arguing for a completely 
reconstructed Indian government that was more interested in recognizing and including 
its substantial minority populations. The AIPWA’s literary power was hurt significantly 
by Partition in 1947 and the consolidation of Indian governmental ideas of “nationhood,” 
but the critiques that the group made of the Indian government still resonate with authors 
and activists in India today. 
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Chapter 1: Listening to the Nation: Local and National Valences of All India Radio 
Man: To tell you the truth, I never much cared for the “Indian State Broadcasting 
Service.” Long-winded and pompous, wasn’t it? 43 
 
In 1936, radio in India underwent a sea change, when Director General Lionel 
Fielden convinced the Indian viceroy to change the name of radio network from 
the stodgy Indian State Broadcasting Service to All India Radio or AIR.44 The 
above quote is from a radio play broadcast on All India Radio in 1961 as a part of 
a retrospective on the history and the importance of All India Radio in creating and 
spreading the new idea of the nation. It is not a coincidence that the changing of 
this radio network’s name was  deemed important enough to be part of the radio 
retrospective  alongside nationalizing radio moments, like Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
“Tryst with Destiny” speech that broadcast over All India Radio at midnight on 
August 15, 1947, upon India’s Independence.  
Radio in India has been pivotal to the national experience since the mid-
1930s. The new name, All India Radio, pointed subtly to the kind of influence 
radio had in defining the nation, both before and after Independence. The state 
wanted the network to help create and reinforce an idea of the unified Indian 
nation. Changing the name from “Indian State” to “All India” drew upon the 
associated meanings of the well-used “All India” naming strategy. Drawing on the 
idea of a nation defined by its unity, as the “All India” name did, freed the radio, if 
                                                 
43
 Radio play discussing the name change, as quoted in K.S. Mullick, Tangled Tapes: The Inside Story of 
Indian Broadcasting (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, Pvt Ltd., 1974), 15. 
44
 Lionel Fielden, Natural Bent (London: Andre Deutsch, 1960), 193. For more on Lionel Fielden and his 
role as the first director of All India Radio see Joselyn Zivin, “‘Bent’: A Colonial Subversive and Indian 
Broadcasting,” Past and Present 162 (1999): 195-220. 
  29 
only in nomenclature, from association with strict governmental controls on 
content and ideas. From its beginnings in 1927, radio in India was promoted as a 
technology that could reach Indians from all classes and provide information and 
education even to Indians who were illiterate. Changing the name from the 
technical sounding “Broadcasting” to “Radio,” a word already common in a 
variety of Indian languages, emphasized the “common” nature of the network.45 
Finally, the new acronym of the radio network, AIR, aside from being catchy, 
suggested that radio was something that flowed across the whole nation--much like 
the air.  
Although these three characteristics of the name All India Radio are key to 
understanding both its role as a governmental body and its use as a tool to create 
national unity, the radio network’s negotiation of unity and difference within the 
Indian national identity was shaped by the two most important of Fielden’s early 
successors. All India Radio’s directorship changed hands three times between 1940 
and 1961. In 1940, Lionel Fielden returned to England, and his second in 
command, A.S. Bokhari, took over the organization. Bokhari led AIR until just 
before independence, late in 1946. Bokhari left the network amid unfounded 
concerns about whether his status as a Muslim would taint his loyalty to India, 
given the immanent founding of Pakistan.46 After a brief tenure by Sardar 
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Vallabhai Patel, B.V. Keskar took over the directorship of All India Radio and the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in 1950. While all the directors brought 
some notable changes in the philosophy of how to best present India to itself, the 
most significant shift was between the leadership of Bokhari and that of Keskar. 
Although Bokhari and Keskar both believed in the same set of goals for 
broadcasting success—growth and the establishment of national identity, education 
and entertainment through quality programming, and the creation of a network that 
could fundamentally reach Indian citizens—their definitions of these concepts 
were very different. Moreover, these divergences in the definitions of the concepts 
that defined AIR, led the radio network to promote wildly different policies on 
issues of unity and identity under the leadership of Bokhari and Keskar. 
Bokhari, who was in charge of AIR during the final push for Indian 
independence when even nationalist organization disagreed about what Indian 
identity might mean, imagined an Indian unity that was regionally and locally 
defined. Bokhari attempted to define the idea of Indian unity as something that 
could be articulated differently depending on regional, religious, caste, class, and 
gender identities.47 That is, that national unity could be built and bolstered by a 
widely dispersed idea of the nation, defined as much by regional, class, and caste 
difference as by centrally broadcasted national ideas. Although Bokhari’s 
administration was far from perfectly addressing difference in the nation, it 
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supported policies that proposed the unifying proprieties of All India Radio as 
defined by its engagement with people on their own terms, within the specific 
binds of war, imperial policy, and technological problems.  
After Bokhari was pushed out in 1946, India’s political climate changed 
significantly. The implementation of the Indian constitution in January 1950, as 
well as internal struggles in Hyderabad, Kashmir, and the Northeast, prompted a 
more rigid interpretation of what India was, which limited the expression of 
difference as an acceptable nationalist position. The limits were in part a reaction 
to the failure of Indian unity to materialize upon independence. For this reason, 
Keskar, as the leader of AIR from 1950 until the mid-60s, emphasized a centrally-
directed vision of the nation. For Keskar, the best way to create a unified national 
identity was to broadcast a centralized vision of the ideal India. By minimizing the 
effect of regional, class, caste, and gendered ideas of the nation, Keskar’s policies 
followed up on the idea of Indian unity as based on a fundamental sameness.48  
The difference between promoting a dispersed idea of national unity whose 
goal was to encourage active citizenship as advocated by Bokhari, and promoting a 
directed vision of nation unity whose goal was a singular idea of India as 
advocated by Keskar, led All India Radio to shift from a dynamic and successful 
national radio network into a network often seen as overly governmental and 
stagnant. I will begin this chapter with a brief discussion of A.S. Bokhari and B.V. 
Keskar, and the main differences in their outlook. Focusing on the idea of “All 
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India” as a defining characteristic of the national radio network, the second section 
will show how Bokhari and Keskar’s policies on the production and dissemination 
of nationalizing messages differed. The third section will talk about the dynamics 
of language and the common good, as captured in the name change from 
broadcasting to radio. 
Bokhari and Keskar 
The difference between Bokhari’s and Keskar’s approaches to producing radio for 
India could be attributed in part to when they directed AIR and the way they were 
identified religiously. Bokhari, who became the director of AIR at the beginning of 
WWII, had to work with the imperial government as they stepped up their 
censorship of broadcasts, especially of news, while demanding more government 
air time and propaganda to fight German and Japanese broadcasts from already 
taxed technological resources.49 As a result, Bokhari was forced to invent ways to 
broadcast messages to as many people as possible without losing credibility 
because of the obvious censoring of news related to the anti-colonial movement. 
To tackle this problem, Bokhari suggested a number of interventions, both in terms 
of technology and programming, to bring in new listeners to AIR. Bokhari pushed 
for wider access, advocating a scheme of installing many medium-wave 
transmitters in regional centers to reach more people across the country. He also 
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pushed for the installation of community-based listening stations, even suggesting 
that AIR should set up public loudspeakers for radio in villages and small towns.50 
With regard to programming, Bokhari suggested a wide variety of specialty 
programs to appeal to specific audiences, as well as increased broadcasting in 
regional and local languages. Additionally, Bokhari suggested that each station 
should be able to direct their own schedules and create their own programming to 
better appeal to the local interests and constituencies and include more people in 
the radio project. 
Bokhari, as an upper-class, educated Muslim, did not fit the mold of the 
“idealized” Indian to which Indian nationalist leaders often obliquely referred.51 As 
such, Bokhari may have been less susceptible to the rhetoric that suggested that 
there was a single, fundamental characteristic that defined Indian unity. Certainly, 
Bokhari’s suggestions on the running of the AIR network pointed to a more 
dispersed understanding of the national identity that was inherent in radio 
production. Bokhari advocated for more regional, and even local, control of 
broadcasting:  including news, music, and feature programs.  
In his lectures on radio in India during colonial rule, Partha Sarathi Gupta 
argued that British civil servants in India showed their resistance to Indian unity by 
“pinn[ing] their hopes on the provincialization of the Indian polity,”52 against the 
possibility of radio programming that strengthened national unity. But the structure 
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of Bokhari’s AIR did not encourage the kind of provincialism that undermined a 
potential national unity. For Bokhari, local and regional radio production were 
both marked as part of the national dialogue precisely because they were both 
produced under the broad rhetoric of All India Radio.53 This idea of dispersed 
unity suggested that the network itself parlayed national identity onto regional 
production. With dispersed unity, the content of national identity was variable and 
negotiated but the effect of national identification was felt from place to place.  
B.V. Keskar, who became the Minister of Information and Broadcasting in 
1950, came into his post at All India Radio at a significantly different time—
joining after the end of World War II and Indian Independence—and from a 
significantly different subject position as an upper-class, Brahman scholar of 
music. Unlike Bokhari, Keskar was the image of the ideal Indian, wealthy, 
educated, upper-caste, and male. Though hitting on the same main goals as 
Keskar--nationalization, education and entertainment, and building a radio network 
that reached out to a large audience—Keskar saw AIR’s mission as defining and, 
in some cases, creating a single national system of politics and culture directed by 
the government. In forwarding his mission, Keskar railed against both foreign 
influence and provincial difference in Indian broadcasting.  
Arguing that it was AIR’s duty to work for unity across the country, Keskar 
was particularly active in promoting “national” programming, especially in the 
areas of news and music. One of the highlights of Keskar’s push for a centrally-
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defined Indian unity was the creation of the National Programmes of Music, Talks, 
Plays, and Features. The National Programmes were all produced in Delhi and 
were mandatory for all AIR stations to rebroadcast. Keskar is also notorious for his 
crack down on “perverted” forms of Indian music, specifically popular music from 
Hindi films. These moves, along with attempts to centralize news and language, 
were aimed at the creation of a single idea of the nation and the idealized Indian 
citizen that would trump or at least override regional, religious, class, or caste 
identities. 
Keskar argued that centralizing content reminded listeners of the single 
idea of unity at the core of a diverse nation. He wrote, talking about the systems of 
music in India, that “in a big country like India, the development of difference is 
natural and does not, in any way, indicate a difference in the basic concept.”54 
Keskar’s management of AIR strived to make central the “basic concept” that 
belied the depth of difference. The effect of post-independence policies of AIR 
was to associate the network with a rigidly governmental point of view. In 1954, 
on a speaking tour of the country to promote AIR, Keskar was consistently called 
on to defend AIR against charges that the variety and quality of programming had 
declined during his tenure.55  
All India Radio: Defining Nationalizing Characteristics of Radio 
Woman: Well, perhaps it was. But why “All India Radio”? They don’t say “All 
British Broadcasting Corporation” do they? 
Man: No, they don’t. And that is precisely why we should. Ours is not just a 
country, it’s almost a continent. Think of the scores of languages… and 
                                                 
54
 B.V. Keskar, Indian Music: Problems and Prospects (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1967), 13. 
55
 “Keskar Answers Critics,” The Hindu, April 9, 1954. 
  36 
countless regional and local traditions. Unless our broadcasting system is truly 
All India in character and outlook…56 
 
This segment of the 1961 radio retrospective on the changing of the name of 
Indian radio from the Indian State Broadcasting Service to All India Radio offers 
one of the most explicit discussions of why the “All India” naming strategy was an 
effective nationalizing tool. The argument hinges on two issues: first, that India, 
with its diverse and far-flung population, required a different unifying outlook than 
the British concerns; and second, and perhaps more significant, India, which was 
looking to create a new nation out of said diversity, required a more democratic 
acceptance of national institutions than did Britain, which had been well 
established as a unified nation.57  The renaming of the Indian State Broadcasting 
Service to All India Radio also represented a shift from an organization whose 
funding, governmental status, and mission were similar to the contemporary gold-
standard for national broadcasting services, the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC), to an organization that was better suited to the nascent national identity of 
the Indian subcontinent. Although some changes in the way the organization was 
funded and operated were made before the name change, the name change signaled 
AIR as a different kind of operation from the BBC.58 Specifically, as the quote 
from the radio play suggests, if it were to accomplish any of its goals, radio in 
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India needed to at least think about circumstances particular to the widely-
articulated Indian situation.59 Despite its circumscribed listener base and 
technology, All India Radio was a nationalizing project. Referencing the 
inclusiveness of the Indian ideal of radio and the variety that the “All India” 
naming strategy often encompassed suggested both a desire for unity and the kind 
of work (both figural and actual) that was actually needed to articulate the Indian 
nation as such. 
All India Radio worked as a nationalizing service both in terms of its 
attempts to unify the nation with an all-encompassing radio feed available across 
the nation and in terms of the way people imagined various parts of the nation. 
Even though the radio was unavailable in much of the nation, as it only 
broadcasted in certain areas, the “All India” name was based on a desire to make 
the nation audible to itself. This is perhaps best articulated by the talks given about 
the parts of the nation where broadcasting was not yet available. In one memorable 
radio talk, the lecturer expounded on the beauty and history of the Andaman 
Islands, which did not have an AIR feed for more than five years after the 
broadcast.60 Other programs featured folk music from parts of India still 
considered distant from the main cultural idea of India. In the early years of the 
service, much of the folk music put on the air was almost exclusively taken from 
marginalized and minor communities. Despite not having radio lectures about the 
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Northeast until around the time of the China war in 1962, at least a tenth of folk 
music programs featured tribal music from the northeastern state of Assam. 
Obviously, making the peripheral regions of the nation into folk or primitive places 
was problematic; but even as these programs shifted the folk traditions into the role 
of the other, they made a point of labeling them the national other, something that 
needed to be articulated into a national understanding of itself.  
It is interesting that the above quote, which mentions vast spaces, a large 
variety of linguistic traditions, and a wide array of regional and cultural traditions, 
seems more like an argument for the eventual disunity than the unity of Indian 
nation. The direct contrast to the British colonial way of doing things was to speak 
about difference without reconciling it. The radio, according to the quote, was not 
available to make the nation into something smaller or less broad but rather to 
recognize the difficulties in the nation. The ellipse that ends this section of the 
radio play, the purposeful marrying of the threat, “unless,” to the absence of 
utterable consequence, is telling. It seems to indicate if the radio is not somehow 
nationalizing—not in some meaningful way “All India”—then AIR is not Indian at 
all. More troubling is that the tantalizing ellipse encapsulates the vagueness of the 
goal of being “truly All Indian.” Beyond recognizing the unconventionality of the 
Indian nation, whose main characteristic is its defiance of defining characteristics 
of a nation, what kind of actions would or could be put forward to prove All India 
Radio’s “truly” unifying character? For the proponents of early national radio 
services, including both Bokhari and Keskar, a major goal of the radio, as a non-
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literacy dependent medium, had to be the transmitting of nation to its citizens.61 
The question that the radio play poses is, “what defines the ‘All’ in All India 
Radio?” Bokhari and Keskar offered different visions of the “All.” Bokhari 
suggested, within his constraints, that the “All” posed a challenge for radio to 
embrace each listener on his own terms, so that the whole network became 
nationalizing because of its widely divergent scope. Keskar saw the “All” as a 
chance to define and transmit the nation in a way that was limited to his ideal of 
what India should be. 
When A.S. Bokhari became the director-general of AIR in 1940, mere 
months after the Indian government was named as a combatant in World War II, 
the radio network was at a turning point. In order to begin rethinking the 
nationalizing purpose of AIR, Bokhari needed to reconsider the issues of structure, 
funding, and content. Structurally, the colonial government had named the central 
government functions of the radio network as a governmental concern, while it 
defined AIR stations across the country as commercial concerns. While the 
separation was made primarily for a budgeting reason, defining the work of the 
center as governmental and therefore worthy of funding had the collateral effect of 
making regional radio, even under the name of AIR, less of a national endeavor. 
Bokhari’s ideas about national radio required that both the central administration 
of AIR and the regional and local stations be defined by their All India 
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connections. To this aim, Bokhari claimed that regional centers and stations, 
especially if they were expected to broadcast “national” news, needed to be 
respected as national assets and funded as such.  
The funding question was tied into the designation of the AIR network and 
AIR stations as national. In 1927, when the government took over the funding of 
radio broadcasting in India, it was stated that the budget would largely come from 
three sources:  customs duties on radio sets paid by the importer, licensing fees 
from the consumer of radio, and advertisements in the several radio journals.62 The 
problem with this funding scheme was that, even together, these three sources 
were not able to fund AIR operations entirely or to allow the number of stations to 
expand. This was in large measure because of the expense to the consumer of 
“free” national radio. Bokhari and many other radio commentators complained that 
between the customs duty for the import of radio sets and the licensing fees, even 
the “cheap” radio units were a luxury beyond most consumers beside the 
wealthy.63 Despite the inevitable shortfall, at the outset of World War II the 
government began to demand an expansion of broadcasting services from AIR. 
During WWII, AIR broadcasts were considered important propaganda tools for the 
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Allies against the strong broadcasts of Axis powers into China, Afghanistan, and 
the Middle East,64 as well as a tool to counter the pull of internal Indian protests 
against the war.65 
AIR used this increased demand for programming on the station to claim 
that, “the out break of the war has emphasized the view that AIR's activities form 
part of the essential idea of Government. As an important organ of publicity the 
All India Radio is undoubtedly making a considerable contribution to India’s war 
effort,” and therefore was a government service in need of funding separate from 
its commercial products.66 Still, the government claimed that the parts of AIR that 
were a “governmental” service did not include programming that did not serve the 
government’s propaganda needs. But, if, as was initially described, the AIR 
network’s mandate was to be a national and nationalizing service, the content of 
the service needed to go beyond merely centrally-produced propaganda programs. 
This meant committing to funding for both local stations integral to the 
government network and non-war related content that encouraged people to listen 
to the radio. 
 The fight over the funding of All India Radio was entangled in the 
discussion about the content appropriate to the network. In 1941, Bokhari 
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admonished that viewing every program that was not war propaganda as purely 
entertainment was clearly faulty. He wrote that entertainment was,  
only one side of the activities of this department. AIR is also a social 
service insomuch as rural uplift items form an important part of the daily 
programming of all stations of All India Radio. Then there are educational, 
women's and children's programmes which are instructional items.67  
 
The fear among AIR supporters was that, once the war ended, the idea of AIR as 
government service, controversial even during the war, would be undermined. 
Because the government’s budget through the end of 1945 was set before the end 
of the war, and the budget for 1946 was defined by an Indian-elected parliament 
more interested than the colonial government in the nationalizing potential of 
radio, the eventual drastic slash in AIR’s budget did not happen at that time. Still, 
this threat of a precipitous drop in funding for AIR activities once the network was 
presumed to return to “mere entertainment” helped to define the very concept of 
AIR that Bokhari was trying to propagate. Specifically, Bokhari posited that AIR 
should be building its network and stations to include more people, both passively 
as listeners and actively as broadcasters.  
 By focusing on programming that people could produce, understand, and 
receive, Bokhari was attempting to include Indians in the nationalization of the 
radio. The argument was that AIR’s national status would be confirmed by the 
connective strand of people being able to listen and engage with a national 
network through their regionally-directed stations, whose content was radically 
different, as was needed across the country.  The term network, which allowed for 
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all the different AIR sites (including the centrally produced journals) to be equally 
national in scope despite widely divergent regional programming, was a powerful 
structuring concept for AIR’s post-war regionally-based focus. G.C. Awasthy has 
argued that during the Bokhari era, All India Radio emphasized a plan of 
increasing the number of short and medium wave transmitters across the country, 
in order that AIR would be able to open regional and sub-regional stations that 
would effectively produce their own locally targeted programs. Ideally, the station 
strategy would cover each separate “cultural” and linguistic zone, allowing for a 
strong diversity of programs.68 These stations would also be available to 
rebroadcast national programs and news from the central AIR feed.  
 The push for regionally and sub-regionally produced programming and 
local audience surveys also included a push for creating a broadcasting culture that 
emphasized community-broadcasting and community-listening as national 
activities. Indeed, some of the suggestions for broadcasting enhancements in the 
1940s, particularly community listening stations and regular out of studio 
recording, are being reintroduced by community radio activists in India at present 
as schemes that would bring communication and global technology into wider 
local use.69 The key to a regionally-determined nationalizing network was having 
active listeners, who both listened and through their habits, if not their expertise, 
directed station content. With this idea as a starting point, the problem of the 
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expense of both transmitters and receivers became paramount to implementing 
Bokhari’s nationalizing vision. 
Bokhari suggested that, without producing cheaper technology, the middle 
and lower classes in the cities would have a hard time listening to broadcasts. 
Moreover, without supporting and producing community listening devices in rural 
areas and short-wave transmitters across rural India, several large communities 
would not be served at all. In a report of a 1940 trip for the external service to view 
Afghani radio consumption, Bokhari described the experience of viewing a 
community listening post and produced sketches and technical schematics of the 
device. He claimed that the whole time he was in Afghanistan, listening posts like 
the one he saw in Kabul and gatherings in public places like stores and restaurants 
meant that he “never missed our Hindustani and English news bulletins.”70 
Although the main point of the report was to emphasize the success of the external 
service in Afghanistan, the most fervent portions of the report were Bokhari’s 
determination that AIR should be primarily investing in the production of 
programs and technologies that promoted a wider audience. In the end of the 
section on community listening, Bokhari argued that, for the good of the Indian 
nation, the state should be most interested in “introduc[ing] free community 
broadcasting on a large scale.”71 The problem with community listening was 
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financing; there was no good way to levy the licensing fees or the import fees on 
community and public listening devices.72  
 In 1945, with the war ending and Indian independence contemplated by 
both anti-colonial activists and colonial governors, the interim Indian government 
in connection with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, asked AIR to 
layout a plan for radio broadcasting after independence. Freed from the constraints 
of spending for war propaganda, and with the implied promise that independent 
India would be more willing to fund national radio, Bokhari widened his rhetoric 
about the best way to make AIR more of a national broadcasting network. His 
approach was to expand access in terms of transmissions and languages while 
promoting local content variety. The implicit argument was that for Indian radio to 
be effective as a tool for the nation, it needed to be something that was available 
widely, both in terms of technological and content availability; that is, the network 
worked as a nationalizing tool best when the ability to conceive the nation was 
dispersed among the populace rather than directed by the center. 
 Based on the idea of a dispersed national identity, Bokhari’s final plan, 
called Basic Plan for Post-War Development of Broadcasting in India, 
conceptualized a wider definition of AIR content. The first sentence of the 
published plan reflected this focus. Bokhari wrote, “the object of this 
memorandum is to formulate a scheme by which every person in India, wherever 
                                                 
72
 The government, in thinking about the problems associated with supporting these kinds of listening 
strategies, pointed out that ad hoc community listening, where several households chipped in to acquire a 
set and listened to programs together meant that far more people listened to AIR broadcasts than subsidized 
them. In the end the colonial government refused to increase AIR’s budget during the war to include and 
promote these communal listening strategies. 
  46 
he is situated, is provided with a broadcast programme in his own language, and 
one moreover, which he can pick up even with an inexpensive receiver.”73 The 
memorandum declared that AIR could only work as a network that could help the 
government define independent India, its rights and duties, and its national 
character by giving each person an opportunity to engage with these difficult new 
concepts on their own terms and in their own language. Moreover, Bokhari pointed 
out that, without making the means of listening (receivers) available at prices that 
were attainable, even if not easily attainable, then whether or not the content was 
accessible, listening would never be an accessible action. Additionally, Bokhari 
claimed that making the means of transmitting (stations) accessible widely would 
increase both the content and the revenue stream from that content.  
Two different categories of objections were made against Bokhari’s plan:  
fiscal and ideological. The fiscal problem seemed somewhat insurmountable. 
Despite a clear commitment toward funding radio at a higher rate, making radio 
available to every person in India on his own terms would have been 
unmanageably expensive. Moreover, critics of Bokhari’s plan, most notably Sardar 
Patel who took over the director-general position of AIR in 1947, pointed out that 
attempting to fund universal listening would inevitably take away from producing 
more and higher quality programs for the largest and most important populations. 
Although the AIR report offered several possible schemes to raise money, 
including a national tax and funding from regional areas, the change in leadership 
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and in focus of the AIR network shortly after the Basic Plan’s publication meant 
that none of the suggestions were tried.  
The ideological objection was more emblematic of the problem for AIR as 
a nationalizing system. In the 1946 report, Bokhari argued that the programming 
produced by the central AIR network in Delhi should be on equal—or near 
equal—footing with content produced in regional centers, as both were integral 
parts of the AIR network. The plan proposed a system of increasingly local centers 
of operations for AIR broadcasting, suggesting that once these centers were in 
place, more responsibility for programs and news should be shifted to local radio 
producers.  
The change would be most significant in the way that news was chosen, 
translated, and produced for AIR. In 1939, when the colonial government used the 
Defense of India Rules to institute stricter pre-censorship rules on newspapers, 
censorship of the news on AIR stations was also increasingly monitored.74 The war 
forced much of AIR news to be chosen by the center for the purpose of 
censorship.75 Because it was easier to judge importance and effect of national news 
stories, the colonial government insisted on a news procedure that preferred 
national and international news to regional and local news and that put the onus of 
selection and translation of news stories on the central AIR station. Bokhari wrote 
that, under the proposed new news system, given the possibility of operating a  
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large number of zone, local, and rural centres (…) the present system of 
news dissemination whereby service is contained almost entirely of news 
of all-India importance, will be unrealistic and unsatisfying. (...) News 
service will therefore have to be arranged at three different levels: (a) all-
India, (b) zonal, and (c) local.76 
 
With the production of news and of programming made significantly more local, 
more people would be able to participate in what was, by its very name, an  
“All India” concern. More importantly, including all the levels of news, all-India, 
zonal (regional), and local news in an All India Radio bulletin signaled that 
regional and local news, and by extension regional and local concerns, were 
clearly delineated as All Indian. The change would have empowered communities, 
even minority communities, to help to define India by defining the sound of All 
India Radio. 
 The 1946 Basic Plan for Post-War Development of Broadcasting in India 
was never implemented. On September 2, 1946, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was 
given the Minister of Information and Broadcasting Portfolio. Patel’s and 
Bokhari’s views about India and the role of AIR were radically different. In 
addition to holding different ideas about the role of national radio, Patel thought 
that Bokhari, a Muslim, was dangerous and less than sufficiently Indian.77 Indeed, 
the fact that Patel felt that the content and culture of AIR’s general offices were too 
focused on minority identities to be Indian suggests that an organization with a 
plan to empower minorities and regional communities would be untenable under 
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his direction. For Patel, the idea of making the network more local undermined the 
goal of telling the nation what it was, and what it should become. Patel argued that 
“pandering” to minority concerns (broadly defined) took time and money away 
from examining the fundamental (read majority) quality of the Indian nation. Both 
Bokhari’s plans and A.S. Bokhari himself were no longer employed at All India 
Radio by the time an independent India was established. 
 Patel made several changes in the hierarchy of AIR that set up the changes 
that B.V. Keskar would later make when he became the Minister of Information 
and Broadcasting in 1950. One of the first things that Patel did upon being made 
Minister of Information and Broadcasting was to declare that any “persons whose 
private life was a public scandal should not be allowed to broadcast.”78 The rule 
was targeted at dancing girls and courtesans, many of whom were Muslim women. 
These broadcasters were some of the first and most successful local performers for 
AIR. When the radio began broadcasting locally, from Delhi and Lucknow 
especially, the station-masters looked toward the local community’s performers to 
fill the music performance time. In several places, some of the most popular and 
able performers were courtesans, who were often extremely well-trained in singing 
and dance.79 Some of the rationale for attempting to eject these women from the 
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radio was that All India Radio and its programmes represented India to itself; and 
as such, the network had to police the kind of people involved with its efforts. The 
idea that the network presented an ideal and authentic Indian voice to the Indian 
public suggests a change in the culture at AIR; it now emphasized directed 
nationalizing efforts rather than the dispersed efforts to create a national network 
under Bokhari. Bokhari had strived to make AIR as accessible to as many Indians 
as possible, even if this meant the overrepresentation of some minorities. For Patel, 
and even more so for Keskar, the goal was to broadcast the idea of India that they 
wanted to instill, even if it meant alienating large segments of the Indian listening 
public. 
 Perhaps because he had several important ministerial profiles including 
Home Minister in addition to his appointment to the post of the Minister of 
Information and Broadcasting, Patel was unable to spend much time on 
broadcasting, with the exception of the rule discussed above. The real changes in 
the AIR culture came with the death of Patel and the appointment of B.V. Keskar 
to the post of Minister of Information and Broadcasting in 1950. As Bokhari had 
been, Keskar was fully convinced of the role that the radio, and especially music 
on the radio, could have in producing and protecting Indian unity and culture. But 
Keskar saw All Indian Radio as a chance to strip what he saw as inauthentic and 
un-Indian elements from the public perception of the nation.80 His policies seemed 
to argue that giving regional and sub-regional stations the ability to make decisions 
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about programming, news, and listening, ran the risk of “destroy[ing] the country’s 
culture and polity.”81 Unlike AIR’s vision under Bokhari, which attempted to make 
all Indian cultures national by allowing them to express Indianness as they lived it, 
Keskar saw the AIR mandate for nationalization to mean creating and broadcasting 
a unified and idealized vision of Indian culture. Keskar was looking to direct 
public opinion about the nation and define the role of an ideal Indian citizen. 
 For this reason, Keskar tried to put more of the programming and news in 
the hands of the central radio administration, or, failing that, in some standardized 
format that gave the central government some control over the way that the nation 
was articulated. He did this by creating a series of four “National Programmes” in 
each of the main areas of AIR programming, music, talks, plays, and features. In 
order to better control the kind of performers local and regional AIR stations 
invited to broadcast, Keskar’s AIR also created a national audition system to 
standardize desirable local talent and wrote rules about what could be classified as 
Indian music and regional music for performances. Finally, he came to a 
“compromise” with stations asking for more regional and local autonomy in news 
production. After trying to keep news production and distribution as a function of 
the central AIR network, Keskar allowed local stations a very limited amount of 
time for local news broadcasts, provided that they also played the national news. 
 The four National Program series, all of which continue to this day in 
modified formats, were created as a way to educate the Indian population about the 
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national character of India. The National Programs started with the National 
Programme of Music, which began in late 1952, and the National Programme of 
Talks in early 1953.82 The National Programme of Plays and National Programme 
of Feature were started in early 1956. I will focus primarily on the issues involved 
in the first two national programs developed—music and talks—but it is worth 
noting that the National Programme for Plays and the National Programme for 
Features have been on the whole very successful at developing material that was 
made specifically for radio audiences.83 Still, the National Programme for Plays 
especially suffered for being almost entirely presented in Hindi, thought to be the 
best candidate for the national language.84 This meant that North India, and 
particularly the Hindi belt, was often represented as the image of India. Even when 
the National Programme for Plays attempted to adapt a South Indian author’s 
work, All India Radio translators rewrote the plays (often badly) into Hindi.  
The idea behind these all four national program series was, “to focus 
attention on national issues, and to present a picture of the development of the 
country as a whole.85” For Keskar, the National Programme of Music was key to 
(re)creating a national mode for India. Keskar argued that a culture’s music is the 
aesthetic center of the nation and that Indian music, washed over by waves of 
external cultures, had lost much of its “Indian” essence. Determined to both root 
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out bad influences on pure Indian music, especially Muslim and British influences, 
Keskar’s National Programmes of Music leaned heavily on well-defined classical 
ragas, modern classical pieces created by the AIR Indian Orchestra, and composite 
versions of traditional Hindu devotional music.86 Folk music made its debut on the 
National Programme for Music almost a year into its founding, something that 
radio reviewers in the newspaper commented on. Keskar claimed that folk music, 
while important to India and especially to rural listeners, was badly derived from 
classical music, and as such, could be traced to and replaced by “more traditional” 
forms. The desire to make folk traditions into merely a badly articulated version of 
the national classic forms was an attempt to create a single, almost ur-music. But 
in doing so, AIR disregarded regional and sub-regional music traditions as poor 
imitations of “real” music. 
The argument for a fundamental Indian music was troubling in other ways. 
India is often described as having two discreet sets of “classical” music:  
Hindustani Music associated with north India and Carnatic Music associated with 
south India. The problem for music nationalists was that having two types of 
Indian classical music undermined the idea of a fundamentally unified India. As 
Janaki Bakhle suggests in her book, music scholars in the first half of 20th century 
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devised notational systems to best define Indian music scientifically, and as time 
went on, actively tried to combine the two systems into a comprehensive Indian 
classical music system. Influenced primarily by the work of the pioneers of 
modern Indian “classical” music V.N. Bhatkhande and V.D. Paluskar, Keskar 
believed that Indian classical music, once epitomizing the separation of traditions 
in India, was able to be unified, and in unifying classical music, so too could the 
nation be united.87 The National Programme for Music was part of this effort to 
create a single, unified Indian classical tradition. 
The National Programme of Talks was created a few months after the 
National Programme of Music.88 The idea behind the talks was to help educate 
Indians about their national rights and responsibilities. The talks were given by a 
variety of people. Although appropriately important politicians often gave them, 
government bureaucrats or middle managers also occasionally gave talks. Looking 
at the topics that were presented, starting with a long series entitled “The 
Challenge of Democracy” and including topics such as “Education for the Nation,” 
“The Role of Women in India,” and later talk series on the National Plan, Indian 
Languages, and Indian Literature, it is clear that the National Programme of Talks 
was meant as a way to focus on defining the civic nation of India to its citizens.89 
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The civic nationalism presented in the National Programme of Talks also 
often emphasized the need for active participation in particular, centrally-
proscribed ways. For example, in the series about the challenges of democracy, 
each of the talkers laid out the role that each Indian citizen has in order to keep  the 
Indian experiment with democracy from failing. Each talker’s prescription was 
based on his own political goals and expertise, but all went toward the same end of 
defining the country as a whole.90 The final talker in the series, John Matthai, even 
argued that one of the solutions to keeping a democracy functioning in a united 
India was the funding and support for All India Radio, because a national radio 
network was essential in defining India across the breadth of the nation in a unified 
way. Clearly, these talks are good examples of the way that AIR, under the 
national government and under the control of someone like Keskar, was attempting 
to create a directed version of India. 
If the National Programmes represented AIR’s efforts to direct the 
nationalizing campaign through standardizing content throughout the country, then 
the changes in the regulations about what kind of music was able to be broadcast 
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and how performers were chosen, was a way that the AIR’s board of directors, led 
by Keskar, could indirectly direct the sound of broadcasting. Specifically, Keskar 
implemented two policies that fundamentally worked as a power grab by the 
center. First, Keskar crafted and implemented a mandatory audition system as a 
way to determine the “suitability” of musicians for the radio; and second, he all but 
banned popular and film music in favor of more time for classical music.  
Under Bokhari, local stations largely chose musicians and other 
performers. The stations used recommendations from local aficionados, personal 
experience, and even commissioned local artists and students from prominent 
music schools and families (gharanas) to perform on the radio.91 Letting local 
stations broadcast local performers based on these criteria meant that AIR’s 
musical programs sounded different based on where the station was located. For 
example, Lucknow was renowned for their female performers, while Calcutta was 
lauded for its folk or light music. Even two stations playing similar musical 
programming, because of the gharana system, often had very different sounds, as 
was the case for the musical offerings in Delhi and Lucknow. 
The Gharana system was a major target for reformers of Indian classical 
music like Keskar because of the system’s argument that each gharana, each 
musical family, upheld a slightly different musical tradition, replete with familial 
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ragas, teaching styles, and musical notations. In contrast, Keskar thought that the 
gharana system was ruining the musical traditions of India.92 In part to supplant the 
gharanas’ influence and to emphasize classical musical traditions over more 
popular folk music, Keskar implemented a set of audition criteria, in which 
potential performers would have to audition to an audience who could not see 
them, either in their local studios a few times a year or via recording. The judges 
would rank the auditions on several things, including Indian traditionalism, 
musical style, vocal timbre, and suitability for radio. While the center claimed the 
auditions were set up to improve the quality of performers and remove favoritism 
on the radio, the criteria and the requirement of national programmers approval 
meant that the auditions also standardized the kind of music that would be deemed 
acceptable for any All India Radio station.93 
While the standardization of radio music served to decrease the variety of 
music played over the radio, the 1952 decision to all but ban Hindi film music and 
most other popular music from the Radio was much more damaging. Arguing that 
film and popular music was corrupted by western influences and instruments, 
Keskar declared that AIR would focus almost exclusively on Indian classical 
music. For Keskar, film and other popular music forms were intrinsically harmful 
to the cultural education of Indians, because they were neither authentically Indian 
nor musically sound. The banning of film music in an attempt to force listeners 
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into an appreciation of a newly created “authentic” Indian classical music was a 
heavy-handed way to dictate the habits and culture of the population. While 
Keskar suggested that listening to classical music would encourage the 
reenergizing of classical values, the AIR audience saw it as taking away some of 
the most popular and pleasurable radio programs. The plan backfired as Indian 
radio listeners realized that they could often receive Radio Ceylon from Sri Lanka, 
which specialized in Hindustani variety shows, comedy programs, and especially 
film music. AIR’s listenership fell so drastically that in 1957, AIR was forced to 
create Vividh Bharati, a light music program, to compete with Radio Ceylon. 
As Keskar was trying to create a standard, unified “Indian” music, he was 
also trying to permanently anchor the news system to the central AIR station in 
Delhi. During World War II, radio news, like all news, was heavily censored.94 
Critics of AIR during the war complained that AIR news was often little more than 
“official communiqués.”95 After the war, Bokhari tried to start including local and 
regional hubs more in the production and dissemination of local news in local 
languages, with the plan to eventually transfer news duties to regional stations 
almost entirely.96 Keskar, on the other hand, wanted to keep radio news largely 
directed by the central news section of All India Radio. He set up a system by 
which an editor in Delhi created a news bulletin in English by selecting articles 
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from parliament, ministers, the states, and the world. This bulletin was then 
transferred to various regional language translators for translation. Mehra Mesani, 
who wrote about this system, argued that the editor who initially chose the stories 
was not able to gauge the important pieces for each region. Equally crippling for 
the possibility of getting important regional news in the Delhi produced broadcast 
was that news stories of local and regional interest might not be available through 
English language reporting. The flaws in the system meant that it was “not 
surprising that bulletins [were] standarised to a degree which [made] them 
uninteresting.”97 Regional stations were unable to broadcast locally interesting or 
sensitive issues. 
Public opinion was against Keskar’s stand on this, with radio critics in at 
least two major newspapers, The Statesman and Aaj pointing out that news 
directed by the center failed to emphasis the information and ideas that would be 
most useful to local situations. Ideally, the attempt to relocate all news production 
to the center would have  created a series of topics for national discussion that 
emphasized the national government. It corresponded to the strategy of 
broadcasting what the Statesman’s radio critic called the “tedious homilies” by 
government officials attempting to direct the issues of “national” interest.98 At the 
same time, because AIR was fighting against the entertainment programming of 
Radio Ceylon and losing, making the news tedious and unavailable to much of the 
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population continued the decline in listenership. In 1953, Keskar made an 
agreement with powerful regional stations to allow regional stations to broadcast 
regional additions to the news broadcasts constructed in Delhi. This meant that 
states still had to broadcast the English, Hindi, and the nationally constructed 
regional language versions of the “national” news broadcasts; but they were able to 
add state and regional news at the end of these broadcasts.99  
The attempt to place news broadcasts entirely in the hands of the central 
government corresponded with Keskar’s other moves to nationalize All India 
Radio’s content by preferring India as whole, to a more dispersed vision of the 
nation. The problem with the move toward the Indian whole as the Indian nation 
was that it reinforced the idea that lower-caste, lower-class, minority religious 
communities, and under-represented Indian regions were less or only peripherally 
associated with India. While the news compromise allowed regional centers to add 
to the national news, the news that they added was clearly marked as less 
important than the national news, as the national news broadcast was aired in 
English, Hindi, and the local language before the local additions. As with both the 
move toward unifying and privileging modern “classical” Indian music and the 
images of ideal India that the National Programmes articulated, the direction of 
news from the center was a way to create a single national view through 
broadcasting. The difference between the dispersed nationalizing efforts made by 
Bokhari—which attempted to localize the ways that broadcasts were created and 
communalize how they were heard—and the directed nationalizing interventions 
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by Keskar—which intended to create a totalizing vision of India and Indians—was 
that Bokhari’s efforts recognized India in as many guises as AIR could, while 
Keskar efforts alienated Indians who did not fit his image of the nation. 
All Indian Radio: Defining a Common Radio Language for the Common 
Good 
Woman (interrupting): All right, all right, All India. But why Radio? Somehow 
it sounds so…so… 
Man: So common? 
Woman: Yes, doesn’t it? 
Man: But what’s wrong with having a common word for something that which 
is meant for the common good?100 
 
In the 1961 radio play referenced above, the change from the term “broadcasting” 
to the term “radio” in the name of the national radio network was used to 
emphasize the idea of radio’s mandate to improve the “common good.” Obviously 
the term ‘common’ with regard to a public utility such as AIR could be read in 
many ways. In the radio play, the woman’s objection was that the word radio was 
lower-class and already widely-used, unlike the more technical term, broadcasting. 
For the woman, the idea of radio being common was taking away some of its value 
as a novelty item for the upper and middle-class consumer, in reality the main 
purchasers of radio sets. The man, on the other hand, imagines the word common 
in the context of the common good, referring the educational and nationalizing 
missions of AIR. The man’s argument is that the radio network was ideally meant 
for general consumption and its name should indicate its function. It is no surprise 
that the part of the radio play that targeted AIR’s use for the common good should 
                                                 
100
 K.S. Mullick, Tangled Tapes, 15-16. 
  62 
revolve around the idea of the kind of language that corresponded to the common. 
Indeed, debates around the usefulness (or the illusion of usefulness) of radio for 
the “common good” almost always revolved around the language in which the 
radio was broadcast, and what language meant and how it defined India and 
Indians.  
Since the beginning of broadcasting in India in 1927, the question of what 
language should be used as the primary language for programs and news 
broadcasts was hotly contested.101 Initially radio broadcasts were primarily in 
English;  the people involved in broadcasting came from many linguistic 
communities, but all were upper-class and educated in English.102 As the AIR 
network began to be interested in the broader base of listeners—defined by radio 
reports as the common people—the question of what Indian language should be 
preferred was important. Specifically the heads of AIR debated over whether 
radio’s default language should be Urdu, Hindi, or Hindustani. 
All three languages, Urdu, Hindi, and Hindustani, were in one way or 
another manufactured by British colonialism. Hindustani most closely resembles 
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the spoken vernacular of northern India; but, as it was defined by the British in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it excluded language habits of the multitude of 
“dialects.” Hindi and Urdu were defined as separate forms of Hindustani and made 
to be associated with the Hindu and Muslim religious communities. Hindi, in its 
“pure” form, was a north Indian vernacular stripped of Persian and English 
influences. Urdu, in its “pure” form, was a north Indian vernacular stripped of its 
Sanskrit and English influences. All of these languages were viable options of 
differing degrees of usefulness for broadcasting in North India, but none of them 
filled the needs of South Indian listeners, many of whom did not speak any North 
Indian language. 
The question of language on the radio was important both because it fit into 
a larger debate about what the proper national language for India was and because 
of the claim made on behalf of radio that radio was the best way to reach 
populations thought to be unlikely to read or understand English, specifically 
minority populations like women, children, and illiterate workers.103 For this 
reason, the language controversy was important, both in the ethos of a dispersed 
national identification, as a way to make the radio more accessible more broadly, 
and in the ethos of directed national identification, in the need to define India as a 
unified nation. Especially after the first  Indian—Bokhari—took over as Director-
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General of AIR, the assumption was that the radio network would be influential in 
the eventual choice of an Indian national language. 
Under Bokhari, AIR made the claim that if the radio was meant to reach 
out to the common man, then programs needed to be recorded in a language that 
the common man could understand. This meant that local stations needed to spend 
the majority of the broadcasting day in the most readily available local language or 
dialect, regional centers needed to broadcast most of their programming in the 
most prominent regional language, and that the center needed to make programs 
available in both English, the most common lingua franca of the elite, and in some 
form of Hindi/Urdu/Hindustani, the presumptive future “national” language. 
Moreover, if some form of Hindi/Urdu/Hindustani language was the choice of the 
nation as the national language, then the radio needed to broadcast in a form of 
Hindi/Urdu/Hindustani that was generally understood broadly. Thus, in 1940, AIR 
claimed that it was appropriate that news reports and announcements of civic 
importance (as well as programs targeted for women and children) be broadcast in 
“a common language based on the rival claims of Hindi and Urdu named 
Hindustani.”104 AIR agreed that the network would author a word-list identifying 
the most widely accessible words for various concepts, like politics, prime 
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minister, and nation, to ensure that easily understandable words would be preferred 
in the creation of news broadcasts.105 
 Bokhari argued that Hindustani best satisfied the need to broadcast in 
common speech because it was more widely circulated and understood than either 
Hindi or Urdu. Still, many nationalists claimed that the language of AIR needed to 
define the national Indian citizen. For them, Hindustani represented an attempt to 
widen ideas about the national language to represent a wider speech community 
including Urdu and Hindi as they mixed together in everyday speech, rather than 
provided a “clear” idea of the singular national language.106 Defined by Bokhari 
and the AIR dictionary committee, which consisted of two Muslim men and one 
Hindu man, the idea of Hindustani was seen by many, even mainstream Indian 
nationalists, as fundamentally pandering to the Muslim minority population.  
 Hindi language supporters had long maintained that AIR had an Urdu 
language bias in its representation of Hindustani. Pointing to language choices like 
using the Urdu greeting Adab-arz to open and close programs rather than the Hindi 
namaste, among other language quibbles, organizations like the All India Hindi 
Sammelan107 protested that AIR’s use of Hindustani was a ploy to prefer Urdu 
over Hindi. The accusations of an Urdu bias were often leveled as arguments about 
the inability of AIR leadership to represent the wide variety of India. Urdu bias in 
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the name of Hindustani was pointed to as sign of British attempts to “divide and 
rule”’ by choosing minority (read Muslim) languages and actors to lead national 
institutions, such as AIR. By expressing concern for “common Indians” (read 
Hindi-speaking Hindus), these attacks were often innuendo about the religious 
affiliation and therefore national loyalty of Bokhari and, by extension, all Muslims. 
The redefinition of Hindustani (and in some way, Bokhari himself) as structurally 
associated with the Muslim community by Hindi activists, poisoned a unifying 
attempt in the realm of language. Bokhari chose Hindustani particularly because it 
was associated with the mixing of cultures (not Hindi/ Hindu or Urdu/Muslim) and 
therefore seemed to serve as a national language, in addition to his concept of 
regional national identity. 
Pointing out that AIR was being run by a Muslim man, and that several 
Muslims were high up in the radio hierarchy, articles suggested that “the All-India 
Radio under the direction of those who are in control… [have] made efforts to 
strangle Hindi language and culture, and to give a fillip to Urdu language and 
Islamic Culture.”108 Hindustani became associated heavily with Urdu, and with 
what was defined both by the British and the Hindi supporters as the affected 
cultural airs of Muslim tezeeb or culture. It is not a mistake that the complaints of 
Urdu bias in Hindustani revolved around cultural moments; beyond the adab arz / 
namaste controversy, articles complained about the radio hosting a ma’fil rather 
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than kavita sammelan, and broadcasting qaawali rather than raga.109 The argument 
served to intensify the sense that Hindustani, to the extent that it embraced Urdu 
words, was damned as an upper-class Muslim attempt to redefine India’s cultural 
landscape. To its critics, Hindustani, under its “Islamic” taint, was defined as 
neither common in the sense of being commonly available, nor common in the 
sense of being part of a common heritage. For proponents of Hindi, Hindustani 
was associated with the kind of accommodations that Muslims were asking for 
politically. 
The problem was with the idea of the word “common” itself. Bokhari and 
his AIR tried to define “common” linguistically as clear and intelligible to an 
already existing community that fluidly embraced Hindi and Urdu vocabularies. 
The emphasis on intelligibility linked explicitly to Bokhari’s emphasis on 
increased regional linguistic variation in radio broadcasts. But the debate about a 
national language was one that undermined Bokhari’s emphasis on intelligibility 
and indeed his idea of common with regards to language, because the debate’s 
conclusion would prefer one language in a sea of hundreds of viable choices. 
Hindustani, while the most widely-accessible of the three contenders, was still 
utterly foreign to much of India, even much of north India. Any national language, 
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Hindi, Urdu or Hindustani, would have to imposed from the center. For this 
reason, the national language debate and its conclusions fit much better with 
Keskar’s directed unity of an ideal India, than with Bokhari’s striving for dispersed 
unity.  
 Bokhari left AIR around the same time that Hindi was being seriously 
proposed as the national language. Shortly after, the Department of Information 
and Broadcasting announced that it was studying whether “the attempt should be 
continued to build Hindustani up as a common language or the use of both Urdu 
and Hindi should be established.”110 Patel came out with a statement soon after, 
that radio clarity and mass appeal needed to be preferred over ideological 
attachment to Hindi, that, in an effort to change the culture at AIR, the Hindustani 
dictionary would be reevaluated, but finally, that Hindi would not be adopted 
whole-scale.111 Privately, the department was uncertain of how to proceed. On the 
one hand, a pure Hindi language broadcast would render AIR unclear to a large 
portion of the listening audience, even its Hindi-speaking audience, but focusing 
on Hindustani meant that the radio could not encourage the national language 
policy. The uncertainty in the national network bled into wider broadcasting 
uncertainty; for example, AIR’s external service had a news broadcast for East 
Pakistan in Bengal but was unable to broadcast a similar service in West Pakistan, 
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because associating Urdu with Pakistan would point to the fact that Hindi was not 
being adopted for internal service broadcasts.112  
 Patel’s reluctance to change the AIR official language to Hindi did not 
continue under Keskar, who did change the official language policy from 
Hindustani to Hindi. To be fair, because of the way Hindustani was defined during 
the 1940s, the language was already too tainted to be defined as national or 
common. Ideologically, Keskar argued that, as with the question of nationalizing 
the radio, the nation needed to be directed toward a national language; and AIR’s 
status as a government broadcaster was to make Hindi a site of common ground. 
The problem that Keskar still faced was that although Hindi was the “National 
language,” it was not spoken by much of the population, especially in the south of 
the country. Indeed, the south was somewhat outraged by the emphasis placed on 
Hindi as a way to create national unity. During parliamentary debates in early 
1950, ministers from the south took to responding to questions posed in Hindi by 
telling the body they refused to answer, but making this response in their own 
regional languages.113 Even AIR listeners in the “Hindi belt” of Northern India had 
some trouble understanding the pure, Sanskritized Hindi preferred by the Hindi 
language supporters.  
Hindi may have been designated the national language, but it was not 
widely accessible enough to be AIR’s primary outreach language. The shift to 
Hindi as AIR’s primary language was accompanied by complaints about the 
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indecipherably “high” Hindi spoken on AIR.114 In his discussion with Kamla 
Bhatt, Ameen Sayani, the host of the popular radio show Geet Mala, argued that in 
addition to the AIR banning film and popular music, the oppressive language 
standards of pure Hindi radio broadcasts made Radio Ceylon, with its “street 
Hindi,” more popular in India than All India Radio.115  
 In 1950, as an effort to encourage non-Hindi speakers to an appreciation of 
Hindi, AIR instituted mandatory fifteen-minute Hindi language lessons for stations 
in non-Hindi speaking areas of the country.116 The lessons were then printed in 
regional editions of the Indian Listener, AIR’s journal. The goal was to encourage 
listeners to learn the national language and was structured as both part of AIR’s 
educational mandate and  as a way to make the “national” language more common. 
The problem was that the Hindi language lesson was both ignored and despised. 
Hindi as a national language reminded non-Hindi speaking parts of the country of 
their relative unimportance in the definition of India. Moreover, the language 
lessons, while based on the radio dictionary, did not seem to increase the listener 
numbers for Hindi language programs in non-Hindi speaking areas.  
 The attempt to push Sanskritized Hindi onto the radio in the name of 
national unity was unsuccessful because it managed to alienate both Hindi 
speakers and non-Hindi speakers by making AIR Hindi broadcasts inaccessible to 
much of the listening public. The complaints forced AIR to announce the 
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rethinking of the AIR language policy. AIR argued that “since the national 
language is Hindi, not what was known before partition as Hindustani, a reversion 
to that convenient, sometimes laboured mixture of Hindi and Urdu is not being 
attempted. Nevertheless, a move toward greater simplicity is evident.”117 The 
quote makes clear the problem with which AIR was faced. The problem was that, 
for Keskar, the national common needed to seem be pure, and not a mixture; and it 
needed to be ideal rather than constructed. The national concept, as identified by 
the national language was a unified, fundamentally preexisting thing; and 
Sanskritized or “pure” Hindi represented this single influence, the naturally-
existing language for many nationalists. Hindustani, with its mixed origins and  the 
labor required to keep  it current and available, could never be the national 
language. For Bokhari, who seemed to believe that the common national ideal was 
one that was crafted, mixed, and labored, Hindustani and commonly spoken 
regional languages were good representatives of what the nation could become; for 
Keskar, they were perversions of the national possibilities. That said, it was 
impossible for AIR to continue to broadcast programs in a language that no one 
could follow. “Pure” Hindi defined as the common vision was not commonly 
understood. 
A.I.R.: Defining the Physical Nationalism of All India Radio 
All India Radio— note the very appropriate initials, “A-I-R”— clearly expresses 
what we are trying to be. To us, India is a vast country, federalised as far as the Air 
is concerned and unseparated by provincial boundaries and ambitions.118 
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For English speakers, the initials A.I.R., for a broadcasting corporation, is an 
appealing acronym. Lionel Fielden, who was the Director-General when Indian 
radio broadcasting changed its name, was reported to have convinced the British 
governors of the change by pointing out the serendipity of a radio organization, 
whose content was transmitted through the air, being called AIR.119 The radio play, 
in thinking about the way that AIR could translate into air, suggested that by being 
on the air, the radio found a way to bring out the fundamentally and naturally 
unified nature of the country. It contended that, although vast, the whole country 
was part of the network, and, though particular provinces might see themselves as 
different, they were all, through the air, Indian. 
 In 1940, it was argued that the unique quality of the radio was that it could 
be at the same time intimate and expansive.120 As Lionel Fielden wrote in his 1939 
Report on the Progress of Broadcasting in India, “broadcasting is both public and 
intimate: the voice addresses millions, but speaks only to the unit of two or 
three.”121 It was this dual mode of radio--appealing to the individual listener sitting 
by his radio while at the same time potentially speaking to the amorphous world–
that gave AIR its most powerful tool for socializing the nation. The question that 
Bokhari and Keskar had to answer in their defining the radio’s geography and 
concept was whether, by appealing to the individual, they created the public, or, by 
defining the listening public, they could eventually entice the individual. 
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 The radio play’s emphasis on the unifying quality of the air, and the ability 
of AIR to connect the nation to itself, asks a question of how AIR defined the 
nation geographically. The radio play suggested that having a daily reminder of the 
nation would help to ease feelings of regional, provincial, or local identities. For 
Bokhari, the call to define the nation’s borders by the production of radio meant 
building a larger technological infrastructure in order to reach more people well. 
But it also meant making the radio airways available to people. While the radio 
play seems to envision the same signal, the same program, reaching out to each 
Indian, Bokhari saw the chance to unite India under the idea of a national signal 
locally created and broadcast.  
For Keskar, the reading of the geography was less clear. Keskar was not 
convinced by the need to extend the geography of AIR, instead focusing on 
providing high quality service to key areas, mostly urban. Yet, he very consciously 
played into the sense that regional and local identities could only be weakened and 
made truly Indian by replacing them with national sensibilities. For Keskar, the 
drama of people in Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, and Delhi all listening to the same 
musical program presented a united India and defined AIR’s role in the bringing 
about that unity. 
Still, both views, but especially Keskar’s, relied on the idea that AIR, as a 
national broadcasting, would not have to compete with other radio in the definition 
of India through the air. Neither Bokhari nor Keskar approved of the idea of 
outside broadcasting services operating in the country. In 1954, Keskar gave a long 
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radio address arguing that commercial radio, even commercial radio that did not 
offer the same kind of news services as AIR, would undermine the national 
unification project that AIR was attempting.122 As other broadcasting services, 
especially Radio Ceylon, began to take a large share of Indian listeners in the 
1950s, the idea that India’s air was an unassailable space that defined India’s 
unified nature was also contested. Indeed, AIR’s declining market share acerbated 
complaints that AIR’s network was actually unable to achieve the goals of 
broadcasting India for the nation and of creating programs for the common person 
and for the common good. 
Conclusion 
Man: To tell you the truth, I never much cared for the “Indian State 
Broadcasting Service.” Long-winded and pompous, wasn’t it? 
Woman: Well, perhaps it was. But why “All India Radio”? They don’t say “All 
British Broadcasting Corporation” do they? 
Man: No, they don’t. And that is precisely why we should. Ours is not just a 
country, it’s almost a continent. Think of the scores of languages… and 
countless regional and local traditions. Unless our broadcasting system is truly 
All India in character and outlook… 
Woman (interrupting): All right, all right, All India. But why Radio? Somehow 
it sounds so…so… 
Man: So common? 
Woman: Yes, doesn’t it? 
Man: But what’s wrong with having a common word for something that which 
is meant for the common good? 
All India Radio— note the very appropriate initials, “A-I-R”— clearly 
expresses what we are trying to be. To us, India is a vast country, federalised as 
far as the Air is concerned and unseparated by provincial boundaries and 
ambitions123 
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Changing the name of India’s national broadcasting system in 1936 from the 
Indian State Broadcasting System to All India Radio was meant to signal a change 
in the function and the focus of radio broadcasts for India. Fielden and his second 
in command, Bokhari, wanted AIR to shift from a purely informational, technical 
organization, to a station that appealed to the listening public and responded to 
their needs and desires. The change in outlook for the station was doubly 
reinforced by the adopting of the motto Bahujan Hitaya, Bahujan Sukhaya (For the 
welfare and the happiness of the people). The name change and the new motto 
defined radio as the property and the guardian of the people of India. As this 1961 
radio play, part of a retrospective about radio’s growth in India, suggested, AIR’s 
new name suggested three main goals to help it live up to its name and motto. It 
argued that the station needed to be a force that defined and responded to the 
nation and its citizens (it needed to be “All Indian”), it needed to be something that 
was common (Radio rather than Broadcasting), and it needed to be a federalized 
organization (like the air itself).  
The role of AIR in each of these areas has been criticized, in terms of both their 
ability to produce programs that successfully fulfill their obligation, and their 
conception of what being a national radio network should mean. In recent years, 
AIR has been criticized most strenuously for the lack of autonomy from the 
government, overly nationalized programming, and the network’s outdated 
technology.124 One argument often made by critics is that since the name change in 
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1936, AIR has made so few changes as to be fundamentally the same organization 
as it was when it was founded. Mehra Masani claimed, “[All India Radio] came 
into being under imperial auspices, in a form suitable for a colony, but, after three 
decades, during which vast political, economic, and social changes have taken 
place in the world and in India, the only change in AIR is an increase in the 
number of its installations.”125  
More commonly, however, scholars and former staff of AIR have pointed 
out that the network’s attempts to create an India based on a singular vision and 
subject position were at fault for the network’s decline.126 Ameen Sayani argues 
that, before the 1950s, AIR “was one of the finest broadcasting organizations in the 
world… it had the best of our writers, thinkers, presenters, producers, 
musicians…it had everything.”127 This is certainly borne out by the impressive 
reviews the AIR network received at the conference for commonwealth 
broadcasting networks held in London in 1945. AIR was roundly seen as the 
second largest, second most technologically forward, and most diverse 
broadcasting service, comparable to the British Broadcasting Corporation itself. 
Bokhari, then the director-general, reported that many commonwealth countries, 
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especially Australia, asked if more programs from AIR could be transcribed for 
Australian Broadcasting.128  
The key to AIR’s success in those years before independence was the 
vision of Indian unity as both singularly and multiply defined concept. The 
diversity of programming and the emphasis on producing programming for people 
in their own languages and on a broad diversity of subjects not only allowed larger 
audiences but also gave artists, writers, and musicians latitude to define their styles 
and thoughts as part of Indian culture. In some sense, the Bokhari era took 
seriously the idea that the nation was a “vast nation federalized,”129 seeking to 
emphasize the role of the parts of a nation, rather than valorizing an unattainable, 
totalizing vision of the Indian nation “unseparated by provincial boundaries or 
ambitions.”130 By taking differences of language, geography, culture, and interest 
seriously, Bokhari was able to make local stations part of the larger national 
network, while allowing local stations to create programming and ideas separately.  
 After Independence, and particularly when Keskar took over, the AIR 
network began to direct the national idea, by removing “unsavory” voices from 
AIR stations, by standardizing music and programs through auditions, by banning 
popular music from Hindi films and marginalizing folk music, by producing and 
directing the news from the central AIR offices, and by implementing a system 
that focused on the propagation of Sanskritized Hindi rather than the discredited 
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Hindustani. These efforts were attempts to define what being “Indian” meant, what 
India was “trying to be.”131 Unlike AIR’s attempts under Bokhari, which attempted 
to make AIR national by interacting with people across the country, Keskar’s AIR 
eschewed local differences, attempting to make the ideal Indian into the national 
citizen. The effect of many of these initiatives was that people felt less interested in 
AIR and more concerned that the station was merely a shill of the government.132  
 It is clear that both Bokhari and Keskar fundamentally believed in the 
promise of radio to be a nationalizing force for the common good of India and its 
citizens. The major difference between their two philosophies of radio was 
whether or not the citizens of India had any responsibility in the definition of the 
nation and its common good.  For Bokhari, with his concept of dispersed unity, the 
nation was defined by local and regional participation in it. As such, an 
organization like the AIR network needed to be responsive to local stations and 
ideas, and flexible enough to understand that different-sounding radio 
strengthened, rather than undermined, radio’s national status. The flexibility of 
early AIR encouraged it to be very broadly interesting and helped build its 
reputation as a source of both interesting information and entertainment. For 
Keskar, the strength of radio broadcast was its ability to draw the entire nation 
together by making it sound the same. Keskar determined that, in order to use the 
nationalizing potential of the radio effectively, a certain amount of rigidity in the 
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definition of the nation was required. This idea of rigid national unity, directed 
from the central government worked against the ability of minorities and regions to 
identify with the nation effectively because it pitted their sense of self and of self 
within the nation against the “true” or ideal Indian citizen. The rigidity of this 
approach to directing the concept of India and its unity made AIR an effective 
government tool but failed to engage the imagination or interest of an Indian 
population–an effect AIR is still dealing with today. 
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Chapter 2: National Unity, Freedom of the Press, and All India Organizing: The 
Rise and Fall of the All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference 
 
Like many post-colonial nations, India used the press, and particularly the print press to 
help to define the content and construction of its national values.133 In the case of India, 
newspaper coverage of the anti-colonial movement marked the nation as an appropriate 
object of each locality. Additionally, arguments about the potential structure of Indian 
democracy, minority rights, and India’s participation in world conflicts were fought 
through the pages of the press.134 For this reason the role that the press played in the anti-
colonial movement and the immediate period after independence was not easily 
characterized as promoting Indian unity against a divisive colonial government. Still, the 
press, and its “All India” organization, the All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference 
(AINEC), attempted to articulate a vision of Indian unity that was based on a limited 
number of shared ideological commitments. As a way to model this concept of unity, the 
AINEC defined their organizational unity through the editors’ shared commitment to the 
protection and expansion of freedom of expression. At the same time, as with the 
definition of Indian unity against colonial divide-and-rule tactics generally, the AINEC 
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found it difficult to advocate the protection of these rights without a commitment to 
unified action.135 
The All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference was founded in 1940 in the early 
stages of World War II, as a way to counter the British colonial government’s attempts to 
control dissent in India, against both the war and the British colonial mission.136 While 
there were several regional, provisional, or politically-affiliated newspaper industry 
organizations, the All India Newspaper Conference was the first nationally-organized 
Indian Press organization.137 As a protest organization during the final years of the 
movement for national freedom, the AINEC agitated for, and was moderately successful 
in coercing from the colonial government, protections against excessive government 
intrusion on the day-to-day operations of the newspaper industry. As such, the AINEC’s 
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role as an oppositional organization cannot be denied or downplayed. Still, the AINEC 
aspired to a life outside merely protesting against government incursions into their 
particular industry. The AINEC argued from the very beginning that, as an organization 
devoted to the expansion and protection of freedom of the press, their goals were 
intimately tied to the expansion and protection of freedom generally.  
Articles written about British colonial government censorship emphasized the 
connection between citizens and the press in India. One article in the Hindustan Times, 
stated the connection quite clearly, arguing that “[in India] as elsewhere the Freedom of 
the Press means nothing more and nothing less than that the press must be as free to 
function under the limitations of the ordinary law as the ordinary citizen.”138 The article 
argues that in democracies, the press does not have any special rights except the rights of 
citizens. Thus the freedom to dissent against the government and its actions in print was a 
manifestation of the personal freedom of citizens in a democracy. Not that this dissent 
can take any form imaginable, the author suggests that the press (and the citizen) labor 
under “ordinary” laws that protect the nation and its citizens.  
  As a colony, the Indian democracy and Indian citizenship were still as theoretical 
as the freedom of the press for which the AINEC argued. But the AINEC contended that 
there was a connection between the idea of freedom– a word often used to describe the 
call for independence– and the functioning of a successful democracy. The organization 
maintained cogently that a democracy that could be successful in India would require a 
significant investment in freedom of expression, especially the ability to express dissent. 
The AINEC argued that their role in the struggle to achieve Indian independence and 
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define the character of Indian national freedom was safeguarding the freedom of 
expression against governmental repression. Moreover, the AINEC held that the 
newspaper industry’s role in the national movement had to be the creation of a space of 
Indian unity around a national call for and commitment to freedom. In their role as 
national guardians of press freedom, the AINEC’s arguments for freedom of expression 
imagined an “Indian nation and Indian citizen” outside the realm of national recognition 
in preparation for full sovereignty. The AINEC saw itself as preparing the nation for 
democracy both by unifying the press around the concept of press freedom and by 
mobilizing the press to unanimously lobby for stronger government protections for press 
freedom.  
In order to realize Indian nationhood and citizenship in a way that fit with the 
organization’s ideas about the importance of freedom of the press and democracy, the 
organization named itself “All India,” which suggested the organization’s commitment to 
the idea of a unified Indian national concept. The organization’s emphasis on freedom of 
the press as indicative of national freedom and citizenship also required that the 
organization be able to make claims from the point of view of a unified national idea. The 
problem that the AINEC had in defining their “All India” status was that the organization 
had two distinct goals that required “All India” commitments. First, in an effort to 
imagine an Indian democracy and an Indian citizen, defined by the freedom of expression 
that the organization was fighting for, the AINEC had to construct a unity that could 
encompass a breadth of Indian voices. The newspaper industry had a particularly diverse 
set of concerns, with papers representing every language, regional area, political position, 
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and religion. The best way that the organization found to define its commitment to the 
whole of India’s newspaper industry was by pointing to a foundational ideology that any 
newspaper editor could espouse– freedom of the press. The organization argued that they 
could remain unified, despite differing on almost any position as long as each editor 
fundamentally believed in the preservation of freedom of expression through the press. 
This unity, which I call ideological unity, implied an expansive vision of the future of 
Indian democracy, a nation united by the belief in national freedom, despite other 
differences. Unlike the newspaper-reading citizen of Anderson’s imagined communities, 
the AINEC’s ideological unity was based on a clear articulation of difference, made 
national through a commitment to freedom of the press.139  
The second reason that the AINEC needed to be seen as unified was that, 
pragmatically, in order to meaningfully oppose governmental attempts to censor the press 
the organization needed to speak with one voice. The AINEC proposed an organization 
that was able to present the industry’s grievances to the government in a way that would 
be representative of the whole press in India and would be a powerful challenge to the 
government’s attempts to increase censorship under the guise of the war. The idea of a 
single, unbroken voice from the newspaper industry, amplified by a claim that the 
organization was widely numerically representative, was a powerful foil to government 
intervention. Even before the first conference in 1940, the AINEC’s leaders suggested 
that at least in public, unity needed to mean unanimity. Despite the knowledge that 
promoting unity on the basis of unanimity meant policing dissent, almost the antithesis of 
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their ideological unity based on the concept of freedom of the press, the AINEC argued 
that by presenting a unanimous unity, they were able to ensure a more vigorous defense 
of press freedom with the government. The organization’s work with the government, 
where they maintained their “All Indian” commitment in the form of unanimous unity, 
protected the Indian press from untenable censorship when it could and the AINEC gave 
the Indian anti-colonial movement a champion when it could not. Moreover, the tenor of 
the discussion about unity as unanimity seemed to indicate that once India had an 
independent national government, the AINEC would no longer need to present itself as 
unanimously united in order to protect the freedom of press, and by extension freedom 
generally.  
The dual ways of defining itself tapped into both the inclusive and exclusive sense 
of the naming strategy associated with the “All India” prefix. On the one hand, like the 
other constituency-based “All India” organizations, the AINEC tried to define Indian 
unity and their “All India’ commitment through an emphasis on dissent and negotiation, 
but with a national commitment to some set of concepts, the ideological unity of the 
AINEC. On the other hand, like majority All India National Congress Party, the AINEC 
argued that they were representative organization of the newspaper industry and as such, 
their voice defined the fundamental Indian unity.140 In this formulation, defined here as 
unity in unanimity, dissent was dealt with internally, but the organization’s public face 
defined the unity of the Indian newspaper industry.  Having two strategies to define the 
“All India” component of their name is indicative of the problems that the AINEC had in 
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defining itself. The AINEC’s conceptualization of ideological unity seemed like a radical 
rethinking of democracy as it applied to Indian difference, because it argued that Indian 
unity could be founded upon a shared belief in tenets that described India most 
generally.141 But, given that Indian democracy was not yet established when the 
organization was founded in 1940, unity as unanimity gave the AINEC enough clout with 
the government to fight for the preservation of press rights.  Still, the failure to defend 
dissent inherent in the definition of a unanimous unity, running directly counter to the 
ideological basis the AINEC claimed to espouse, undermined the claim that the AINEC 
was interested in redefining unity based on a multiplicity of voices. 
Because the AINEC defined its unity as both ideological unity and unity as 
unanimity, the organization was plagued by a series of crises that threatened to disband 
the organization, brought on by an uncertainty about what was expected of Indian editors. 
Although the AINEC ultimately became important as an oppositional organization during 
the fight for independence, the organization was never able to fully embrace the 
ideological unity that would have allowed it to retain relevance after national freedom 
and actual democracy were enacted.  
This chapter will consider the AINEC at three pivotal points in the organization’s 
conceptualization and explanation of its relationship to unity and representation in the 
course of its rise during World War II and fall after Indian Independence. First, I will 
discuss the events that led to the calling of the first AINEC conference. Then I will 
consider the founding of the conference in 1940 and the assurances crisis that happened 
after the conference, which shaped both the ideological and practical approaches the 
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organization would take toward unity and representation. In the next section, I will 
consider the events surrounding the second meeting of the AINEC in 1942. On the heels 
of the announcement of Congress’s Quit India movement increasingly repressive stances 
by the government toward publication of news the AINEC had to redefine unity in light 
of the growing chasm between nationalist newspapers and the rest of the industry. 
Finally, in the fourth section, I will discuss the failure of the AINEC to resist government 
censorship after independence, and what that failure said about both the AINEC’s claim 
to unity and the changing valence of the concept of freedom of the press after “freedom” 
of the nation was accomplished.  
Contextualizing the All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference 
Nationalizing news 
It would have been difficult for the AINEC to effectively argue that press freedom was 
constitutive or even indicative of a national public debate without shifts in the newspaper 
industry that made more news stories nationally focused. While news about the 
nationalist movement was widely published in both vernacular and English language 
journals, local protests and nationalist agitations, even those with implications for the 
anti-colonial movement, were often only reported in the city or province in which they 
took place.142  
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Several changes allowed for a wider conception of national news. One important 
move was the translation of and engagement with stories from vernacular language 
sources in English language journals. Although there had been a significant relationship 
between vernacular and English language news sources before the early 1930s, as the 
nationalist movement became more heated, English language news sources began to pick 
up and publicize stories of resistance from local language newspapers as indicative of 
growing support for independence. A clearer predecessor however was the broader 
publication of news about nationalist heroes, and specifically news related to Mohandas 
“Mahatma” Gandhi. In particular the 1939-1940 Satyagraha campaigns were reported as 
national news despite being enacted largely at the local level.143   
Unlike earlier Satyagraha movements, the 1939-41 Satyagraha was initiated as a 
set of individual protests rather than mass civil disobedience, because Gandhi claimed he 
wanted the movement to be “non-embarrassment” Satyagraha in deference to the British 
war effort. 144 However, the limited nature of the program seemed to amplify local action 
into national news because the local Satyagraha protests were seen as a way for papers to 
define national events for a locally-situated audience.  For this reason, unlike previous 
Satyagraha movements, the 1939-1941 Satyagraha campaign volunteers were solicited 
for action in their local area and acted locally, but were reported in detail across India. 
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For example, in January of 1941, 10 men were chosen to protest in Calcutta, but their 
names and arrests were reported in the Madras newspaper, The Hindu.145 Volunteers who 
were selected to participate in Satyagraha action were announced in lists published 
widely around the country, and the arrests of these volunteers were reported as national 
news.146  
Local political news being reported nationally both pushed the colonial 
government to consider the need for stricter controls on the newspaper industry and made 
the need for a nationally unified and representative newspaper organization more clear. 
Because Gandhi carefully chose participants to act in a local way throughout the country 
as a national action, and because the newspaper editors wanted to report on the ongoing 
Satyagraha movement, these local actions became national news. The Satyagraha 
movement helped to reorient newspapers from local productions into a national industry 
with national concerns.147 
Gandhi was also active in creating news nationally through his national journals, 
Young India and the Harijan,148 and his near daily transmission of press releases directly 
to newspapers.149 Both Young India and the Harijan journals were nationally focused, 
                                                 
145
 “Satyagraha Report,” The Hindu, January 30, 1941. 
146
 Some examples of these can be seen throughout the year 1941 in The Hindu. The Satyagraha Report 
was a regular part of the paper, and each detailed local (Madras-based) Satyagraha volunteers along with 
lists of volunteers from other parts of the country. 
147
 Of interest on this subject is Alon Confino, The Nation as Local Metaphor: Wurttemberg, Imperial 
Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
148
 Gandhi took over editorship of Young India upon his return to India until the journal closed in 1922. The 
paper Harijan and its language affiliates were nominally edited by Mahadev Desai, one of Gandhi’s most 
trusted secretaries, but in reality, as Desai himself conceded, the papers functioned as Gandhi’s 
mouthpiece. On Gandhi’s place as a journalist, see Sailendra Nath Bhattacharyya, Mahatma Gandhi as 
Journalist (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press Reprint, 1984). 
149
 Statements sent by Gandhi and published by many different newspapers were not only on relevant 
issues, like Satyagraha, non-violence, and anti-war protesting, they were also on subjects like proper diet, 
train travel, and religious observance. 
  90 
and Harijan had several language affiliates that published essentially the same material as 
the English language journal. These journals addressed readers on national topics, 
arguing for an interest and conception of Indian concerns. Thus, when these journals 
focused on what were often defined as local, or even individual concerns, the expectation 
was that they had some kind of national significance.  
Because of his national stature, the government’s attempts to censor Gandhi’s 
press notes, newspapers, and articles were considered to be a bellwether measure for the 
level of repression on the industry in general. Therefore it was no surprise that when 
Gandhi and his Harijan newspapers were ‘advised’ by the central Government’s Press 
Advisor to stop publishing anti-war arguments in Harijan, it was taken as a warning of 
future repression to many nationalist papers.150 Moreover, Gandhi’s reaction to the 
proposed censorship, closing the Harijan and all of its language affiliates “indefinitely,” 
pushed newspaper editors not willing to follow his lead in closing down to propose other 
options of fighting increasing levels of government repression.151  
As the nationalizing of the Satyagraha movement helped to create the conditions 
for a national news industry, the shutting of the Harijan and the pointed censorship of 
Gandhi’s other publications and press releases stoked a national response that helped to 
create the conditions needed for a large scale meeting of Indian newspaper editors. More 
importantly, the shutting down of a legitimately national voice, suggested a much wider 
threat to the ideal of freedom of press in India. 
Institutional Censorship 
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While the Satyagraha movement increased coordination between English and vernacular 
language journals and Gandhi’s nationalizing influence laid the groundwork for thinking 
about the newspaper industry as a national body, a specific instance of increased 
governmental censorship pushed editors to create a national organization. On October 26, 
1940, the Government of India (GOI) published a Press Note announcing an emergency 
provision under article 41 of the Defence of India Rules (DoIR)152 that implemented 
rigorous pre-censorship of all news and banned the publication of news that is 
“detrimental to successful war effort.”153 The implementation of emergency powers by 
the government was an expansion of the accepted interpretation of article 41, which 
before the press restriction codicil regulated publishing more generally. The additional 
restriction of the modified article 41 was a burden on newspapers that had already been 
working under strict regulations in the form of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act 
of 1931.154 The outcry from newspapers at the announcement of the new restrictions, 
even among newspapers run by Anglo-Indian proprietors, was impressive. Though each 
paper had their own take on the increased censorship, the general stance primarily 
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focused on the threat to “democracy” and the “freedom of the press” that the new 
restrictions posited.155 
The Defence of India Rules had long been unpopular as “permanent” emergency 
measures.156 Because they themselves were the targets of the new restrictions, the press 
had a particularly violent reaction to the announcement of the amendment of the Defence 
of India Rule 41. They ran editorials claiming that the British were actively undermining 
their own fight for democracy by attempting to resist speech even to the extent of 
threatening to jail editors who complained about repressive press measures.157 The 
government defended their repressive move by arguing that despite being a fairly radical 
reinterpretation of a repressive emergency power, the press had already tacitly agreed 
with the new formation of the rules, and that they were merely a new interpretation of the 
old formulation that everyone had worked under since before World War II.158 
The government’s move to actively suppress the Indian press was in marked 
contrast to the early war commitment to press freedom in Britain. Several sources in the 
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newspaper industry at the time claimed that the British censorship of newspaper 
publishing was “a military rather than a political censorship.”159 While censorship 
certainly did exist in Britain during the war years, much of the censored material that did 
not directly relate to military issues was news from the colonies.160 Still, as George 
Orwell argued in his (censored) preface to the 1945 version of Animal Farm, “We have 
not been subjected to the kind of totalitarian ‘co-ordination’ that it might have been 
reasonable to expect. The press has some justified grievances, but on the whole the 
Government has behaved well and has been surprisingly tolerant of minority opinions. 
The sinister fact about literary censorship in England is that it is largely voluntary.”161 
This industry-wide, voluntary censorship, while obnoxious, was clearly different from the 
kind of censorship imposed on Indian news and literary organizations, which was both 
intrusive and involuntary.   
Government Response to the Outcry 
The government vigorously denied that the tightening of the rules against newspapers 
was intended to stifle news about the anti-colonial movement. Still because of the broad 
anti-war stances of Gandhi and the All India Congress Committee, the new amendment 
could easily be used to stifle discussions of these bodies. The outcry in the newspaper 
columns was so severe that one week after sending out the press note the GOI was forced 
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to ask for a meeting with the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society (IENS)162 citing a 
need to assure the newspaper industry that the new rules were less invasive than the 
industry thought. Editorials in newspapers argued that although there was no other 
organization to choose, the choice of the IENS as negotiator for the Indian newspaper 
industry was flawed and self-serving for the government. The argument among editors 
was that the general functioning of “nationalist” newspapers, or even conservative 
newspapers run by Indians would be hindered more significantly than the Anglo-Indian 
newspapers that made up the IENS because these papers were seen as supportive of the 
colonial government.163 Because of the relative latitude British papers had with the 
government, newspaper editors were not comforted by the thought of the British 
dominated IENS being the representative of Indian newspaper concerns with the 
government. Although, many of the members of the IENS became members of the 
AINEC, the IENS as an organization was not interested in unifying the Indian newspaper 
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industry, nor did it make any sustained claims to be the representative of the Indian 
newspaper industry. 
In addition to asking the IENS for a meeting, the government put out a statement that 
was meant to reassure the press that though the new restrictions seemed extensive, they 
would be taken as guidelines, which if followed would not result in a crippling of the 
press reporting on the national movement. Summing up the government’s argument, the 
press release noted that, 
The desirability of trusting to the sense of responsibility of newspapers as 
regards the manner of presentation of news was stressed, and it was further 
pointed out that the object of the Government would not be served by the 
Government to restrict newspapers to news contained in official 
communiqués. It was, therefore, suggested that the matter should be left to 
the good sense of the newspapers acting in consultation with Press 
Advisors.164 
 
The government argued that the restrictions, though seemingly wide-reaching, were 
necessary in order to regulate newspapers that were irresponsible or dangerous to the war 
effort.  
The problem with the assertion was that it was not at all clear which segment of the 
national press would be labeled irresponsible and which responsible.165 The power to 
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delineate the space between appropriate journalism and irresponsible publications that 
needed to be suppressed was the power to define the overall freedom of the press. In 
order to protect press freedom, the newspaper industry either needed to be part of the 
policing of the “responsibility line” or to attempt to discredit the idea that responsible 
journalism required self-censorship altogether. Part of the ultimate failure of unity in the 
AINEC was that on its founding, it attempted both to be the government’s interlocutor in 
defining what was responsible journalism and fight against self-censorship as necessary 
to press freedom. 
Censorship and the Call for the AINEC 
Despite these communiqués and meetings, or perhaps because of them, many 
newspapers and their editors were convinced that the Government would use their new 
powers to suppress news about the independence movement. Several cases of particularly 
strenuous censorship were brought forward against nationalist identified papers, but none 
were more troubling than the cases against the National Herald and the Sainak, both of 
which had their security deposits seized and publication suspended indefinitely.166 The 
Sainak case was particularly galling, since the article that caused the newspaper to be 
sanctioned was an Associated Press article reprinted without repercussions in almost 
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every large paper in the country. Editorials about the Sainak case argued that the paper’s 
only crime was being nationalist leaning.167  
As a result of these distressing actions, several editors in Delhi, including the 
editor of the Hindustan Times, Devdas Gandhi, and the Delhi correspondent of The 
Hindu, B. Shiva Rao, both of whose papers were members of the IENS, suggested that a 
large emergency conference, separate from the IENS meeting, be convened.168 Kasturi 
Srinivasan of The Hindu was commissioned to act as the public face for the conference, 
and he sent out messages to various large newspapers, both vernacular and English 
language, around the country calling them to Delhi for a “representative” conference. 
Citing a need for an Indian voice against increasing repression of freedom of expression 
by the government of India, the explanation of the conference suggested a new idea of the 
press as a vital, unified national industry, as opposed to an industry that displayed the 
instability of Indian unity, fractured by place, race, language, and politics. The 
conference invitations were meant to be national and representative in their breadth and 
depth. Even the Subjects Committee (convened to decide upon subjects and write 
resolutions for discussion at the plenary session) was constructed to represent both 
powerful and diverse constituencies.  
As soon as the first conference was suggested, articles and editorials began 
speculating whether the new organization could effectively fight the trend toward 
governmental censorship and restriction. The fight between the Press and the government 
was spun as a larger parable about the dangers of fascism seeping into a society and 
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undermining democracy and its resultant freedoms. The pre-conference articles 
connected the idea of the diverse newspaper industry coming together to protect freedom 
of the press to the idea of a diverse country unifying through their shared belief in 
democratic values. The idea of an organization brought together by shared values was 
mirrored in the discussion of the newspaper industry as unified through the concern for 
freedom of the press. 
While fighting the threat of collapsing freedom of expression and failing 
democracy, several editorials argued that unity unmarred by difference, or a fundamental 
unity, was a necessary tool in the fight to preserve freedom of expression. In one, the 
author points out that “The resultant position constitutes a grave threat not only to the 
Nationalist Press, but to the Press as a whole, Indian and Anglo-Indian, Congress and 
non-Congress. (…) Effective action is only possible if the Press stands united as a whole 
and does not disintegrate according to its political affiliations.”169 Oddly, the call for 
unanimous action was framed as a way to preserve the ability of papers to differ and 
present opinions at odds with each other. The early pre-conference press oscillated 
between the danger inherent to freedom if the press did not act unanimously and 
powerfully against the government and pro-uncensored news, and the goal of freedom to 
allow difference assuming certain shared fundamental tenets. In both cases, the idea that 
there would be a national organization that would unify the industry was supported, but 
the uncertainty about the structure of its unity could be seen even before the conference 
was called. 
Founding the All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference 
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The first conference of the AINEC was convened on November 10, 1940, one day after a 
second meeting between representatives of the IENS and the government about the 
change to the Defence of India Rules. Although the conference was well-attended, 
several important provincial newspapers, especially vernacular newspapers, were not 
initially invited. The Hindustan Times pointed out that the invitations had been sent 
haphazardly, because of the need to be reactive, but, since the conference had invited the 
papers with the largest circulation and papers from most major political and language 
group, the article argued that the conference was still representative.170 The conference 
organizers also argued that because the conference was organized with the intention of 
representing the newspaper industry the organization could be described as having a 
representative character. The organization’s claim to represent the whole newspaper 
industry, and its proof of this assertion by unified action at the conference, allowed the 
organization to make both an ideological and oppositional case against governmental 
restrictions on the freedom of the press. 
For an organization that prided itself on its ability to represent the entirety of the 
newspaper industry, the structure of the conference was far from modeling the kind of 
“democratic values” it claimed to hold. The Subjects Committee, appointed before the 
conference, decided the issues that were appropriate to the meeting and wrote the 
resolutions for the plenary session. The only debates on the resolutions, the agenda of the 
meeting, and the goals of the conference happened during the Subjects Committee 
meeting, held one day before the plenary session of the conference began. Members of 
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the Subjects Committee met with several government officials before the plenary session; 
the meeting resulted in the government agreeing to revoke the revisions to Defence of 
India Rule 41.171 Establishing the work of the conference in a small group, like the 
Subjects Committee, meant that the conference was able to run smoothly and present an 
organized, unified resistance to the government’s attempt to control the press. Still, if 
restricting debate on the actions of the conference to a very limited forum of editors of 
high circulating and/or politically important newspapers increased the formal unity to the 
point of unanimity, it also undermined idea of the organization’s claims to be unified 
through support for freedom of expression and its importance for democracy.  
The work by the Subjects Committee also brought up concerns about the 
AINEC’s relationship with the IENS and the government, because so many editors were 
members of both the IENS delegation to the government and the Subjects Committee for 
the AINEC. The timing of the Conference with respect to the timing of the meeting 
between the IENS and the government also caused a good amount of suspicion among 
journalists that the new conference was merely a rubber-stamp organization for the IENS. 
Despite being advertised separately from the IENS meeting with the government, the 
Conference was often written about as a continuation of the newspaper industry’s 
meeting with the government already in progress. The idea that the conference 
represented merely an open meeting of the IENS rather than a separate entity was 
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reinforced by the deeply hierarchical structure and secretive manner in which the 
Conference was conducted.172  
Despite the deeply secretive and hierarchical structure of the first meeting, the 
plenary session attempted to draw a clear trajectory from the values of the newspaper 
industry to the unity and democracy of the nation. Moreover, the link between unity and 
democracy was often defined as the ability to speak and express dissent, something that 
the AINEC tried to argue was the basis of their claim to “All India” representation. 
Speeches by the editors argued that the lack of a democratic national government was the 
reason that freedom of the press was under attack. The speech made by Mahadev Desai in 
the plenary session stressed the connection between fighting for freedom of the press and 
freedom for the nation, while Srinivasan pointed to the House of Common’s stand against 
censoring British newspapers. Both editors pointed out that the British were asking 
colonial people to accept a measure of repression that would be unacceptable under the 
democratically governed Britain.173 As the years went on, the AINEC would consistently 
stress the importance of freedom of expression for democracy and democracy for the 
founding of a stable and well-governed Indian nation.174   
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Both ideological unity and unity as unanimity were defined at the first meeting of 
the AINEC. The goal of the conference was defined by President Srinivasan’s speech, in 
which he argued that the conference was called in order to “agree upon a common 
action,” in response to government moves toward repression. But, according to 
Srinivasan, what made the conference worth supporting was the shared idea that freedom 
of the press was vitally important to the creation and support of a nation. Unity as 
unanimity gave strength to common action, but ideological unity created common cause. 
He said, “We in India are painfully aware of the many differences in the political sphere. 
But I am glad to feel that in regard to the liberties of the Press differences of outlook or 
opinion are not likely to divide us.”175 Although common action in the face of crisis was 
the cause for the founding of the AINEC, for Srinivasan loyalty to the concept of freedom 
of the press was the only way to hold the radically divergent subject positions in the 
industry together.  
The potential of unity based on common ideology is entirely determined by its 
implementation. For an organization that structured the claim for unity around knowing, 
accepting, and promoting divergences, the AINEC was woefully unable to accept dissent. 
The AINEC, from the very beginning, was an organization devoted to unity defined by 
unanimous action defined by the elite majority. The plenary session was short, lasting 
only a day, with no room for speeches about the resolutions presented by the Subjects 
Committee. Further, the speeches at the first conference were solicited from major editors 
in advance of the conference, so there was no chance for editors with unexpected 
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opinions to speak. The President of the Conference read the Subjects Committee’s 
resolutions aloud to the editors, because the conference did not pass out paper copies. The 
lack of paper copies of the resolutions meant that editors who were not members of the 
Subjects Committee could not review the resolutions before the vote, which followed 
viva voce directly after the resolutions were read, leaving no time for debate or 
amendment. The result was that the resolutions all passed unanimously.176 In a letter to 
J.N. Sahni, published in the Hindustan Times, Manoranjan Guha, the editor of the 
Ananda Bazar Patrika, a Bengali language newspaper, argued that several editors, 
himself included, had voted for the resolutions despite feeling uneasy about the overall 
haste of the proceedings and the structure of the new organization. He wrote, “I think like 
myself they suppressed whatever feeling of dissatisfaction for the sake of formal 
unity.”177 Although the ideological foundations of the conference may have been the 
respect for a common belief in the freedom of the press, the functioning of the conference 
was based on the concept of unanimous action. 
The resolutions at the 1940 AINEC conference were aimed at remaking the 
relationship between the press and the government. The most functional of these 
resolutions was the formation of a system of press advisory committees in each province 
and at the center that stood between the government and the newspaper editors in an 
effort to determine the appropriateness of news stories, to punish editors and publishers 
who were wanton in their publication of rumor, and to monitor the tone of news 
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stories.178 This plan had been advocated by the IENS in the meetings with the 
government before the AINEC conference was called, and the Government finally 
accepted the proposal as backed and operated by the AINEC largely because of their 
“representative capacity.” The government argued that because of "the recent All India 
Newspaper Editor's Conference, which was as fully representative as any such conference 
is likely to be,” the new organization would be better able to set up representative 
advisory committees in each province and at the center.179 The claim to represent the 
newspaper industry was based on both kinds of unity depending on who was asking it be 
proved. When speaking to the newspaper industry itself, the AINEC defined their 
representative claim based on the agreement that the industry had made to the ideological 
unity of their joint commitment to the protection and expansion of freedom of expression. 
When speaking to the government, the AINEC argued that their representative capacity 
was based on the unanimous agreement and commitment of the AINEC members to the 
actions taken by the organization.  
Even before the end of the plenary session, the government agreed to repeal their 
amendments to Defence of India Rule 41. In the press note announcing the reversion to 
the previous rule 41, the Government wrote,  
As a result of friendly conversations in Delhi with representatives of 
leading newspapers, who have given them an assurance that they have 
no intention of impeding the country’s war effort and that any deliberate 
or systematic attempt by newspapers to do so would be viewed with 
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disapproval by the Press as a whole. Government now feels that the 
matter may well be left to the discretion of Editors, in consultation with 
Press Advisors in cases of doubt.180 
 
The government also agreed to the setting up of Press advisory committees in each 
province and at the center with representatives appointed by the AINEC Standing 
Committee, so long as their choices were representative.181 The agreement between the 
government and the AINEC, in which the AINEC supported a policy against anti-war 
propaganda and the government agreed to send disputes through the advisory 
committees, was publicized as the Delhi agreement. 
The public response in the first days to both the concept and the effectiveness of 
the Conference was largely positive. The government had withdrawn its orders, and had 
endorsed the press-advising mechanism that the Conference had drawn up in Delhi. The 
AINEC’s unified front and the large attendance was lauded as especially effective in 
influencing the government. The idea of the newspaper industry working unanimously to 
stop further restrictions seemed to be a promising tactic against government incursion in 
press freedoms. Still, the Associated Press article about the success of the conference was 
headlined “Indian Press Gag Not So Tight Now,” and many editorials indicated a 
similarly tentative stance toward the success of the AINEC.182 In part, there was a fear 
among several editors, especially once the text of the press note revoking the rule change 
was parsed, that the newspaper industry had traded government fetters for self-policing 
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policies.183 The consensus was that the AINEC had made a good start in getting the 
government to reverse its decision, but that freedom of the press was by no means 
secured by the successes of the conference. Something about the way the conference was 
called (quickly and haphazardly), conducted (with all of the real discussion done behind 
closed doors with specific press elites), and closed (with the press note and the Delhi 
agreement) raised the hackles of even press editors positively disposed to the conference.  
Those misgivings became even more pronounced when on November 26, 1940, 
the Bengal Provincial government banned newspapers from publishing news of 
threatened hunger strike by Subhas Chandra Bose without consulting the provincial (or 
central) press advisory committee, and the United Provinces government not only refused 
to return the security surrendered from the National Herald, but demanded an additional 
10,000 rupees. The Hindustan Times argued, “When the news about the withdrawal of 
the order was conveyed to the Newspaper Editors’ Conference, which met at New Delhi 
on November 10, some delegates voiced their misgivings that though the order had been 
withdrawn, the assumption of powers to prohibit publication of news of a certain kind 
and to subject publication of such news to pre-censorship was still there to be used by the 
government whenever they felt it necessary to do so. These misgivings have proved 
absolutely justified.”184 The confusion about what had been actually accomplished at the 
first meeting of the AINEC, added to the general feeling of sacrificing without any 
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benefit, led to a series of public recriminations against and defenses of the AINEC that 
centered on the language of assurances in the government press note that was called the 
Assurances Crisis. 
Policing Dissent: Defining Unity through the Assurance Crisis 
The less than wholly confident reaction to the “success” of the AINEC among attendees 
was followed by a series of fundamental uncertainties that remained about the 
conference. Some questions were as mundane as a continued uncertainty as to the 
organizational aspirations of the conference, the name of the new organization, and the 
role of the newly-formed Standing Committee, all of which were answered within a few 
months after the conference. More troubling were the questions that continued to dog the 
conference until its fall from relevance just after independence in 1950. Most important 
among these were; what kind of responsibilities could the conference pledge in the name 
of its members and how much self-policing of ideas would be necessary to endorse the 
conference; that is, was unanimous support for AINEC required from members? 
In part, these uncertainties stemmed from the failure to specifically outline the 
conference’s aims at the outset. One group of editors saw the changes to Article 41 as the 
final attack on the freedom of the press, and thought that the AINEC conference goals 
were to fight against all press repression. Another group felt that the purpose of the 
conference was to fight specifically against Article 41, pushing for a return to the status 
quo with regards to press restrictions. This split persisted throughout the life of the 
AINEC, between the editors and journalists who argued that the organization was 
fundamentally about positive change (fighting for the expansion of freedom), and those 
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who were at least content with negative gains (pushing back against government 
encroachment on already ceded freedom.) The questions regarding the kind of unity 
required from the editors could partially map on to this distinction between positive and 
negative gains, where editors concerned with positive gains tended to be on the side of 
ideological unity, and allowing for a wider show of difference within the organization. 
While editors who were content with negative gains tended to support the more strategic 
unity as unanimity, following through on issues that the entire industry could support. 
These questions came to a head just after the government released the Press Note 
revoking the amendment to Article 41. The problem was specifically around the idea that 
the AINEC had given the government an assurance that the newspaper industry would 
self-police articles that dealt with the war effort. The idea that, without any mandate from 
the whole conference, some undefined group of leaders of the AINEC gave the 
government an assurance that the industry, under the auspices of the AINEC, would 
police its members’ speech was galling to editors who thought they had signed on to an 
organization unified by their devotion to freedom of expression. 
Several editors were dissatisfied with the language of the press note because it 
seemed to indicate to them that a backroom deal had been made.  Specifically, the 
language of assurances as it bound “the press as a whole” led to speculation about 
specific obligations made on behalf of people who were not privy to them. The main 
issues of the assurance crisis were set in a public letter exchange in which the editor of 
the Ananda Bazar Patrika asked Srinivasan to explain the language of the Press Note. He 
specifically asked for clarification about what made the government feel that there was an 
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assurance, what the assurance was, and who was involved in the negotiations. The 
concern was that the assurance seemed to bind the whole newspaper industry to not only 
police their own news about the war, but also to actively disapprove of papers and 
responses that hindered the war effort.  
Guha, the editor who wrote the open letter to J.N. Sahni, argued that under the 
press note’s dictates, “the press as a whole is saddled with the duty of viewing with 
disapproval any ‘deliberate or systematic attempt by a newspaper to do’ what the 
Government calls ‘impeding the country’s war effort.’ (…) Why should the ‘Press as a 
whole’ accept the task of ranging itself against a paper that is neither immoral nor 
transgresses any journalist etiquette?”185 The problem with the idea of “the press as a 
whole” is fundamental discomfort with the more totalizing versions of unity and 
representation that the AINEC presented as necessary in dealing with a hostile 
government. Hence the most effective argument made in the initial open letter exchange 
between Guha and Sahni was about what the nature of assurances in the AINEC ideally 
was. Guha argued that the AINEC leaders had “stretched their representative capacity 
somewhat beyond its legitimate limit,”186 because it forced upon the industry as a whole a 
responsibility for self-policing freedom of expression on certain topics. The claim that the 
organization unified and represented the ideological underpinnings of the newspaper 
industry meant that the AINEC had more responsibility not to police dissent out of their 
constituency.  
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Dissent has long been a partner to unity, either as an opposite, or as a key part of 
the equation.187 In the case of the AINEC, the organization tried to have it both ways, 
where behind closed doors, dissent was necessary to the organization’s conception of 
unity, but in the world the AINEC defined their organizational unity as without dissent. 
While the AINEC’s unified action forced the government to recognize the organization as 
a force to be reckoned with, the way the conference’s resolutions were accomplished 
struck some of the participants as overly disciplined and perhaps even contrary to the 
foundational idea of freedom of expression. Although the assurances crisis quickly 
moved from ideological issues of the conference to discussion of the failings of the 
conference, the question of when unity could be claimed was raised. Indeed, Guha, Desai, 
and other involved in the assurances crisis, in asking about what was promised in the 
name of “the press as a whole,” questioned the applicability of a claim of unity in the 
case that the opportunity for dissent was not presented.  
The AINEC’s representative claim was the responsibility to be sure that 
dissenting voices were heard and acknowledged. The challenge to the organization that 
emerged during the assurances crisis, especially around the issue of the “press as a 
whole,” was how to allow for dissent under the terms of unity that they had built their 
organization upon. Under a regime of unity as unanimity, a unified front against those 
papers that indiscreetly published prejudicial war news was the basis for leverage with 
the government against increasing restrictions on press freedoms. But, considered under 
the terms of an ideological unity in which the newspaper agreed to fight together on the 
                                                 
187
 This is certainly the case in the definition of the naming strategy “All India” whose two senses function 
as either making dissent into part of a unifying strategy or tamping down dissent to preserve unity. 
  111 
basis of a commonly held belief of freedom of expression through the press, the idea that 
the organization would censor based on any other position besides freedom of the press, 
and that this decision was taken without giving the press as a whole a chance to voice 
their discontent, was antithetical to the original purpose. 
By January 1941, the heated battle about the assurances had burned itself out 
amidst chides from editors that the fight was petty and undermined the ability of the 
AINEC to bill itself as unified.188 But dismissing the immediate questions of who gave 
assurances, what were they, and when were they given, did little solve the real problems 
of the assurances crisis; that is, what kind of unity and organizational structure would be 
most appropriate for the AINEC? For the AINEC, the structure of claims of 
representative power through disciplined approval of undisclosed actions came to 
organizationally indicate unity of action and widely shared obligation. The sense of 
obligation seemed to be two-fold; the obligation to disown writing that seemed counter to 
the government’s war effort and the more insidious obligation of the papers to stifle their 
own dissent and expression on the basis of the representative capability of the unanimous 
organization. 
Defining Representation: Agenting, Mirroring, and Absenting  
The AINEC articulated their representational claims in three ways, by claiming to be an 
agent of the press, by claiming to mirror the make-up of the industry in their membership, 
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and by creating a space between the press and the government through the press advisory 
mechanisms.189  First, they argued that the resolutions at the 1940 conference had 
authorized the AINEC to speak and make decisions for the press as their agent. This 
claim of representation based on being the agent of the industry was based on the idea 
that the organization best suited to care for the core beliefs of the newspaper industry in 
its concern for freedom of the press. This first representational strategy was empowered 
by the claim of ideological unity, because it relied on the organization being trusted to act 
responsibly to preserve freedom of expression even if the editors acting as agents would 
not necessarily be able to act as stand-ins for their trustees.  
Secondly, the AINEC argued that they were best suited to represent the 
newspaper industry because their large and widespread membership best mirrored that 
industry. This second representational claim that the AINEC mirrored the industry was 
argued based on the organization having members that could stand in for larger segments 
of the industry. By putting editors in positions such as the Madras editor, the Anglo-
Indian editor, or the Hindi-language editor, the representational claim of mirroring 
allowed the AINEC to support the idea of an industry at its core undivided, and an 
organization that valued unity as unanimity.  
The third representational claim, of creating a space between the industry and the 
government, is less straight-forward. In the advisory committees, the AINEC tried to find 
a way to define the representative goals outside of the industry by claiming to represent 
an idea– freedom of the press– and thereby making the organization’s goal not industry 
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protection but national democracy. The goal was to absent the AINEC from the goal of 
representing the press to the government and the government to the press by offering a 
space through which the two could speak.  The three representational claims supported 
different registers of meaning for AINEC’s efforts to understand unity and its All India 
status. 
Because the AINEC’s vision of Indian unity was in part built on the idea that 
there was a set of fundamental beliefs that tied together the newspaper industry, the 
organization was freed in part from describing their representational capacity in terms of 
numbers and mirroring. In March 1941, V.S. Venkatraman, editor of New India, argued 
that “the Editors’ Conference had in such a short time, done so much for the protection of 
the liberty of the Indian press,”190 that the organization had already fulfilled its promise to 
be a strong voice against attempts to harness freedom of expression. As such, the AINEC 
in general, and the Standing Committee as the acting body of that organization, had 
shown that it was an appropriate agent for the newspaper industry. 
Immediately after the first conference, B. Shiva Rao, an associate editor at the 
Hindu, argued that “the Conference stood for the interests of the Press as a whole, and he 
begged of the members not think in terms of vernacular press or territorial 
representation.”191 The AINEC argued that in pursuing an agenda of protecting– and in 
some cases expanding– the freedom of the press, the newspaper industry had a reliable 
agent in the organization. Indeed, Shiva Rao and others argued that the choice of editors 
with good reputations, skill as negotiators, and strong connections with both the news 
                                                 
190
 “Work of Editors’ Conference: Nagpur Journalists’ Tribute: Mr. Srinivasan Appeal for Cooperation,” 
The Hindu, March 15, 1941, 5.  
191
 Ibid. 
  114 
industry and the government, meant that the AINEC was better able to represent the 
industry’s main goals and ideologies. 
The AINEC had problems sustaining this representational claim, because its 
validity was not entirely clear. Although the assurances crisis stopped being news after 
the first meeting of the Standing Committee in 1941, the questions about dissent, secrecy, 
and discipline left many newspaper editors wondering if the organization was the best 
agent to represent their commitment to freedom of expression. In order to allay the fears 
of some newspapers that the AINEC in general, and especially that the Standing 
Committee were too conservative and thus could not represent more nationalist papers, 
the Standing Committee began to argue that the AINEC was the organization that stood 
the best chance of having a cross section of the industry on its membership roles.192 It 
was this representational claim that forced the government to see the AINEC as the 
industry’s representative in negotiations. But this representational claim required constant 
work. At the first Standing Committee meeting, three new member slots were added to 
better represent language and minority newspapers. The Standing Committee also had to 
make sure that each of its members could be assigned to a discrete subject position. 
Even with constant revision, this claim was flawed from the very beginning. The 
organization was not large enough to accommodate any particular newspaper’s views. 
Attempts to fill slots for categories of newspapers that did not support the AINEC were 
particularly tortured. For example, in an attempt to represent “Muslim newspapers” the 
AINEC Standing Committee invited Tej, a Congress-supporting Urdu newspaper, and in 
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an effort to keep the committee size within reason, proprietors of chains that included 
both language and English papers were slotted into language paper slots. Because of the 
agenda of unity as unanimity the AINEC standing committee was not able to fully admit 
the kinds of differences of opinion that would allow for representation to mirror the 
industry.  
One of the ways the AINEC defended its suitability to represent the newspaper 
editors was the authorization granted to the AINEC by both the government and the 
industry to act as a mediator through the Advisory Committees. One of the most 
important, and surprisingly uncontroversial, resolutions to come out of the first 
conference called for the creation of a Central Advisory Committee (whose membership 
corresponded directly with the Standing Committee) and Provincial Advisory 
Committees.193 These committees were technically separate from the AINEC, but they 
were staffed by AINEC leaders and were often conflated with the AINEC. Their role was 
to act as “a body of fellow-editors […] interposed between the journalist and the 
Government.”194  The Standing Committee suggested names of editors who would be 
good candidates to the Provincial governments and the Provinces were instructed by the 
government to accept the names, providing that they were “representative”.195 It is 
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unclear what the government’s criteria for being representative was, but the AINEC 
claimed to nominate people from their side who would represent the value of freedom of 
the press in a space that was institutionally between the government and the press. 
The editor of the Bombay Chronicle, reflecting on the role of the advising bodies 
two years after its enactment, argued that the space provided by the Central and 
Provincial press advisory committees “enabled the Press, in some parts of the country, at 
any rate, to safeguard to a considerable extent what little liberties have been left to it.”196 
By creating space between the newspaper editor and government punishment, the 
organization did help preserve some aspects press liberty. However, the space put the 
organization in a difficult situation in decoding its representative mandate. Clearly, 
newspaper editors, in opposition to specific restrictions by the government against the 
press, created the organization and, as such, the AINEC’s main representational claim 
was as an advocate for newspaper concerns to the government.197 On the other hand, the 
government argued that in agreeing to work with the AINEC in the form of Advisory 
Committees, the Standing Committee of the AINEC was compelled to also represent 
government positions to the newspaper industry.  The AINEC was constantly fighting 
against claims by the organization’s members that the Standing Committee was too 
willing to compromise to preserve some advising system and claims from the government 
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that the organization was too willing to let newspaper editors who really did undermine 
the war effort off with a warning or less.198 
All Indian or National: The Suspended Newspaper Conference and the Second 
AINEC Plenary Session 
As 1942 progressed, the government attempted to more rigorously control the popular 
political situation by policing the mechanisms of public opinion about the war and the 
government- including speeches, meetings, and the press. The war was not going well in 
Europe, and the nationalist agitation was increasing. In an attempt to keep the press 
positive on the war and the government, the government threatened several times to 
discard the relationship with the AINEC. These feints away from the working 
relationship with the AINEC were generally quickly resolved, but their resolution 
generally included the AINEC agreeing to slightly more restrictive press censorship. Still, 
until May 1942, the general framework of the organization was largely static.199  Despite 
continued wariness on the part of editors, newspapers tended to read the almost constant 
level of government censorship until summer 1942 as proof of the AINEC claims that 
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they had some success in curbing the government’s attempts to censor reporting of the 
nationalist movement under the cover or war necessities.200 The caveat to these generally 
positive feelings regarding the successful operation of the AINEC was Bengali 
newspapers, which were buried under a series of ever escalating censorship demands 
from their provincial government. 
The generally positive feelings changed in May 1942, a few days before a 
scheduled Standing Committee meeting, when the government, responding to an 
investigation of Congress party headquarters,201 wrote an open letter to the AINEC 
arguing that despite the good work that the organization, the advisory committees, and 
the government had been able to accomplish together, they were no longer able to 
continue the relationship because of the “defeatist” rhetoric in many newspapers’ 
coverage of the war.202 The letter stated, “subject to discussion at the forthcoming 
meeting, it will no longer be possible for Government to maintain in full the procedure 
which was the subject of the understanding with the AINEC.”203 Almost immediately 
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after the announcement was made, the government began censoring and closing 
newspapers, especially in provinces where Advisory Committees had been ineffective or 
had never been set up and on papers that ran radically nationalistic editorials. The AINEC 
met with the government in an attempt to reinstate the advisory committee system.  
Although the negotiations were hailed as a partial success in renewing contacts 
between the government and the AINEC, the short break in relations highlighted the 
problems inherent in defining an “All Indian” organization from the center.204 The 
national government was loath to force the provincial compliance with the AINEC and 
the advisory committees, and the AINEC’s representative claims did not endow 
provincial AINEC branches with the power to assert themselves with provincial 
governments. As a result, the AINEC claimed successes that were never manifest in non-
complying provinces. Provinces like Bengal and the United Province (later Uttar 
Pradesh), which were both fairly radically nationalistic, often failed to see any 
meaningful success from AINEC agreements with the government. The disparity in relief 
that the AINEC’s meetings with the government was able to give and the expectations of 
the editors trying to avoid punishments left editors in provinces with tight censorship to 
ask whether they could be united in the ideology of an “All Indian” organization but still 
not be effectively represented by the same organization. While it made sense that the 
AINEC needed to negotiate and organize their national organization from a standpoint of 
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the whole nation, some papers made it clear that it was a problem that the AINEC 
ignored local concerns.205  
On August 9, 1942, the All India Congress Committee (AICC) met and ratified 
the “Quit India” resolution.206 The resolution called for the British to leave the running of 
India to the Indians, and for Indians to declare themselves Indian citizens, completely 
free of British colonial rule. The Government of India promptly declared the AICC to be 
a criminal organization. Most of the visible leaders of the AICC were arrested within a 
week of the announcement, and the Government declared that any news about the AICC 
required approval by the censor before publication. Moreover the government published a 
press note that warned, “The editor of any newspaper who supports or encourages the 
mass movement sponsored by the bodies referred to above [Congress] or who opposes 
the measures take be Government to avert or suppress that movement will be guilty of an 
offense against the law.”207 Just before the announcement of censorship of material about 
the Congress, on August 8th, the Government formally cancelled relations with the 
AINEC and imposed a series of drastic censorship rules. They required the registration of 
correspondents; imposed strict censorship on all war news; declared compulsory pre-
censorship of all news; and declared that they could censor any article without providing 
justification.208  
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In May 1942, when the Government of India began a new campaign to impose 
pre-censorship on several categories of “factual news,” several papers called for the 
calling of another AINEC plenary session. The calls became more strident as newspapers 
were punished for what seemed to be inoffensive news stories. The Bombay Chronicle 
was fined for publishing information about a riot in the city that was started by British 
soldiers, while the Hindustan Times was told to stop publication after the editor, Devdas 
Gandhi was jailed because of his publication of a story about a nationalist leader, J.P. 
Bhansali, who was fasting because of a mass rape in the village of Chimur, by soldiers. 
After August 1942, calls for a new general meeting of the AINEC increased. 
Several member editors, especially those from provinces with particularly repressive 
provincial governments, no longer felt convinced that the Standing Committee was 
appropriately representative of the AINEC membership at large. On August 11, 1942, in 
a widely-published open letter, Ramnath Goenka (the owner and editor of the Indian 
Express Group) wrote: 
The Indian press have to determine the policy to be adopted in the conditions 
created by the latest activities of the Indian National Congress and the 
Government’s policy of in retaliation thereto. (…) No decision can be taken by 
the present Standing Committee which has outlived its tenure and which can 
claim no representative character in the greatly changed circumstances of 
today will represent the opinions or interests of the members or even a majority 
thereof. It is therefore, essential that the President should call a meeting of the 
plenary session without any delay.209 
 
The letter refutes the representative character of the Standing Committee both in terms of 
its organizational claim (by asserting that it was out of date) and in terms of its 
constituency (by asserting that it was no longer adequately representative of the industry). 
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Goenka argued that the despite organizational mandates, the Standing Committee was not 
re-elected by a plenary session after its year-long tenure expired. Moreover, he argued 
that because the Standing Committee no longer seemed to speak to the values of most 
newspapers in the country, they no longer could claim ideological representative status. 
Still, his claim that the Standing Committee was no longer representative did not call into 
question the ability of the AINEC to represent the newspaper industry. In a way, this call 
by Goenka argued that the only way for the AINEC to remain representative of the 
newspaper industry was to disinvest the Standing Committee of representative power for 
the organization.  
Despite calls for a plenary session, the Standing Committee decided to negotiate 
with the government to renew contacts rather than call a plenary session. The 
Government agreed provisionally to a meeting with the Standing Committee, but 
suggested that ties would not be renewed without significant concessions from the 
AINEC on war censorship. Without the option to express their grievances en masse, 
newspapers that had been the target of increased censorship began suspending 
publication (or were forced into suspension by the demands for high securities to be paid 
to the government). Many big nationalist papers, specifically Bande Mataram and the 
National Herald, suspended their operations almost immediately. Other papers including 
the Hindustan Times, Hindustan, and almost all of the large Bengali papers suspended 
before September.210 Although some Anglo-Indian papers refused to fully comply with 
the government’s new restrictions, they were left largely unmolested. The disparity in the 
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treatment of papers, from the standpoint of political affiliation and geographic context 
suggested that one of the problems with agreeing to a system of unity as unanimity meant 
that grievances were unlikely to be dealt with unless they effected the industry as a 
whole, or perhaps more tellingly, if they effected the leaders of the organizations. 
At the AINEC Standing Committee meeting with the Government in middle 
August, a structure was agreed upon to provide “consultative scrutiny in certain 
categories of news,”211 if the government would agree to repeal their August 8th press 
restrictions. In the meeting, the Government agreed to repeal the restrictions from the 
center, but allowed for broad leeway for provincial governments to continue heightened 
censorship measures. The AINEC called this agreement, which was never fully made 
public, a huge success, and encouraged suspended newspapers to begin publishing again. 
Many newspapers complied, including almost all of the suspended Bengali papers.  
Despite the AINEC insistence that the “consultative scrutiny” was not the 
equivalent of pre-censorship, newspapers that defined themselves as nationalist found 
that their articles were being censored. Shortly after resuming publication, strict 
government censorship caused newspapers to question the exact details of the new 
AINEC Government framework, arguing that the AINEC had misled papers in urging 
them to begin publishing again. The discontent caused several papers to again suspend 
operations, but more importantly for the organization, several newspapers rescinded their 
membership in the AINEC. The board of The Nagpur Times pulled the representative 
from the AINEC arguing that the AINEC failed to protect its members against capricious 
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censorship.212 The clear spilt between editors who suspended publication and those who 
did not was commented on as a break in the spirit of unity that had previously 
characterized the AINEC’s self-image.  
Suspended Newspaper’s Conference: Unity and Representation Questioned 
When it became clear that the AINEC would not immediately call a plenary session to 
discuss the August restrictions, Samaldas Gandhi began organizing a conference from 
September 14-16 in Bombay for editors of newspapers that had suspended operations to 
meet and discuss the national situation and the place of press freedom in it. The SNC was 
initially organized to protest the lack of response from the AINEC to the plight of certain 
sections of their constituency. Goenka argued that the nationalist papers had borne the 
brunt of the most recent set of regulations, and given the disproportionate restrictions, the 
nationalist press needed representatives who would take their plight into account 
separately from other sections of the press. Circumscribing issues that could be discussed 
by the ability to gain consensus meant that solutions that could solve the nationalist 
papers’ troubles would often be discarded. He argued,  
The Anglo-Indian press as a body is totally unaffected by the situation created by 
recent events and happenings. Its counsel will therefore be of little avail to help us 
through the troubles that confront us. It is imperative that Nationalist newspapers 
in the country subjected to repression on political grounds should have a 
dependable organization for dealing with matters of common interests.213 
 
Goenka, S. Gandhi, and several of the other participants in the conference were arguing 
that there were significant differences in not only the biases between various political 
bents of papers, but also in the way the context of colonial India affected their industry. 
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For this reason, they argued that an organization like the AINEC, which valued unity as 
unanimity, could no longer represent them.  
Ideologically, the nationalist papers were forced to consider whether the agitation 
for freedom of the press could function as a proper articulation of the desire for the 
freedom that an independent, democratic government represented. The AINEC’s 
emphasis on working with the government to secure press freedom had come to be seen 
as a way to continue to assert the colonial government’s authority to regulate the 
industry. Moreover, the efforts of the AINEC for the year and half of its existence had not 
shown an increase in press freedom that could be leveraged toward national 
independence. Initially, part of the AINEC organizational image had been that in 
asserting unity under the ideological commitment to preserve freedom of the press they 
were building the conditions of possibility for freedom more generally. When Srinivasan 
argued that freedom of the press was essential for a democratic nation, the implication 
was that they were working toward even more significant freedom. But it was 
increasingly clear that advocating for freedom of the press was not the same as 
advocating for freedom in general. S. Gandhi argued that if the nationalist papers wanted 
independence, then they would need to break from the unity that the AINEC espoused. 
The conference ended with the nationalist papers authorizing a new organization, 
the Indian National Press Congress (INPC), contingent upon what happened in October at 
the AINEC conference. Although the INPC never met again, the organization is 
interesting for its differences from the AINEC. The most important difference was in the 
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INPC’s stated antipathy toward working with the government.214 According to Goenka, 
the INPC’s focus “would be turned not on securing the favor of officials, but rendering 
service to its people (nationalist newspapers) with care and dignity.”215 By maintaining 
themselves as unified around the difficulties of opposition journalism and not allowing 
themselves to be part of a larger project of negotiating with the government, the INPC fit 
well with a different model of nationalist organizations not aiming for a life past 
independence.216 
The Second AINEC Conference: Unity and Representation Reasserted 
When the AINEC met in early October 1942, it was under the cloud of the complete 
repudiation from the Suspended Newspapers Conference (SNC). The SNC had called for 
the AINEC to “desist from all undertakings purporting to be given in the name of and on 
the behalf of the Nationalist section of the Press. It also disowns all undertakings already 
given.”217 Given such language, in order to keep their claim to unity, the AINEC needed 
to justify the workings of the conference to nationalist section of the press, present 
actions for positive gains in press freedoms, and not alienate moderate, conservative, and 
Anglo-Indian newspapers in their attempts to appease the nationalist section. In order to 
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do so, Srinivasan’s presidential address pointed to the power of unity– specifically unity 
as unanimity. 
Srinivasan argued that limiting debate and divided action on divisive issues had 
prevented the government from following through on threatened restrictions that were 
stronger and more odious even than the strictures the press worked under at that time. By 
being unanimous, the AINEC had preserved as much liberty for the press as could be had 
from the government.218 Srinivasan’s argument suggested that the unanimous aspect of 
unity created an opportunity for expressing (if not fully supporting) ideological unity, and 
that ideological unity transformed newspapers— fundamentally local things— into 
national objects requiring an “All Indian” organization to support their national aims.  
The AINEC continued to define its power with the government through their 
unity presented in unanimity in voting. In his 1942 presidential address to the second 
AINEC plenary session, Kasturi Srinivasan described the structure of AINEC Standing 
Committee debates. He said, “I may next explain to you the procedure we generally 
follow in our discussion in the Standing Committee. Every member is allowed full 
freedom to express his views as strongly as he can; but every decision we come to is 
always agreed to unanimously and if there is any view that is likely to divide us we do 
not press for its adoption.”219 Srinivasan’s argument about the importance of unanimity in 
resolutions was that despite differences the press, as represented by the AINEC, had 
“always acted as a team in the matter of resisting all attempts to circumscribe the liberty 
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and freedom of the press.”220 The picture Srinivasan presented in his speech was of a 
unified front, which privately respected divisive arguments as part of its whole.  
Arguing that the newspaper industry needed to resist the urge to divide based on 
political differences, Srinivasan argued that all newspapers fundamentally required 
freedom of expression and that working together would give the industry its best chance 
to thwart government attempts to stifle expression. Several editors pointed out that 
splitting into sections allowed the government a better chance to play the papers against 
each other, reprising the common argument about divide and rule. For example, in an 
editorial after the second day of the AINEC meeting, the Bombay Chronicle argued, “if 
these journalists work in a spirit of unism [oneness] in resisting all attempts to fetter the 
liberty of the press, it would be impossible for the Government to divide and crush 
them.”221 The meeting of the AINEC therefore argued that without the power of a united 
industry, unanimously represented by a central national organization, goals for freedom 
of the press, or an ideological unity based on a commitment to that freedom, would be 
impossible to honor. 
Still, in order to maintain the idea of unanimity that had characterized their 
previous Conference, the AINEC leadership was required to take several controversial 
proactive steps. First, they had to promise to start working more provincially, especially 
in the set-up and management of Advisory Committees. The uneven implementation of 
the Advisory Committees had long been an area of grievance among moderate papers, 
and during the Suspended Newspaper Conference, it was brought up as an example of the 
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AINEC being too focused on lobbying the national government to see the problems 
occurring in the provinces.  
The Conference proceedings as a whole argued that in provinces where an 
effective Advisory committee was operating the Government was less likely to punish 
papers harshly.222 The resolutions of the plenary session did nothing to correct the 
disparities in the workings of newspaper censorship across the country however. In 
practice, the conference ended with the announcement that the central government was 
willing to agree to the AINEC resolutions regarding revising “consultative scrutiny” but 
at the same time the government announced that it would no longer make policy for 
provinces regarding censorship, and it would stop encouraging provincial governments to 
work with the AINEC on Advisory Committees. Divorcing central government policy 
from provincial enforcement meant that the AINEC, from this point forward, would be 
responsible for working individually with local authorities. 
The AINEC had warned the government that if it did not allow for factual 
information to be published, then the press would institute a press blackout of 
government information. On the strength of the promises made by the Standing 
Committee for strong action, Srinivasan, and most of the Standing Committee were 
unanimously reelected, and the Nationalist newspapers agreed to officially disband the 
INPC and rejoin the AINEC. 
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In one of the most effective actions the organization ever took, the AINEC 
decided to punish the government nationally for the failure of the Central Provinces to lift 
the ban on news about Bhansali’s fast. The AINEC declared a series of blackouts of 
Government news in all member newspapers. Participating papers would not publish the 
Government’s New Year’s Honours List, Government advertisements, or Press Notes. 
Moreover, the AINEC declared on January 6, 1943, newspapers would suspend 
nationally. Initially, the government refused to call an investigation into the matter, 
allowing Central Provinces to continue to assert that the story was not factual. But after 
150 of 190 newspapers did suspend publication, the government relented and began an 
investigation into the atrocities, which forced the Central Provinces to allow press 
coverage of both the investigation and the hunger strike.223 The policy shift was hailed as 
a win for the AINEC and for the idea of nationally united action. Moreover, the strong 
actions gained the AINEC some credit with the Nationalist papers, which despite some 
continued concern, supported the AINEC until independence. 
The assertion of the Standing Committee acting as the guardian of the press 
liberty, and as such as an indivisible body was much more complex than the AINEC 
Standing Committee wanted to admit. The fact that the second plenary conference was 
held under the schismatic scare of the Suspended Newspapers Conference (and the 
possible new organization the SNC suggested to represent “nationalist” newspapers) 
indicated that the practice of only formally discussing and recording issues that would not 
lead to a divided vote failed to effectively take into consideration the concerns of several 
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sections of the press.224 At the 1942 conference, the AINEC was only able to retain the 
tradition of unanimity by promising both an increased representation on the Standing 
Committee and a more direct approach boycotting the government. By pushing most 
significantly for a modified version of ideological unity that included unity as unanimity, 
Srinivasan was downsizing the AINEC’s mission to represent the Indian newspaper 
industry broadly, instead creating a very limited number of subjects that the organization 
could formally discuss, despite the fact that at the same time the Indian newspaper 
industry was attempting to capture a broader range of ideas.  
The AINEC had to wrestle with the problem that their power with the government 
depended upon a strict self-censorship of topics of discussion within the industry and did 
not allow for recognition of the difference among its members, which prefaced their 
stance as an “All India” organization. As they worked to create industrial (and by proxy a 
national) unity defined by a fundamental and or universal principle, the return to claims 
that allowed different political, geographic, or language practitioners to have distinct 
enough reading of the universal principle to require their own articulation in the 
organizational hierarchy damaged the ideal of a nation undifferentiated at some level. 
The flaw in their ideological unity, which Srinivasan obliquely recognized in his defense 
of it, was the failure to imagine that freedom of the press might mean something else to 
different segments of the newspaper industry. 
Fractured Unity and Failed Representation: The AINEC after Independence 
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The events surrounding the 1942 AINEC conference suggested a continued uncertainty 
among the organization’s membership as to whether the AINEC, with its profession of 
ideological unity, was able to represent the industry effectively. Moreover, although the 
nationalist editors chose to rejoin the organization at the end of the 1942 session, the 
reasons for their rejoining were unclear. Did the nationalist editors rejoin the AINEC in 
an effort to fight for press freedom, or an effort to fight against colonial government 
censorship? While these two fights were combined, the AINEC could proclaim itself as 
unified in its desire for wider freedom; the organization could emphasize the connection 
between press freedom and national freedom.  
Even directly after independence, the connection between press freedom and 
national freedom seemed unassailable; the government began to make the national press 
more open. In a widely quoted statement, Jawaharlal Nehru claimed, “I would rather have 
a completely free Press, with all the dangers involved in the wrong use of that freedom, 
than a suppressed or regulated Press.”225 More to the point, Nehru’s government 
rescinded the Defence of India Acts in 1948, and repealed many of the long-standing bills 
that supported colonial censorship and restriction of the press. Moreover, when the 
national constitution was adopted in 1950 it included an unlimited freedom of expression 
in the fundamental freedoms section, explicitly preserving freedom of the press.  
Still, despite these actions, the national government was not entirely friendly 
toward the unlimited exercise of press freedom. Several journals and newspapers noted 
that though the press restrictions were revoked, the government actively tried to “reserve 
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to themselves the right of pre-censoring and even suppressing news and comments.”226 
Newspapers that were unhappy with the government credited the satisfaction with the 
national government’s press policies to a desire to support the new national government 
at all costs. Indeed, there were several instances where newspapers appealed to the 
AINEC complaining of censorship and mistreatment by the government. Hori Lal 
Saxena, the editor of the right wing weekly paper, The Nationalist, wrote the AINEC to 
ask them to back his claims that the government had discriminated against his paper 
unjustly. He argued the repression was due to his paper’s consistent criticism of the 
Nehru government. He wrote, “Either declare openly that [the government] is the 
Autocracy of Pt. Nehru… and as such nobody has the right to criticize his actions, or if it 
is asserted, as is done ad nauseum, that the present Government of India is a Democracy, 
then no one has a right to curtail my freedom of expression.”227 Saxena’s argument was 
that the government of India was using laws against the incitement of communal violence 
as a way to stifle criticism of national policies.  He was not the only newspaper editor to 
argue as much. The editor of The Daily Pratap, a newspaper that moved from Lahore to 
New Delhi after partition, made similar claims in a counter-suit charging the government 
with sedition after the government banned the newspaper on the charge of inciting 
communal violence.228 
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In addition to the policing of newspapers, the government encouraged the AINEC 
to discipline newspapers that made “scurrilous” claims, participated in communal 
rhetoric, or supported causes that would destabilize the government— particularly papers 
associated with the Communist Party. Vallabhai Patel, an important nationalist figure, 
and the minister of Information, gave a speech at the 1947 AINEC conference, where he 
encouraged the organization to be particular vigilant against the “spread of the 
Communal virus” from Muslim community papers, and to work toward making the 
newspaper industry more “responsible.”229 The AINEC did take up the issue of 
journalistic ethics during the conferences immediately after independence, attempting to 
create a list of press values and a curriculum for schools to teach proper journalism.230 
But the celebration of independence, as well as a general feeling of mistrust toward 
Muslims, meant that the AINEC was unwilling to act decisively against slights, and 
weakened their claim to ideological unity in that any encroachment on freedom of the 
press would be unacceptable. 
Revising the Fundamental Freedoms 
By the end of 1949, the national stance on the protection of freedom of the press had 
materially changed. Under the pressure to stem a variety of “anti-social” movements--
communal rioting, border disputes, militant communism, and price gouging of food 
staples especially in Delhi, Bengal, and Punjab--the government began to consider the 
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advisability of reinstating some press laws as a way to control at least the image of the 
problem. In looking toward reinstating control of the press, the government came up 
against two major cased decided by the Supreme Court in 1949, Romesh Thapar v. the 
Government of Madras, and Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi. In both cases, the Supreme 
Court struck down attempts by provincial governments to censor newspapers on the basic 
of protection of “public order.” In Thapur, a communist journal The State of Crossroads, 
was banned from circulating the journal, and in Bhushan, Organiser, a conservative, 
Hindu Nationalist journal was asked to submit articles about Pakistan for pre-censorship 
before publication. In both cases, the Supreme Court argued that while the opinions 
professed by the newspapers were extreme, the constitutional standard for censorship, 
“security of the state,” required a higher standard of threat than the standard of 
“preservation of public order,” and therefore, the government could not constitutionally 
use the latter justification to restrict speech.231  
In the course of debates about these decisions, Justice Sarjoo Prasad argued, “if a 
person were to go on inciting murder or other cognizable offences either through the 
press or by word of mouth, he would be free to do so with impunity because he could 
claim freedom of speech and expression.”232 Nehru took up this line of reasoning in 
arguing that an amendment of freedom of speech clause was necessary, if not to allow a 
full measure of “public order,” then at least to prevent the incitement to criminal action. 
In 1951, Nehru’s government called for an amendment to the Fundamental Freedoms 
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Clause 19 (which guaranteed the freedom of expression) to include “reasonable 
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of 
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or 
morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.”233 
In addition to the move to change the Constitution, Nehru’s government also advocated 
the passing of the Press (Objectionable Matters) Act, 1951, to give the government a 
stronger hand in suppressing overtly communal sentiments in newspapers. 
The AINEC called a special plenary session in June of 1951 to discuss the 
amendment to the constitution and the possibility of a return to fight against government 
censorship. The president of the AINEC in 1951 Lala Deshbandhu Gupta argued in his 
plenary address that the organization needed to maintain its traditional unanimity in the 
passing of a resolution against the Government’s amendments to the constitution, even if 
the resolution was a compromise. He appealed to the 1951 AINEC plenary session that 
he was “looking forward to a spirit of accommodation among the members and they 
would pass a resolution in a way that was acceptable to all. If the conference is divided in 
its resolution, we are starting with a very big handicap in the struggle.”234 The resolution 
that came out of the conference called for the AINEC to suspend the working of the 
Advisory Committees and to resist the passing of the amendment bill. Still even this mild 
of a resolution did not pass unanimously, with a group of editors publishing a statement 
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saying, “it would be inopportune and hence unwise to start ‘direct action against a 
democratic Government with a large public support.”235 The failure of unanimity was a 
heavy blow to the power of the AINEC with the government but more importantly it hurt 
the organization’s credibility with its own membership. The organization’s staunchest 
members, like the Bombay Chronicle and the Hindu, questioned whether, given the 
advent of national freedom, the organization would be able to support press freedom. The 
divided vote did more than merely give lie to claim of a unified, unanimous organization, 
it raised the question of whether the ideological stance of freedom of the press was still 
relevant. 
The resistance of the AINEC to the press amendment was problematic in terms of 
the organization’s commitment to “All Indian” unity. The amendment was billed as a 
chance to fight the kind of rhetoric that threatened national integrity. One of the AINEC’s 
main supporters and a past president (and incidentally the author of the AINEC’s 
resolution against the amendment bill), A.D. Mani wrote a few months after the passage 
of the amendment that while it was important to support freedom of the press in India, 
“when it is remembered that the Indian democracy was almost engulfed by communal 
fanaticism in 1947 and by external troubles like the war in Kashmir and the intransigence 
of the Nizam of Hyderabad, one can sympathize with the majority of Indian newspapers 
in their desire not to embarrass the government.”236 The amendment and the subsequent 
press act were both billed as ways that the Government could preserve Indian unity 
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against communal and communist calls to disunity and violence. The position of the 
government asked editor members to decide between the unity of the AINEC and the 
ideological position of freedom of the press on the one hand and the unity and 
preservation of the nation on the other. In the end, the AINEC could not even encourage 
enough support among its membership to ensure that the editors in parliament would vote 
against the measure. 
Aftermath 
After the failures of the AINEC to put together a unified or vigorous response to the 
constitutional amendment and the new press law, it was no surprise that the organization 
lost a certain amount of stature with the government. After the suspension of the 
Advisory Committees, Nehru’s government decided to appoint a government division 
called the Press Commission that would work like the Advisory Committees. The AINEC 
was invited to become a member of the Press Commission on the same footing as smaller 
press organizations.  
 In addition to the loss of “sole-spokesman” standing for the newspaper industry 
with the government, the failure of the AINEC to take issues of journalist pay and 
working conditions seriously resulted in the loss of enough support among working 
journalists that an alternative in the Indian Federation of Working Journalists was 
founded in 1950. The Government took advantage of the new Working Journalists’ 
organization to point out the variety of views on press issues, while the Working 
Journalists argued the emphasis of the AINEC on proprietors and editors failed to protect 
working people. In its loss of primacy with the government and some parts of the 
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newspaper industry, the AINEC lost its ability to claim that it was unanimously the 
representative of the industry.  
Conclusion 
The AINEC tied their organizational conceptions of unity to their definition of 
themselves as “All India” editors in a speculative Indian nation. The foundational 
ideological unity attempted to define common ground, in this case freedom of the press, 
which all members could claim to desire. Unity at a fundamental level meant that 
newspaper editors could point to something that defined their commitment to the nation 
and to each other, even when they disagreed about everything else. Ideally, the AINEC 
was “All Indian” because they differed, not in spite of their differences. The idea of an 
ideological unity that recognized and negotiated difference is appealing for a nation like 
India, whose differences are sometimes more manifestly obvious than its similarities.  
 The problem that the AINEC ran into was that in order to effectively work against 
the colonial government’s attempts to impose stricter restrictions on freedom of the press, 
they needed to appear unanimously in support of organizational action. As an 
oppositional organization, the AINEC needed to police dissent and difference in its 
members. This type of unity was both undesirable and untenable; once independence had 
been accomplished, the organization could neither convince editors that their support of 
the nation hinged on their opposition to national attempts to restrict freedom of the press, 
nor could the AINEC change organizational convention to accept open dissent as part of 
their organizational unity. 
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 Ultimately the burden of two contradictory systems of defining unity and the loss 
of urgency in defining India’s future democracy in the face of national independence 
caused the AINEC’s sense of itself as All India in a constitutive way to lapse. But the 
organization’s attempts to create an Indian democracy that was built on the right to speak, 
publish, and acknowledge dissent suggested a connection between the freedom and 
democracy not often considered.  
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Chapter 3: An All India Organization for All Indian Women: The All India 
Women’s Conference and Federated Unity 
 
Sporadic individual efforts had already begun for some time, but it was only with the 
emergence of the All India Women’s Conference, just a little over a decade ago, that we 
can say that a truly coordinated, homogeneous All India Womanhood had been born.237 
–Renuka Roy, prominent member of the All India Women’s Conference (1941) 
 
The All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) originated in 1927, and was originally 
named the Women’s Conference on Educational Reform in India, a one-time conference 
sponsored by the Women’s India Association (WIA) to discuss the state of women’s 
education in India. The conference was meant to be part of an education advocacy section 
within the WIA. However, the first Women’s Conference on Educational Reform in India 
attracted women who saw issues like domestic abuse, widow poverty, women and 
children’s health, prostitution, and alcohol consumption as tied together with discussions 
about the low rate of female education. The conference also included a large number of 
women who were not members of the WIA.238  Although the first conference did focus 
on education-related issues, such as sharing local strategies for increasing literacy, it also 
veered widely from its purely non-political ‘reform’ mission in discussing plans for wide-
ranging political activism on the issue of girls’ education, contraception and women’s 
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health education, family support for adult women’s education, and the debilitating effect 
of purdah239 on educational opportunities for women and girls.240  
By the third meeting of the Women’s Conference on Educational Reform in India 
in 1929, the organization had voted to change its name to the All India Women’s 
Conference to reflect its role as a women’s advocacy organization that was active in 
issues including but not limited to education. In addition, the conference wanted to 
expand beyond reform efforts. By choosing the concept of reform to describe their 
organization, the AIWC connected itself with early attempts to improve women’s lives 
by luminaries such as Ram Mohan Roy, among others. But an exclusively reform-minded 
approach limited the kinds of work available to women by asserting that women needed 
aid and society needed to recognize women’s needs. The ‘In India’ of the old name 
defined Indian women’s position as descriptive, the women were located in India, 
whereas the ‘All India’ prefix defined the women as part of a larger Indian project. The 
new name identified women as agents in the creation and redefinition of the nation 
without specifying the means of their action. The inclusive-ness of the “All India” prefix 
argued that women would and needed to be involved in negotiating the meaning of 
“India.”  
The new “All India Women’s Conference” name offered the new organization 
more flexibility in terms of the issues that were appropriate to its mission, but also in the 
way that the organization imagined the role of women in India.  While many other 
national and international women’s organizations were already actively engaged with 
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similar issues in India, the AIWC sought to shape its national movement out of local 
initiatives and grassroots organizing efforts that better reflected the diversity of Indian 
women’s concerns.  The All India Women’s Conference transitioned away from being an 
organization devoted entirely to the question of improving access to and the content of 
women’s education, and toward becoming an organization with a series of wide-ranging 
concerns tied together only by the terms “All India,” and “women.”  Thus, the structure 
and purpose of the organization relied on its ability to define the broad way that women 
belonged to and created the nation.241 Renuka Ray’s statement at the beginning of this 
chapter unconsciously confirms that as the All India Women’s Conference gained 
increasing influence as a centralized, national organization the conference undermined its 
initial devotion to an All India unifying strategy, which was meant to preserve the 
coordination between locally and nationally focused women’s organizations and projects. 
This chapter argues that the AIWC’s growing success and recognition as a 
centrally controlled and legislatively focused leader of the national women’s movement 
caused it to lose sight of its earlier promotion of both local and national women’s work in 
the creation and reconstruction of Indian-ness and its original goal of a federated 
women’s organization to promote women’s active citizenship. In the first section of this 
chapter, I will consider this shift in emphasis from local and national issues to primarily 
governmental issues by looking at how the relationship among the AIWC’s local 
associative bodies, organized local branches, and central committee changed. The second 
section will consider how the AIWC’s relationship with other nationally organized 
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women’s groups prompted a shift in the AIWC’s focus from a mix of locally and 
nationally determined issues to a primarily top-down strategy of nationally determined, 
legislative-based change. The chapter will end with a consideration of how the shift to a 
legislative-minded organization, epitomized by the fight to revise the Hindu personal 
laws, undermined the concepts of federated unity and women’s active participation in 
Indian rights. 
Defining an All India Commitment 
Although the archival records from the 1940s and early 1950s do not include any 
sustained discussion of difference between organizations that were “national” in character 
and organizations that were defined as “All India,” the various writings by AIWC 
leaders, articles in the organizational magazine Roshni, and archival documents often 
refer to the status and commitment of the AIWC as an “All India” organization rather 
than a national one.242 The term “national” was used more sparingly to describe the 
character of specific work that the organization wanted to do rather than the structure of 
the organization itself. I argue that the term “national” was paired with the term “local” in 
the AIWC’s rhetoric as descriptions of locale, while “All India” was a modifier that 
connected national and local agendas. Women who participated in the All India Women’s 
Conference did local and/ or national work, but they were All Indian women, and their 
commitment to their particular work—local or national—helped to rebuild and 
reconceptualize Indian unity. The AIWC’s emphasis on its “All India-ness” rather than 
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its national character did two slightly different things. First, it gave the organization a 
chance to ally itself with all kinds of women’s agendas (both local and national projects, 
as well as locally and nationally organized women’s organizations). Second, it allowed 
the AIWC to imagine a present and future definition of Indian womanhood that was 
inclusive of all of these women, projects, and organizations.  
Thus, the stakes of their commitment to an “All Indian” rather than national 
character can be seen both in terms of representative claims and of negotiated 
involvement in the building of the Indian democracy. By naming themselves “All India,” 
members of the AIWC challenged the representative claims of the nation and argued that 
the “India” under debate needed to encompass women who were not generally considered 
as being nationally positioned. The AIWC parlayed their “All India” commitment to 
transform the role of women working at the local level with no obvious national 
implications into a defining characteristic of Indian women and their commitment to the 
nation.  
At the same time the “All India” commitment emphasized the AIWC’s own need 
to maintain itself as separate from the women’s wings of political parties. While useful 
national organizing tools, women’s wings tended to ignore the specific goals for women 
defined by national agitation and local initiatives. Moreover, AIWC women argued that 
women’s wings, while helpful for women’s participation in the political arena, tended to 
undervalue both women’s work for the party and the need for women to be recognized as 
active citizens rather than mere targets for welfare.243 In a1946 article entitled, “All India 
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Conference Day,” a working woman demonstrates this distinction in articulating her 
objections to the calls by Congress leaders to close down the AIWC:  
Many people who regard the Women's Conference as a superfluous 
organisation, especially in view of the approach of freedom, do not realise 
that in social matters even some of our own political leaders are 
reactionaries. We request them to follow carefully the speeches in the 
Central Assembly on bills aimed at improving the status of women (...) it 
is necessary that pressure groups like the AIWC should continue their 
work with unabating enthusiasm.244 
 
 Seeing itself as separate from political parties, but with “All India” agendas that worked 
with those parties, the AIWC recognized that as an “All India” organization they were 
able to influence debate in ways that being attached to a specific national agenda would 
not allow. 
Still the question of how the AIWC could create a connection between women’s 
work and organizations already effective at the local level and a proposed national 
advocacy agenda, which would together embody the idea of “All India” remained salient. 
The solution for AIWC was to create a federalizing organizational structure that 
emphasized the unity of women workers whether they be interested in local or national 
agendas. From the very beginning, the AIWC leaders argued that affiliating already 
existing local women’s organizations into a central organization would help to raise the 
profile of the women’s movement in the wider dialogue of what it meant to be Indian. 
The idea of a federalized Indian women’s movement under the auspices of the AIWC, 
but with affiliates ideally doing their own work throughout the countryside as well as in 
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urban areas, resonated strongly with the Gandhian ideal of thousands of villages and 
neighborhoods that together made up the Indian national unity.245 
Thus, the AIWC advocated a federalized organization that defined itself through 
both its national and local agendas. Scholars have described the AIWC’s federal structure 
as an attempt to create an “umbrella women’s organization.”246 Much has been written 
about the way that the Indian national discourse defined federalist ideas in the 
constitution and how the federalist relationship between states and the center was and 
continues to be implemented in India.247 As a nation, most scholars argue that India is at 
best quasi-federalist. In an article tracing the shifts in the implementation of power in 
India, Amaresh Bagchi argued that in general, “federalism offers a way for diverse 
communities to come together and derive the strength of unity while retaining their 
identity.” 248 Ideally, federalism works this way because it invests limited power with the 
central entity while allowing for ideas, enforcement, and agendas to propagate on a local 
level. The central federal institution is a set of minimum parameters that define and is 
defined by the organization’s local bodies.  
In advocating federation as an organizing strategy, the AIWC argued for an “All 
Indian” unity that was prefaced on locally and nationally determined issues fought for 
with equal emphasis within the organization. Ideally, federated unity meant that locally 
based women and women’s issues were as important to the Indian concept as the women 
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with national connections who created the organizational superstructure. It also meant 
that divisive issues could be dealt with locally and not intrude into the national 
discussion. Indeed, the idea that women could “coordinate and cooperate and work 
silently towards attaining the goal of unity,"249 was based on the idea that local women 
doing local work was the best stepping stone to the kind of Indian nation that the 
woman’s movement desired. At least initially, an Indian woman was connected to the 
“All India” movement through the work that she did in her own locality as well as the 
way that work created the national agenda. As the AIWC began to consider issues that 
resonated in a more exclusively national way, especially as it began to focus on a strategy 
of legislative action to begin to solve the systemic social problems women faced, the 
organization became more centralized and less interested in supporting local work as 
politically constitutive of the nation. 
 Initially, the AIWC argued that local works created Indian womanhood—indeed 
even Indian national unity—because as women worked locally, they were improving the 
whole nation. The rhetoric argued that Indian women were potentially “All Indian” in 
scope if they were engaging in the kind of work that encouraged the uplift of All Indians 
through the improvement of their community.  All Indian rhetoric built upon older 
arguments linking women’s work to reform and social welfare by now arguing that this 
kind of work had a political and national effect. The AIWC argued that local movements 
created the kind of productive communities that were necessary to build a successful, 
independent nation even before Independence.  
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In a context where social work and political agitation were often sharply 
differentiated, the AIWC’s stance was novel in suggesting that only by mutual infusion 
could political and social work be effective.250 Purnima Banerji argued that too much of 
the national political understanding was tied into independence movements, while the 
women’s movement offered the immediate alternative of political action through local 
action. Calling her article “Reconstructing India,” Banerji argued that Indian nationhood 
should and would be based on social action, such that independence led to a nation that 
accepted and supported all of its citizens. She wrote, “Some means have to be found to 
help our people. Things cannot wait till the advent of political power, it may indeed be 
found awaiting individual and group action.”251 Banerji’s observations fit well with the 
argument for women’s local work being productive for nation building. Arguing that real 
independence and the attendant goods of communal unity, gender equality, and the 
removal of the caste system were dependent not on political independence but on the 
definition of the Indian nation through social and political work, Banerji suggested that 
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women available for work were the subjects that could concretely define India’s national 
character long before Independence defined the boundaries of India politically. 
AIWC leaders argued that in leading by example, an individual’s work—be it for 
women, Harijans, or neighborhood development—was dual-pronged in its ability to 
actively help the locality and the nation, which grew from local existences. Writing in a 
pamphlet called Challenges to Women, Amrit Kaur argued that of all the things the 
AIWC could accomplish, a guide to local service would be the most conducive to 
national reconstruction. Her pamphlet delineates advice to “towndwellers” from advice to 
village workers and in each section, she suggests areas in which work desperately needs 
to be accomplished in order to create a well-functioning Indian nation. Her contention is 
that a citizen of any nation, but especially of a nation yet to be independent, is required to 
earn her citizenship only insofar as she “helps to make it and maintain it,” through a 
variety of forms of service.252  
The emphasis on social work and the argument that women’s work had an 
uplifting character for society more generally was based in the “tradition or image of 
feminine caring.”253 That is, these ideas were based on the traditional role that women 
played as family sustainers and care-givers, but instead of linking women to the family 
exclusively, local work was made to be seen as a woman’s role in the production of the 
nation. Just as women’s roles as caregivers qualified them for membership in the family 
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(and created the family around their works), so too would local work outside the home 
constitute the nation and qualify women citizens. By connecting women’s local activities 
to the fight for active citizenship and the nation, Kaur makes a clear connection between 
women’s local service commitments and the rights and duties of an independent Indian 
citizen. Thus, local service (and by extension local work) was constructive of the All 
Indian community. In this way, the AIWC argued that both local women activists and 
their targets were All Indian in nature without being required to be national in scope. 
Similar claims had been made previously, especially during the nationalist movements, 
which posited that women and women’s uplift were constitutive of the nation merely as 
the “keepers of tradition” or the marker of Indian readiness to be independent. Now, 
women were asked by the AIWC to earn their “All India” designation through 
constructive work.254 These new conditions required for becoming an active citizen of the 
nation clashed with “traditional” nationalist movements that based the concept of 
citizenship on only broad national and legislative agendas.255 
Several scholars have argued that the emphasis on “welfarist” women’s activity 
can be characterized as a conservative form of women’s organizations, because of their 
association with patriarchal notions of women and their abilities.256 Purely welfarist 
organizations structurally functioned as an extension of the familial metaphor of the state, 
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which emphasized woman’s role as a private actor rather than a public figure. Still, as 
Sangari and Vaid argued in their introduction to Recasting Women, conservative social 
rhetoric and methods were often tied to attempts to overturn the very patriarchal social 
structures that required the rhetoric in the first place.257 Although the AIWC actively 
pursued women’s participation in the public sphere, it was neither entirely progressive in 
its attempt to organize a women’s social justice movement for active citizenship, nor was 
it fully conservative in its attempts to find a role for local women’s work in the national 
dialogue about the character of a future India. Even though these attempts did recognize 
that women were often successful as private actors, it is not correct to say either that the 
movement became more progressive or more conservative as the AIWC become 
increasingly focused on national organizing.  
As the name of the AIWC’s journal, Roshni (“Light”), suggests, the role of the 
organization was to shine a light on the importance of local work done by women’s 
organizations and later the AIWC branches. In the 1940s and 50s, the organization saw a 
shift whereby local work—still valorized—became less visible and indicative of the 
national AIWC project. Instead, the organization got caught up in a number of nationally 
focused projects, which had no clear local component, but rather were directed by 
national coordinating committees and dictated to local branches. In addition, as the 
central AIWC framework became stronger in its own right, its national leaders took more 
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liberty in directing branch action, working with other women’s organizations on issues 
that resonated on a national but not local scale. As the central organization got stronger, 
the commitment to a federated movement defined by local work was less emphasized and 
less rewarded as the idea of an expansive local vision of Indian unity narrowed. 
Creating an All India Organization through Affiliation 
One thing that the women leaders of the AIWC struggled with was how to effectively 
grow their movement without encroaching on pre-existing local initiatives. From the very 
beginning of the AIWC in 1927, leaders jncluding Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Sarojini 
Naidu, and Margaret Cousins argued that only local organizations would be able to 
accurately assess the needs of women in their areas. Moreover, since the abilities and 
time commitment of women active in outreach organizations around the country varied, a 
central organizing committee that dictated specific goals and policies would have little 
chance of succeeding.258 Still, without a more concrete center for the movement, there 
would be little chance for creating the feeling of urgency to address women’s issues on a 
national scale. Moreover, the concept of local women working diligently but unheralded 
in their own localities prevented women from being recognized in a national context. The 
women of the AIWC were eager to derail the hierarchy that often defined national 
legislative campaigns as more important than local service initiatives and agitations, but 
needed to have an organization recognized across the nation to spotlight the work of local 
women.  
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In their book about the AIWC, Aparna Basu and Bharti Ray argue that the women 
who attended the first conference “felt that active propaganda needed to be launched 
mainly by local organisations under the guidance of a central women’s league in order to 
reach the message…to the people.259” As such, the first conference laid out the goal of 
creating a central body through which pre-existing (or newly created) local institutions 
could affiliate. Affiliating with a larger central organization offered local groups several 
things, including support for local service initiatives, ideas about programs to begin or 
suggestions for reforming or widening local programs, and most importantly, connection 
to other local women’s organizations that could share experiences, resources, and 
programs. 260 Affiliation with a central body also built local institutions into a national 
discussion in a way that had not been previously possible. By the same token, the central 
AIWC was able to parlay the appearance of support from local women’s groups into 
recognition as viable representatives of women’s interests separate from political party 
agendas. 
In her introduction to the edited volume, Feminism in India, Maitrayee Chaudhuri 
argued that this spirit of imagining the whole in parts, as a fragmented nation, only able 
to be federally located is a theme that has been followed throughout the history of the 
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Indian Women’s Movement. She suggests that the structure of locality, which was central 
to the movement’s message, could be attributed to the societal recognition of women’s 
power to affect change locally since the mid-nineteenth century, even despite continued 
blindness to women’s issues nationally. Thus, she argues that for Indian women’s 
movements, the “local is global.”261 The argument advanced within the AIWC in the 
1930s and early 40s suggested that knowing the local landscape allowed women to more 
easily attain positions and reap benefits of their efforts.  
Yet, the women leaders of the AIWC were also clear in their belief that the key to 
strengthening women’s place as a citizen and political partner in India was national 
action and support carried out in local settings. As one example, the central AIWC 
mandated that branches across the nation attempt to sway regional and local officials into 
allowing married women to continue working as school inspectors, 262 demonstrating how 
the AIWC demanded that local women’s groups be prepared to accept the articulated 
goals of the central body and that they formulate an independent plan for local action. 
Still, despite continued vocal commitment to the idea of Indian citizenship being 
constituted by local actions, as centralized control of the organization became more 
powerful, the AIWC began to focus on issues that were either nationally organized or 
rooted in national legislation. For example, Lady Irwin College was a university for 
Indian women organized and administered at the national level, and efforts at national 
legislation were made to enact rules to protect women in mines. After building a 
reputation based on the goal of federating local women’s working strategies and 
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organizations to create an “All India” identity for women, the 1940s and 50s saw the 
AIWC turn its focus to national and legislative attempts to involve women theoretically 
in national reconstruction. 
While internal ideological debates over the role of the national and the local 
continued throughout the 1940s and early 50s, the AIWC also struggled with more 
practical concerns that included modes of affiliation, the power and role of the central 
organization, and how independent the affiliated women’s groups should remain after 
joining the umbrella organization were. The next section will consider the way the central 
organization of the AIWC, located first in Bombay and later in Delhi, thought about the 
politics of affiliating branches, the relationship between the branches and the center, and 
how the federalized approach was used to define what AIWC co-founder Margaret 
Cousins and others have since called “All India Womanhood.”263  
Branches of the All India Women’s Conference Tree 
The beginning of the 1940s marked a change in the overall structure of the AIWC central 
organization and its method of associating with local affiliates. Between 1929 and 1939, 
the central organization existed largely to organize the annual conference agenda and 
collect information and dues from the affiliated groups on its behalf. The goals of the 
center were limited and its location was not fixed, instead following with the elected 
General Secretary of the AIWC. 
In 1939, the organization of the center changed. The AIWC registered as an 
associative organization with the Government of India (GOI). As the central organization 
of the AIWC was more clearly articulated, the way it imagined the affiliates changed as 
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well. Originally, local groups were associated to the AIWC as constituent bodies. The 
constituency terminology was interesting in terms of how it defined the central 
organization.264 Each local organization was defined as constitutive to, but separate from, 
the main body. This original format imagined the central AIWC as a conduit for the 
connections that could be made by the annual meeting for local organizations. As the 
central AIWC began to assert itself more by registering with the GOI and setting up 
offices, the terminology used to discuss the affiliated local groups changed from 
“Constituency” to “Branch.” The branch is a very different metaphor from the 
constituent. Although both groups can be said to make up the organization, the 
constituent maintains a certain amount of autonomy from the larger idea, being a self-
sustaining body in itself. The branch, using its “tree” metaphor (something that the 
AIWC did), is not able to exist without the AIWC trunk.  
  The shift suggested that the AIWC was trying to tweak its priorities, moving away 
from its image as merely an umbrella organization that let the constituent organizations 
determine its course, and toward more actively creating a national agenda that described 
women’s work. The attempt to define central authority was most clearly displayed in new 
regulations for presenting resolutions at the national conference. These regulations 
introduced the new order for raising resolutions, “1. Urgent because of pending 
legislation, etc. 2. Starred resolutions—these of first class importance because of their all-
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India application, 3. Local—for which the backing of the conference is desired.”265  Thus, 
legislation and resolutions with an inclusively wide effect were privileged over purely 
local activities.266 The change did not completely reverse the previous emphasis on local 
issues since it recognized “All India” issues, that is those that had both national and local 
resonance, but it also placed the role of legislative and national agendas higher than 
resolutions that did not couch themselves in terms of some larger effect on the nation. 
Local affiliates found the new emphasis on national and especially legislative issues to be 
a demotion of sorts. A small number of previously affiliated organizations even began 
participating less actively with the central AIWC committee.267 
  The move from constituency to branch was followed by concrete changes to the 
organizational make-up of the branches. In 1941, the AIWC standing committee passed a 
resolution asking that each branch change their constitutions to put them “in conformity” 
with the AIWC constitution.268 Once the AIWC registered as an associative organization 
with the government, it began to promote outreach in order to set up branch offices 
specifically for the AIWC. By 1941, a large number of new groups had organized 
specifically as AIWC affiliates, while fewer than expected came from previously existing 
or independently functioning organizations. The branches drew on the AIWC branch 
constitution language, which closely mirrored the central organization’s language. As the 
number of branches organized exclusively for the purpose of becoming AIWC branches 
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increased, the Standing Committee recognized that there needed to be two paths to 
affiliating with the AIWC.269 Branches organized through the AIWC branch committee 
were admitted once they had recruited fifty members; local, independent women’s 
organizations co-opted as AIWC branches needed to have the requisite fifty members and 
were required to prove that their organization “ha[d] the same aims and objectives as the 
AIWC.”270  
Local groups that wished to affiliate with the AIWC had to send an application 
packet to the General Secretary that included its membership rolls, a copy of its 
constitution, an application for affiliation letter, and a list of the organization’s activities. 
Using this information, the AIWC Standing Committee rejected groups that they felt did 
not have the same goals as the AIWC. This process suggested a vision of the AIWC that 
was independent of its affiliates and less of a federated, umbrella organization. Women’s 
wings of political parties were the most common examples of organizations that were not 
acceptable to the AIWC Standing Committee.271 Debate was fierce over how to deal with 
associations organized by the major political parties, especially in considering the 
women’s wing of the Congress Party, with which many of the most active women 
workers in the AIWC were affiliated.272 Still, the AIWC was wary of political parties in 
general and their commitment (or lack thereof) to women’s politics. Even the many 
                                                 
269
 The Standing Committee was the AIWC’s central organizing committee. It included women elected 
from regional areas and the AIWC’s official board. 
270
 NMML, AIWC papers F. No. 337.  
271
 Nearly every major political party organized a women’s wing or a women’s organization associated 
with the party. Certainly Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Muslim League had women’s wings. 
Other parties included women’s associations that were not wings of the party, but were still groups primary 
associated with the political party’s work.  The All India Democratic Women’s Association is an example 
of this kind of party, organized originally by the Communist Party of India. 
272
 Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, “Women’s Development and the AICC,” Roshni 2, no.1 (June 1940), 3-4. 
  160 
women who worked for the Congress Party recognized that at its best, the party played 
lip service to women’s demands for active citizenship. At its worst, the Congress Party 
ignored the demands of the women’s wing entirely. Although the AIWC demanded that 
the organization not engage in party politics, it was by no means rejecting political action. 
Rather, it believed that an independent political womanhood, advanced by the women of 
the AIWC, would be more effective in truly paying attention to women’s rights and 
responsibilities within the national ideal. For this reason, the final decision of the AIWC 
Standing Committee was that all women’s organizations should be accepted under the 
previously stated conditions and “provided that they accept primary allegiance to the All 
India Women’s Conference.”273 The ruling made it almost impossible for associations 
organized by political parties to join the AIWC because for the most part, the women’s 
groups remained primarily attached to the party out of which they were formed. But the 
ruling also made it possible for the AIWC to assert more control over affiliated groups 
that were independently organized. As the role of the AIWC changed from a purely 
umbrella organization connecting local women’s initiatives to an organization attempting 
to intrude in both national and legislative agendas, the AIWC Standing Committee, the 
central AIWC organizing committee, began to assert more central control.274  
Despite the move to open branches that were centrally organized, the AIWC was 
clear about the importance of preserving its local ties. After being sent to Hyderabad 
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(Sind) to attempt to start an AIWC branch, Rameshwari Nehru found that it would be 
better in that case to try to repurpose locally available women’s organizations.275 She 
wrote, “Hyderabad having several women’s organizations, it was pointed out that a new 
committee only meant a duplication of work. I explained the desirability of linking the 
local organizations with the All-India Women’s Conference which will give an All India 
colour to the former and strengthen the latter.”276 For Nehru, associated with national 
women’s agendas for more than twenty years, the importance of creating a large national 
discussion about women’s rights was obvious.  
Nehru begins her article by arguing that she was sent to the Sind because the 
AIWC had few branches in the province, and very little contact or reports of work from 
even those branches. She found that the organizations in Hyderabad (Sind) were in close 
contact with women’s organizations in Karachi (Sind). The Sind women saw more of a 
benefit to working locally and regionally rather than joining the AIWC, which might 
attempt to enforce national level goals over regionally effective work. For the AIWC, 
both regional and national work were required in order to create an All India Women’s 
organization.277 The main ideological thrust for creating a unified federal movement was 
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that All India womanhood happened on several levels, national, regional, and local. In 
order to be effective as an All India body, as the AIWC aspired to be, work needed to be 
valued at all of these levels.  
Nehru argued that what was on display in Sind was the claim that all around the 
nation, women were doing work for India without any recognition nationally. In her 
opinion, all that the organizations needed to add to an Indian women’s agenda was their 
work already in progress and a gloss of All India color available through association with 
the AIWC. The iteration of women’s work on local scales all over the country—
separately and unrecognized—was the core of the rationale for the AIWC’s importance 
as a nationally recognized organization that made local nation building activities visible 
to the whole country. In this sense, the benefit of the Sind women gaining a little “All 
India colour” was part of a push to make women’s work a national issue for the benefit of 
the national AIWC. In the end, this line of argument resonated with at least one of the 
women’s groups in Hyderabad and led to a very active AIWC branch there.278 However, 
it did not resonate with the organizations in Karachi, who argued that affiliation meant 
money sent to the central office and national attention that was neither desired nor useful 
to their work. The problem was that the AIWC failed to explicitly explain, even to itself, 
how “All India colour” benefited any local group's labor. The AIWC had articulated a 
way for the local to become All Indian by uniting local issues with a federating 
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organization and agreeing to tenets that could be used to organize national initiatives, but 
it failed to imagine the reciprocal benefits to local organizations in local terms. 
The central AIWC organization became even more markedly national in its 
orientation from 1945 onward. The AIWC opened a central office with a paid staff in 
Bombay in 1945.279 The founding of permanent offices was timed with a shift to a more 
centrally organized set of suggested work projects, including the organization of 
nationally important work often done in collaboration with other national women’s 
organizations. In her presidential address in 1945, Hansa Mehta suggested that the AIWC 
branches should focus on the same two or three major issues: women’s health, girls’ 
education, and local political participation, as a way to make the work of the conference 
more uniform. More importantly to Mehta, however, was the central branches main job 
of the crafting the Charter of Indian Women’s Rights. The charter was to define women’s 
rights and responsibilities as active citizens in an independent India. In an attempt to gain 
a certain amount of uniformity, the conference’s suggested issues tended toward national 
agitations with enough space to insert some local character, such as legal challenges (i.e. 
the Hindu Code Bill agitation),280 health initiatives (i.e. the Kasturba Gandhi Hospital and 
the “Skippo” Mobile Health Van),281 or education work (i.e. Lady Irwin College and 
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creation of adult learning curriculums).282 By as early as 1946, the AIWC resolved to 
change the organizational constitution to emphasize the ideas laid out in the Charter of 
Indian Women’s Rights. The new constitution emphasized structures that prioritized 
national legislative issues over local work even more than before as the foundation of the 
AIWC’s All India commitment.283  
After Independence, the AIWC emphasized funding for women’s work through 
national grants given to projects with an “All India character”. The AIWC applied the 
funding lines they received in the national economic plans to continue work on national 
initiatives, especially around education and health issues, but neither applied for nor were 
allocated money to their village outreach or local initiatives programs. Several of the 
important AIWC leaders took position in the national government or in India’s foreign 
service. Mathews and Nair have suggested that the AIWC lost a good portion of its 
radicalism, and much of its character after Independence because the leaders chose to 
take positions in the government rather than carry on the movement independently.284 At 
least initially, the AIWC women believed in the promise of the government to create the 
conditions for gender equality in India and their sense of possibility was heightened as 
the new national government placed women in positions of authority. Unfortunately, their 
hope was somewhat misguided; the Towards Equality report published in 1974 showed 
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that by many measurable factors, women’s position in India had declined rather than 
improved in the decades after Independence.285  
Bad Branches 
One of the ways that the AIWC went about defining the borders of its control over 
branches was in their negotiations about how to discipline branches that were not 
following the lead of the central organization. As the AIWC began to consolidate their 
hold over the kinds of issues that were put forward in the organization’s name, it became 
more strict in punishing branches that strayed from the path. Still, each individual “bad 
branch” case raised its own concerns about the goal of federal unity, as established by the 
AIWC. Using three test cases, I argue that the disciplinary actions taken against erring 
branches by the central AIWC organization indicate the limits of the AIWC message that 
local work and local agitations were both constitutive of and principal to the national 
representation of All India Women’s Movement. I will discuss the Andhra branch for 
participating in political action with the Congress Party in 1945, the Chittagong Branch 
for defying the goals of national unity by supporting partition in 1947, and the Baroda 
Branch for calling the central AIWC committees to task for not adequately supporting 
and recognizing local work in 1949.286  
 In 1945, the Andhra branch of the AIWC (located in the then Central Provinces, 
now in Andhra Pradesh) affirmed that while it was affiliated with the All India Women’s 
Conference, it had the right to dictate the terms of its local work and in the course of 
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doing local work had the right to affiliate itself with other women’s organizations. The 
central office of the AIWC received a letter from the previous president of the Andhra 
branch, which complained that the branch had used its members to engage in political 
canvassing for Congress candidates and had unofficially attached itself to the local 
Congress Party.287 When the AIWC was first established in 1927, the organization 
decided to ban politics as subject of discussion. But in 1940, the constitution was 
amended to allow for political discussion, arguing that the AIWC was “free to discuss 
and contribute to all questions and matters that affect the welfare of the people of 
India.”288 The 1940 constitution still limited the Conference from engaging in political 
activity targeted at advancing the agenda of any particular political party, but it was much 
more open to understanding political work as AIWC work. 289 As mentioned above, the 
AIWC was rightfully skeptical of political parties because the parties seemed to 
undervalue the work of women and their role in a future nation. The AIWC also wanted 
to avoid engaging in feuding over specific party affiliation when none of the major 
parties had strong women’s rights agendas. So the question posed by the Andhra branch 
work with the Congress party was whether and/or how to discipline the branch. 
 After many attempts to get the Andhra branch to be more sensitive to the 
extensive role that political parties were playing in their work, Margaret Cousins, who 
had been asked to investigate the branch, admitted that the Andhra branch was asserting 
more local control than was expected. Both the Andhra chapter and Cousins asked the 
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AIWC to clarify who directed branches local work. Ultimately, the AIWC attempted to 
walk a very fine line between granting local control and dictating the lengths that women 
workers could participate in party politics as AIWC representatives. They argued that as a 
centrally organized institution, the AIWC did not support any political party, but 
branches should be given discretion in all local matters, including what kinds of work to 
engage in.290 In other words, branches were in theory still able to affiliate with political 
parties to carry out work in the interests of women and children at the local level, but 
branches were not to engage in party politics on the national level, including all national 
AIWC commitments led by the central committee, which in principal could extend even 
into local work.  
The Andhra branch’s incongruous behavior forced the AIWC central organization 
to question what the role of the central committees actually was. In theory, the AIWC 
wanted to exert more strenuous control over the action of branches. In parsing the 
agreement on the Andhra branch problem and the debate over local control that it 
prompted, it was agreed, “until the AIWC has secured marked influence over women all 
over India, rigid control by the Central organization should be postponed.”291 This 
comment suggests both some ambivalence toward the federalized structure that the 
AIWC had been building and an ambition to having the kind of national presence that 
easily allows control over local situations. While federation required reckoning with local 
control, the desire for national influence over branch activity needed to effectively rein in 
the Andhra branch did not seem to necessarily negate the more locally based federalized 
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approach. Ideally, every branch would ask for permission before taking organizationally 
complicated steps, but this kind of appeal to a central body required soft power of regard 
and influence that the central AIWC could not yet assert.  
 One of the reasons that it was easier for the AIWC central committee to assert the 
provisional rights of the Andhra branch to direct its own work was that almost all of the 
women leaders of the AIWC central committee were Congress women themselves, and 
while the work with the Congress Party pushed the non-partisan stance of the AIWC very 
close to the edge of a cliff, it did not, in their opinion, violate any fundamental AIWC 
objective. In the case of the Chittagong branch, the AIWC had to deal with divergence 
from commonly held AIWC beliefs.292 In 1947, during the Muslim League’s final push 
for partition, the Chittagong branch of the AIWC passed a resolution supporting the 
proposed partition of Bengal and the creation of the state of Pakistan.293 The resolution 
did not explicitly support the All India Muslim League, but in essence the branch was 
supporting the Muslim League by supporting its call for partition. The AIWC central 
committee was incensed that the branch thought that it was possible to remain members 
of the AIWC and still support something like partition. The reporting of the crisis was 
filtered through letters between the general committee and Renuka Ray, who was in 
Bengal working on the AIWC’s children’s homes and famine relief project.294  
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 For the AIWC central committee, it was unacceptable that a branch would violate 
what they considered their most important objective, “to stand against all separatist 
tendencies and to promote a greater national integration and unity.”295 The AIWC had 
often articulated a very strong reading of this particular objective, which remains part of 
the AIWC constitution to this day. The AIWC saw a commitment to Indian unity as 
fundamental to its political identity as a women’s advocacy organization. The women of 
the AIWC argued that the tendency to define women, or any group, as separate from an 
Indian identity was to decrease their ability to claim a right to national political 
negotiation, hence the idea of the All India in the name of the women’s conference.296  
In the eyes of the AIWC Standing Committee, which was distinctly politically 
hostile to the Muslim League and the partition argument, the move by the Chittagong 
branch had to be thought of as advocating the undermining of Indian unity.297 Once the 
partition was effected, what the AIWC saw as a temporary concession to identity politics, 
while waiting for a more unifying national character, would become nearly irreversible. 
The national committee’s approach to dealing with this seriously errant branch was 
defended by arguing that unlike the Andhra branch, where the issue was how much 
leeway did a local branch have in defining “local”, the issue at stake in the Chittagong 
case was to what extent could local decisions affect (and derail) the character of an entire 
organization. More precisely, if the partition affirmation was allowed to stand, the central 
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committee of the AIWC argued that the issue could permanently disrupt the All India 
character of the organization by allowing that some parts might be against a unified India. 
Ray was instructed to go to Chittagong and straighten out the situation in any way 
possible. When it seemed that many of the women were unwilling to void the resolution 
supporting the partition of Bengal and the creation of Pakistan, Ray met with the 
dissenting members, voided the earlier branch’s charter affiliation, and created a new 
branch in Chittagong.298  
The issue under question in both the Andhra and Chittagong cases was 
delimitating how far central control could actually reach without changing the character 
of the organization and what was properly under the purview of local branch influence. 
By contrast, the issue in the disciplinary action against the Baroda branch in 1949 
concerned whether or not local branches could speak publicly against the working of the 
central AIWC organization. In 1949, the national committee was sent a report that the 
Baroda AIWC branch had published a pamphlet that criticized the AIWC central 
committee.299 The AIWC Standing Committee immediately sent a letter to the Baroda 
stating, “The booklet published by the Baroda branch is a direct propaganda against the 
All India Women’s Conference which no branch is permitted to do. Since the pamphlet 
contains material prejudicial to the All India Women’s Conference, the standing 
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committee takes a serious view of the matter and asks you to withdraw the matter 
immediately.”300 The branch wrote back to the AIWC standing committee promptly and 
argued that the AIWC had made an appalling decision with regards to the pamphlet. In 
her letter, the Baroda branch representative of the Standing Committee claimed that the 
decision of the AIWC to insist on the branch withdrawing their pamphlet was 
overreaching on the central organization’s part and therefore, “absolutely wrong.” As 
such, the branch was “not bound to withdraw the booklet.”301  
The Baroda branch representative further argued, “any branch of a mass 
organization has the right to criticize the parent body if they are not in the interests of the 
general masses,”302 and finally, 
Such publications [as the Baroda booklet] are the only means to better 
effect a change from the existing state of affairs by the democratic means. 
We hold ourselves, in honor bound to safeguard and indicate this 
democratic right of every individual and a branch unit inside our 
organization. 
 
The Baroda branch was effectively arguing that the members and branch members of the 
AIWC have a responsibility to make the organization into the kind of open, democratic 
organization that it claimed to be. Moreover, the branch seems to argue that any mass 
organization should, on account of their “mass” status, be accountable not only to their 
own membership, but to the masses, which they claim to represent. In essence, Baroda 
argued that the AIWC was only All India to the extent that it was made accountable to 
the masses. In an effort to create the kind of democratic, federated movement that the 
AIWC claimed to advance, Baroda argued that it was incumbent on the branches to 
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respond and remake the national organization when it was failing to recognize the needs 
of “every” member. The argument reflected a general organizational tension between 
locally controlled work and nationally dictated agendas.  The former included the ability 
of each member, branch, or even each woman affected by the AIWC to define the 
organization. The latter recognized the right of the central committee to dictate 
organizational issues of concern and appropriate responses.   
 In the cases of Andhra and Chittagong, the AIWC central organization tried to 
imagine the line that when crossed meant that the local work of the branches substantially 
changed the national objectives of the AIWC as a whole. In dealing out punishments (in 
the case of Chittagong) or declining to (in the Andhra affair), the AIWC argued that local 
work helped to define the All Indian nature of the organization and as such actions by 
local branches had the potential to harm the national image of the AIWC. In these cases, 
the AIWC argued, the organization needed to delineate acceptable behavior. The Baroda 
branch was arguing almost precisely the opposite point. In a way, its argument was an 
attempt to bring the AIWC back to the point of federalization where it had started. The 
Baroda branch argued that the work of the individual woman member or collective 
branch activity—not merely their existence—was the way that the AIWC marked itself as 
All Indian. Any work undertaken by the national AIWC organization should come from 
the work at the branches, and as such the branches had a right and a duty to chide the 
national organizational committees when they failed to properly support local initiatives. 
For the Baroda branch, the central committees and national agenda were the places most 
fraught with the danger of becoming exclusive and undemocratic. The national AIWC 
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response brought the Baroda branch’s fears to bear more concretely than they could have 
reasonably expected. The branch was disaffiliated. More repressively, the constitution 
committee officer of the Standing Committee suggested, “there should be a check on 
…Branches making statements and publishing magazines without consulting the Branch 
Central Committees. A clause to this effect might be added [to the AIWC 
Constitution].”303 The AIWC’s reaction to a call for more openness and local 
accountability was an attempt to further consolidate national level control. 
 One could attribute the escalating level of severity with which the central 
committee responded to the branches as a mark of the increasing ability of the central 
organization in exercising power over time. After all, the AIWC did write in response to 
the Andhra case that control and influence were linked. Yet, the change could also be 
attributed to independence and a growing sense in the nation that the local could no 
longer be expected to define the national good. By 1951, two years after the Baroda 
incident, many of the women leaders involved in the nationalizing of the AIWC agendas 
had been established in government or pseudo-governmental positions. Despite 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s claims that the AIWC was less a women’s advocacy group than a 
middle class women’s tea party, his government routinely wrote to the president and 
general secretary of the AIWC for recommendations of women who would be qualified 
for a variety of government postings in India and abroad.304 In 1953, the organization 
moved from Bombay to set up a huge campus in New Delhi to be closer to the 
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government for advocacy purposes. It is not hard to see that the AIWC was becoming 
less interested in branches, except insofar as their number contributed to the general 
feeling of the organization’s national character.  
The All India Women’s Conference in a National Context 
As India is such a vast country, with manifold problems to be solved, we do 
recognise the necessity of more than one All India body working for the welfare 
of the country. Such being the case, in order to conserve our energies and achieve 
the best results we feel the need for closer cooperation.305 
 
The AIWC was far from the only nationally organized women’s organization functioning 
in India in the 1940s and 50s. The AIWC joined the National Council of Women, India 
(NCWI) founded in 1925,306 and the Women’s Indian Association (WIA) founded in 
1917, as a nationally recognized women’s organization. Unlike the AIWC, the WIA and 
NCWI were organized to be defined as national organizations rather than All India ones. 
The WIA, the mother organization of the AIWC, was founded by British and Irish 
women associated with the women’s suffrage movement. As such, their experience was 
of local activity being coordinated and directed from a national organization with an eye 
to the national agenda. The NCWI was organized by the International Council of 
Women, and was fundamentally organized with an eye on national agendas that lent 
themselves to international cooperation. All three of these organizations recognized the 
other two as similar institutions working on a national level for the uplift of women and 
children. Similarly, all three recognized the Young Women’s Christian Association 
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(YWCA) as a possible national contributor, though only in a limited way due to its 
sectarian focus. 
 While the AIWC recognized these women’s groups as nationally organized, they 
did not necessarily consider them to be “All Indian.” Because the AIWC had organized 
its membership around federation and its ability to be broadly representative through the 
participation of its branches, the AIWC argued that its organization, with its umbrella-
like qualities, would be best able to unite the work of women’s organizations (large and 
small) around India. For this reason, the AIWC leaders wanted to imagine a way for the 
other two “national organizations” to exist within its own framework. There were several 
issues during the period of 1940-1956 that required joint effort on the part of the three 
major women’s groups, and organizing that cooperation was complicated. This section 
will consider the ways that the AIWC tried to work with the WIA, the NCWI, and 
sometimes the YWCA to create a more unified national women’s movement in India,307 
while also keeping a proprietary watch on AIWC branches.308  
The understanding of the AIWC as a federated and unifying organization was at 
stake in its dealings with other national women’s groups. As the AIWC began to engage 
with and lead joint ventures with these national organizations, it began to be more 
difficult to imagine the local driving the national affiliation in the AIWC. As national 
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initiatives became the more important aspect of the AIWC’s agenda, it began to work 
more closely with the large, nationally organized women’s groups and to ignore its work 
coordinating local initiatives. With the national agenda becoming the focus of the 
AIWC’s organizing, the concept of a federalized unity, which privileged local action as 
constitutive of Indian agendas, became more tenuous. 
Most provinces and localities had their own province-wide organizations, but 
these organizations tended to affiliate loosely with either the NCWI or the AIWC when 
they took on agitations with national significance.309 Of course, as was mentioned earlier, 
most of the political parties had women’s wings. Many religious organizations had 
women specific sub-organizations. Particularly notable are the women’s groups and 
schools organized in coordination with the Arya Samaj movement.310 These 
organizations, tied to specific religions and social action movements, while considered 
commendable for their actions, were not considered “All India” enough to be invited to 
participate in joint action with the other three. In addition to regional and local 
organizations, there were several women’s magazines and journals that thought seriously 
about the issues confronting women, but which were not associated with any particular 
organization. These outlets for women’s organizing were closely linked with women in 
the AIWC, but also with regional workers who never rose to particular prominence 
outside of print.311 
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 The other organization that was not particularly welcome in the All India club is 
the Mahila Seva Samaj (The Women’s Service Society).312 The society was founded in 
1913, and had locations initially in Mysore and Pune. Still, the Mahila Seva Samaj is 
generally not considered by historians to be a national women’s organization. Anup 
Taneja’s remarks about the organization are somewhat typical of its place in the 
literature, “Branches of the Mahila Seva Samaj were established in Mysore and Pune in 
1913 and 1916 respectively. But the first major attempt to organize women on an all-
India basis took place with the Women’s Indian Association (WIA).”313 In part, it seems 
that the Mahila Seva Samaj gets excluded because it did not participate in the lobbying of 
the colonial state, nor did it publish in English. The Mahila Seva Samaj was certainly a 
women’s group organized on more than a regional basis, but it was never associated with 
coordinated national work. The treatment of the Mahila Seva Samaj and other national 
women’s groups that functioned in regional vernaculars indicates a strong preference 
both in governments during the 1940s and 50s (colonial and national) and present 
scholarship to exclude minority and marginal women’s work.314 The failure of the AIWC 
and the “women’s movement” to recognize these organizations as anything more than 
potential federating partners provided fodder for the claim that the women’s 
organizations failed to engage with the masses in any measurable way, which has been 
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often used by political parties to deny the representative capacity of the “women’s 
movement.”  
The problem in orchestrating cooperation with other “All India” organizations 
was with the AIWC’s federated approach. On the one hand, the AIWC was at a structural 
disadvantage from the other organizations as so much of their rhetoric was tied to the 
idea of local work, which meant that the AIWC had to measure their collaboration with 
groups organized as national bodies in terms of the importance any issue had on the 
center and the local activity. On the other hand, the AIWC was a much larger body than 
any of the three women’s organizations in 1940, with by far the most members, the 
largest network, and the largest body of active issues. As such, the AIWC often seemed 
to indicate that any work with the other national women’s organizations was work that 
would ultimately lead to a more complete federation of the women’s movement under 
their banner. The AIWC was not precisely interested in completely co-opting these 
organizations, but in creating an outlet in which close cooperation could be easily 
commanded. This section will consider two different ways that the AIWC tried to 
configure the relationship with other large women’s organizations. First, I will consider 
the founding and working of the “liaison committee” founded by the AIWC, the NCWI, 
and the WIA and the organizational issues that surrounded its creation. Second, I will 
consider the AIWC’s attempt to conduct joint work with these organizations on the 
specific issue of the Hindu Code Bill through the 1940s and 50s. 
Organizing an All India Commitment 
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At the 1935 AIWC conference, it was resolved that a series of directories of women’s 
organizations active in various cities be published in time for the 1936 conference. The 
impetus for the directories was that women, interested in working with women’s 
organizations, should be able to find already functioning organizations to work with, 
rather than investing time and money in new committees. Also, the directory was meant 
to allow organizations with similar purposes to share work as seen fit. The preface to the 
directory states, “It is, therefore, essential that women who are interested in activities for 
the uplift and advancement of their sisters should know what is being done in that behalf 
and who are doing it. That will also enable them to find out what remains to be done.”315 
The directories listed social work organizations, with their national affiliation if the 
organization had one, as well as a short precise of the purpose and activities of the 
organization. In many cases, it also listed the last major work that the organization had 
done. The directories were suggested in part to make manifest that there were far too few 
women workers to succumb to organizational jealousy. The directory argued for 
continued work, especially by AIWC women, even if the kind of work they were 
interested in was not available through the AIWC branch.316  
The directory also functioned as a way to continue the federating work of the 
AIWC. By pointing women workers to organizations in need of social work, the AIWC 
was putting work in to coordinating women’s work even outside their organizational fold. 
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Recognizing the work of women’s organizations outside of the AIWC fold was a major 
theme of the 1936 conference. In an essay called “Random Thoughts on the Women’s 
Conference,” Hansa Mehta argued that in promoting women’s work wherever it was 
successfully functioning and discussing it at conferences, like the AIWC annual 
conference, was productive work in the sense that conferences “bring together such 
workers who are connected with educational and social activities in order that they may 
exchange their experiences and their views on various problems that they come across in 
the course of their work.”317 By making the work of women in any form the focus of the 
AIWC conferences and organizational structure, AIWC workers spread the message of 
the organization, local work, and national vision more broadly. As the 1940s and 50s 
went forward, the AIWC and other national women’s organization attempted to draw 
together resources more concretely with new organizing techniques and joint national 
legislative advocacy. But these new joint approaches with the NCWI and the WIA, which 
were self-consciously national in focus and organization, undermined further the AIWC’s 
commitment to local work and defining the local into the Indian consciousness. 
Late in 1940, the National Council of Women, India passed a resolution stating, 
“in order to ensure the fullest cooperation between the various All India Women’s 
Associations and to prevent the overlapping and reduplication of work and to promote 
joint action in matters of All-India importance, especially those affecting the position and 
welfare of women and children, a joint standing committee of representatives, possibly 
three in number from every All India Women’s Organization willing to cooperate and 
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those whose aims and objects are similar should be speedily set up.”318 The proposed 
committee seemed to fit well with the AIWC’s attempts to avoid reduplication of work, 
especially given the limited number of women who had the education, leisure, and 
inclination to do social work as far as possible. 
Essentially, the committee that the NCWI proposed would work on a macro level 
like the kind of coordination done by publication of these directories and discussions at 
the AIWC conferences. Still, despite the connection to AIWC rhetoric and stated desire, 
the AIWC responded to the NCWI’s proposed liaison committee tentatively. Instead of 
creating a permanent committee, the AIWC and the NCWI chose instead to appoint a 
study commission on all women’s organizations, as a “move toward unity” of purpose 
and organization.319 At the same time that the AIWC was moving slowing toward 
accepting a permanent alliance with the NCWI, it passed a resolution to extend 
“representation on the AIWC standing committee to organizations of an All-Indian 
character.”320 The NCWI and the WIA were able to appoint representatives to the main 
committees of the AIWC and were invited to send three representatives to the AIWC 
annual conference.  
The preference for a study committee and seats on each other’s standing 
committees over the creation of a separate committee was justified as a way to further cut 
down on administrative activities for already busy AIWC workers. A NCWI woman 
would be able to help direct the AIWC in terms of staying clear of reduplication of 
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NCWI work and would be able to tell the NCWI standing committee about the proposed 
AIWC work. However, the preference also reflected the terms of the AIWC idea about 
unity and All Indian work. The AIWC’s ideological approach to women’s work was 
based on the idea of local work being directed by local and regional actors with a 
structure that supported, engaged, and helped at a national level, while the national 
organization publicized the local and created national agendas around it.  
In some ways, the liaison committee’s focus on organizing responses on behalf of 
the “women’s movement” to issues at a macro level, was hard for the AIWC to justify on 
the basis of its local commitments. Although the organization was becoming more 
focused on national organizing throughout the 1940s and early 50s, the idea of organizing 
a committee entirely around the national agenda seemed to represent a troubling 
disengagement from the local initiatives that formed the greater part of the AIWC 
rhetoric. In part, the problem was fundamentally about the organizational beliefs of the 
two main organizations.321 The AIWC, organized around the idea of Indian federation of 
local women’s groups, even amidst national and international work, was concerned with 
the way that organizing an All India committee would separate national work from local 
initiative. This is not to say that the AIWC was uninterested in nation building. As I 
discussed in the introduction, the AIWC saw itself as the best organization available to 
harness women’s work to define and create the kind of unity that would sustain the 
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promise of a differentiated nation that India seemed to be working toward. Still, the logic 
behind the AIWC idea was always that national work was created by local conditions and 
was meant to supplement the kind of local intervention that made Indian unity possible. 
Because of the NCWI’s international connections and avowedly national focus, it more 
narrowly pursued national issues and directed its branches toward specific kinds of labor 
thereof. The AIWC was also wary of the NCWI’s close ties to international women’s 
associations out of concern that the organization was more interested in positioning India 
in the world than India in Indian life. 
Once the AIWC decided to have an informal liaison committee in 1942, an 
organizational problem quickly arose in the appointing of the liaison committee to 
coordinate the activities of the All India women’s organizations—namely, who to 
appoint. The problem was not trivial. There were a limited number of women workers 
with a national presence. The AIWC first thought of appointing Lady Dhanvanthi Rama 
Rao and Rani Lakshmibai Rajwade to the committee, but found upon their invitation that 
both were already also active members of the NCWI. The NCWI had a similar problem 
as it considered appointing Shareefah Hamid Ali only to find that she was already an 
active member of the AIWC. Ultimately, the AIWC sent Lady Rama Rao, despite her 
joint affiliation, and the general secretary Urmila Mehta, a young but active worker.  
The overlap in women working at the national level was troubling for the AIWC, 
in part because it gave lie to its claim to be focused on local level work as the basis for its 
All India agenda. It also brought up the question, more forcefully than before, about how 
close local women workers could get to national prominence. Indeed, many of the 
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women who were important nationally positioned workers were related to other women 
in power (like Sarojini Naidu’s daughters), daughters of the royal families of Indian 
States (Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Rani Lakshmibai Rajwade, and the daughters of the 
Hyderabadi [Andhra] royal family), or family members of national leaders (Rameshwari 
Nehru, Indira Gandhi [then Nehru], Vijaya Laxshmi Pandit, and Kasturba Gandhi). While 
many women, such as Hansa Mehta, Renuka Ray, and Urmila Mehta, made it into 
national prominence through their own effort, the number of potential women activists 
who were in the situation to make it to national prominence (relatively wealthy, generally 
upper-caste, extremely well-educated, and with a forceful personalities) was vanishingly 
small. The average local AIWC worker, engaged in local and regional work, was never 
even able to attend an annual conference unless it was held in their city. Even important 
regional leaders were often unable to reach a national level of prominence unless they 
lived in a large city (specifically in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, or Madras). Moreover, 
while most of these nationally important women did engage in actual local work, few 
privileged it over national agitation. Women like Lady Rama Rao, who eschewed 
national appointments to work with her local branch and on pet projects, were unusual 
among nationally active women.322 This is not to say that many national women’s 
activists were not interested in local-level work or did not participate actively in social 
work. Most of the women involved in national level work were absolutely interested in 
work at the local level, and most were active in promoting productive work. Still, many 
found their main commitments to be at the national level and on national issues. 
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Ultimately, the liaison committee failed to do much to combine the efforts of the 
NCWI, AIWC, WIA, and to a lesser extent the YWCA. The committee was short lived, 
with each of the organizations pulling away from it after a little less than two years. The 
organizations moved toward working jointly on issues directed to “the women’s 
movement in general,” such as the agitation around labor protections for women and 
children working in underground mines, which led to a jointly advocated bill against the 
practice of having women in underground mines. The organizations also worked together 
to found the All India Save the Children Fund in 1943 in response to the devastation of 
the Bengal Famine.323 In an effort to actively renew connections to the NCWI and the 
YWCA in 1945, the AIWC created a membership class of the organization called an 
“associate body”. The associate bodies could be “any All-India women’s organization in 
sympathy with the policy, aims, and objects of the A-IWC…provided it has at least 250 
members on its rolls.”324 While AICW archive does not follow up on the question of the 
whether the “associate body” plan was ever enacted, several other very large regional, 
vernacular organizations did join the AIWC as associate bodies. In many ways, the new 
classification was more apt for the vision of a federated women’s organization focused on 
local work, for national agendas than the liaison committee. 
Uniform and Hindu Code Bill Agitation 
From the early 1940s, the AIWC argued that large-scale agitations that could have 
national effects needed to be brought to the foreground. Specifically, the call for legal and 
social equality, an overarching goal of the AIWC, needed to be sounded nationwide both 
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in consciousness raising campaigns throughout India and through legislative action to 
remove institutional inequalities aimed at making women second class citizens. In this 
respect, the marquee battle was the fight to remove or reform the personal law system and 
to revise the Hindu Civil Code in particular. An especially perverse effect of the way that 
the British colonized India was the importance placed on “keeping” with the local laws 
and judicial traditions, which meant creating a system of laws for India that codified 
“indigenous” traditions defined by religion. This system manifested itself as a series of 
laws separate from the overarching criminal code called civil codes or personal laws, 
which were applied based on the litigant’s religious affiliation.325 There were two main 
personal law codes: the Hindu personal law code and Muslim personal law code with 
several less prominent personal law codes for other religious affiliations that did not 
match these two large categories.326 All legal actions involved in “civil” proceeding, 
including but not limited to marriage, divorce and maintenance, widow remarriage, and 
inheritance were tried using personal law proceedings. Thus, a person’s religious 
affiliation determined whether they could legally engage in polygamy, pass property to a 
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married daughter, or the level to which they were required to maintain an ex-wife and 
acceptable manner of claiming the divorce. 
The AIWC saw the existence of different personal law statutes for different 
communities as a way to codify disunity into the nation. Drawing on anti-colonial “divide 
and rule” rhetoric, the AIWC argued that the continuation of personal law codes based on 
religion was a tactic by the government to disable justices and discourage inter-
communal participation in advocacy groups, especially among women, who were most 
affected by the lack of commitment to equality that the personal civil codes represented. 
Thus, as Rajeswari Sunder Rajan has argued, “women’s organizations like the All-India 
Women’s Conference stressed the need for a [Uniform Civil Code] mainly for the reason 
that uniformity of laws would unify a nation split along religious communitarian 
lines.”327 The failure to create a uniform civil code meant that no matter what legislative 
and local action the women’s movement took, their work could be undermined by 
different community codes.328 One simple example of this disability can be seen in the 
divergence between national criminal codes, which ban dowry, and personal civil codes, 
which lay out specific rules for the giving, receiving, and disposition of dowry.  Taking 
the same example of dowry rules, the AIWC recorded that local branches around 
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Lucknow had long protested against excessive dowry, but that local Waqf boards 
routinely ruled against changes the branches encouraged, making societal change less 
likely.329  
The AIWC had (and still has) an official policy that actively sought the promotion 
and passage of a uniform civil code that would be favorable to women and children.330 
The organization argued that different codes made different levels of discrimination 
against women permanent, legal, and hard to determine, but that all were ultimately 
unfavorable to the rights of women. Moreover, discussions about the discrimination 
inherent in these codes often broke down to arguments about whether the Muslim or 
Hindu Code was more discriminatory against women rather than focusing on the ways 
both codes were discriminatory. The idea of a uniform code, written collaboratively 
between representatives of the women’s movement, legislators, and concerned national 
citizens was the best of all possible worlds for the leaders of the AIWC because it would 
remove legal disabilities that allowed the Indian woman to be thought of apart from and 
inferior to the normative Indian. The AIWC argued that the Uniform Civil Code created 
the conditions of possibility for Indian women to be Indian citizens. As such, disabilities 
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codified in communal civil codes—both in their separatist tendencies and in the way they 
disadvantaged women—were acted on as a necessary realm of national action beyond 
what was explicitly called for on a local level. Still, even on this issue, which as Gandhi 
pointed out was removed from the plane of individual intervention defined by the local, 
the AIWC attempted to institute a policy of federation, at least to the extent that they 
worked in coordination with the NCWI, the WIA, and the national YWCA to draft 
responses to questions asking them to clarify the Indian women’s stance on the code 
issue. Moreover, in working to draft an All India women’s movement response, the 
AIWC attempted to reframe the debate about the legislative changes to civil law codes 
about the effect that legislation would have, and indeed already had, on Indian women. 
While the AIWC preferred to draft a uniform civil code for India, it was clear that 
the best chance to enact change would be to continue agitating for a uniform code, while 
at the same time attempting to legislate the revamping of the Hindu Personal Laws.  
Throughout the 1930s, the AIWC carried on a high level campaign to start the process of 
revamping the Hindu Law. Several women involved in the agitation were concerned that 
support for a revised Hindu Law Code would set back their more important goal of 
putting a uniform civil code, but the question of political expediency was called and 
settled on. While the AIWC members argued that there was a chance that the legislature 
might enact radical changes to the Hindu law, they agreed that political parties would not 
use the political capital required to support a uniform code, a change that would upset 
both Hindu nationalists, who formed an important part of the conservative wing of the 
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1940s Congress and would make minority religious communities more wary of central 
government overreaching.331  
Ultimately the issue to take up Hindu Law reform rather than a concerted effort 
for a Uniform Civil Code was chosen for fear of two major splits: first, between secular 
women’s organizations (like the AIWC and NCWI) and religious organizations, which 
were more invested in religious personal laws; and second, between women activists and 
male legislators.332 Given the decision not to emphasize a uniform civil code, revising the 
Hindu Personal Law (as opposed to any or all of the other codes) was attempted for 
several reasons. As many authors have argued, the AIWC was largely made up of upper-
class, upper-caste urban women.333 Although more women from religious minorities were 
involved at the higher national levels, the largest segment of the AIWC membership was 
normatively national, which meant (and still means) caste Hindu.334 Moreover, by 1946, 
the All India Muslim League had “banned” women involved in Muslim League politics 
from participating in the AIWC, which limited the number of politically connected 
Muslim women willing to be associated with the organization.335 For the AIWC activists, 
the normative idea of the Indian woman as a Hindu woman (and more particularly a 
Hindu Wife) led to a near conflation of Hindu Law Reform and Uniform Civil Code 
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agitation. Indeed, in her discussion of the problems of Indian women, Hansa Mehta 
justified the agitation for changing the Hindu Law by thinking about women’s status in 
general. She wrote, “The Hindu Law was twisted and turned against the woman. …Social 
deterioration went hand in hand with the decline of the states of women.”336 The Hindu 
law became the catalyst for causing the deterioration of women in general, and as such, 
the revision of Hindu Law, in particular, was important in raising the status of all women. 
In 1941, largely because of the AIWC led agitation, the Government of India 
agreed to appoint the Rau Commission to consider a whole-scale revision of the Hindu 
Civil Code. While no women were appointed to the committee, it did issue a 
questionnaire to the major women’s organizations in order to solicit suggestions on how 
the code should be rewritten. The AIWC tapped Kitty Shiva Rao to organize a committee 
with women’s groups all over the country and to draft with a united response to the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was translated into several Indian languages and sent 
each branch with directions to send them back to the AIWC central office. The branches 
were also instructed to tell their members to send individual telegrams to the law member 
of the AIWC.337 Meetings were held between the AIWC, the NCWI, and the WIA to 
determine how best to respond to the Rau Commission and adopt a “women’s 
movement” response to the question of how to reform the Hindu Code. In the end, the 
joint committee of the AIWC, the NCWI, and the WIA submitted a report about the kinds 
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of reforms that women around the country desired.338 Under the auspices of all three 
women’s organizations and led by the AIWC, the agitation was largely based on mass 
movement politics, but with a select group of women as their audience.339  
The three organizations each allotted money to hold large rallies, in which women 
were brought out of purdah to talk about the repressive role of personal law in their lives, 
and the redemptive actions of agitation for revising the laws.340  In Roshni, Rameshwari 
Nehru argued that the responses to the code bill questionnaire were fully representative of 
women, in fact, she wrote, “The answers do not merely represent the views of our 
members, because at public meetings held under the aegis our Branches, thousands of 
women attended and recorded their opinions.”341 These rallies were both about role-
playing the effect that changing the laws would have on a large section of the female 
population and about creating a national demonstration to counter the argument that the 
bill was only applicable to women who, at least functionally, were better off than the 
majority of Indians. The idea of women coming out of purdah at the mere suggestion of 
legal reform pointed to the positive changes that would be much more widely effective if 
the legislation were to actually be adopted. The impact of thousands of women, 
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previously uninvolved in AIWC or any national body’s work, expressing their opinions—
both physically by attending the rally and vocally by actually speaking—demonstrated 
the effect of an all India movement, whereby national issues created interest in women’s 
issues in local areas.  
Despite the financial support and cooperative effort committed by the other “sister 
organizations,” the AIWC—not the local branches, other national organizations, or 
unaffiliated women—was seen as leading the charge in both the committee that was 
founded and in the general mass extravaganza. The work of responding to the 
questionnaire was considered to be the AIWC workers’ responsibility342 even though the 
decisions that the committee came to were based on discussions with “representatives of 
sister organizations.”343 Moreover, when the legislature was bullied into appointing a 
woman for the reformed Rau Commission in 1944, they chose Renuka Ray, a prominent 
AIWC worker, and when the Cabinet Mission of 1946 wanted to speak to someone about 
the role of Hindu Code agitation and Women’s Rights, they chose Hansa Mehta, another 
AIWC member. Ultimately, the Hindu Code Bill was broken into pieces and passed in a 
diluted form in 1955.344  
The later association of the Hindu Code Bill agitations with the AIWC promoted 
the AIWC as the mouthpiece for the Indian Women’s Movement. In addition to erasing 
the efforts of the other national women’s organizations in the agitations, the conflation of 
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the AIWC with the national movement paints over the (not entirely successful) 
contortions that the AIWC central committee undertook in its attempt to make the 
national program for Hindu Law Code part of its assertion to be a magnifying glass for 
local work and agitation.345 The engagement required from the AIWC in moving the 
issue into the national consciousness, in organizing local (branch) support for their 
efforts, and in working with organizations more interested in national than local efforts 
and effects gave the organization more of a voice in the central government. 
 The fight to reform the Hindu personal law clearly indicated a shift in the way 
that the AIWC imagined their claims about unity and the definition of “All India.” 
Throughout the 1940s, the organization was moving away from the advocacy of a wide 
range of solutions to problems that affected women and from making the claim that local 
and national solutions were both part of a larger All India definition of female equality, 
and rather toward becoming an organization that was largely focused on national, and 
especially legislative, solutions to inequalities in society. As the legislative mode became 
the preferred way to fight discrimination against Indian women, the AIWC’s definition of 
both local federation and of women began to change. Localities became test cases and 
subjects for polling, as in the Hindu Code agitation, rather than partners helping to define 
the Indian woman’s agenda. The organization became centrally and nationally directed, 
allowing local women’s work to benefit the cause of AIWC legislative agendas, but no 
longer recognizing it as the source of women workers, women’s agendas, and the 
cultivation of both active and passive citizenship. Perhaps more troublingly, the idea of 
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women changed in the definition of the organization. Previously, “women” referred to the 
group to be included in a definition of India, the group that was attempting to make this 
inclusion possible and the target of the former’s aid. As the AIWC shifted to a national, 
legislative agenda, women became a merely category of concern and need for the 
organization. The change from local and national women’s work making up a category 
that defined Indian women’s active citizenship to a national women’s movement focused 
on legislative change to safeguard women damaged the idea of women’s active 
participation in the remaking of the Indian nation. 
Conclusion: Being All Indian Women at Home and Abroad 
After Independence, large women’s organizations like the AIWC needed to reconsider 
the ability or political will of an Indian national government to continue to push for 
women’s issues—both in terms of encouraging active citizenship and ensuring safeguards 
for women as minority actors. While older women activists from organizations, such as 
the AIWC, continued to fight for increased government participation, younger women 
felt that the national government offered little return for their work. The women of the 
AIWC had too much faith invested in the ability of the national government to properly 
assert itself on behalf of the needs of Indian women. As such, the AIWC invested too 
much of its time in central government initiatives that assumed the subject position of 
Indian women to be dependent. The evidence of the Indian government’s actions toward 
women in the first several years seems to bear this claim out. The first three Five Year 
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Plans only address women in terms of welfare programs, rather than instituting 
suggestions that would have advanced the cause of equality.346  
Indeed, the AIWC had not only faith invested in the first national governments, 
they had their workers invested as well. Almost every woman involved in the early 
national governments was an AIWC woman. In addition to the vast majority of women 
elected to national government as members of parliament, there were several AIWC 
women who were made part of the government. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur was appointed as 
India’s first health minister, Renuka Ray was appointed to be India’s head of 
reconstruction, and Sarojini Naidu was appointed Uttar Pradesh’s first state Chief 
Minister. AIWC women were also appointed as diplomats internationally, Hansa Mehta 
was appointed the lead the Indian UN delegation, and in a Vijaya Laxshmi Pandit was 
named the Indian ambassador to the Soviet Union.  
With so many of their senior workers members of the national government, it was 
difficult for the AIWC to maintain that it was more interested in local work as the agenda 
that created the All Indian woman. It was not only that Indian women were participating 
at home and aboard, but that the AIWC imagined these women’s successes on the 
national stage to be indicative of success for the women’s movement more generally. 
With Independence, the AIWC began to see the “All Indian” woman even more so as the 
woman on the national stage. Thus, the success of the women’s movement generally and 
the AIWC specifically was measured almost entirely on a national rather than local scale. 
                                                 
346
 Nirmala Banerjee, “Whatever Happened to the Dreams of Modernity? The Nehruvian Era and Woman’s 
Position,” Economic and Political Weekly 33, no 17 (1998): 2-7. 
  197 
By investing faith and action primarily in the ability of national agitations for legislative 
fixes, the AIWC undermined its own claims that federated unity of local women doing 
local work claimed the right to active citizenship for All Indian women. Because local 
and individual women no longer had the means to contribute to the larger discussion 
about Indian citizenship through their work and their needs, the category of women 
became one of many groups of people that needed aid from the state rather than support 
in their own attempts to change their dependent position. Thus, the mode of the Indian 
Women’s Movement was only slowly starting to reintroduce the concept of local and 
marginal women’s participation and to question the value of legislative agendas for 
women’s rights.347
                                                 
347
 Since the 1970s, women’s organizations have begun asking how to focus attention of women’s actions 
rather than women’s disabilities. There has also been a movement afoot to record women talking about 
women’s struggles around issues of national upheaval and more widely to make a space for women’s 
voices.  See Stree Shakti Sanghatana, We Are Making History…: Life Stories of Women in the Telengana 
People`s Struggle (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1989); Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices 
from the Partition of India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Urvashi Butalia, Making a Difference: 
Feminist Publishing in the South (Chestnut Hill, MA: Bellagio, Pub. Network, 1995). 
  198 
Chapter 4: The Unmade Nations of the All India Progressive Writers’ Association 
The details of the founding of the All India Progressive Writers’ Association are both 
often recounted and equally often contradicted. Late in 1934 or early in 1935,348 a group 
of between twelve and thirty-five, mostly (or all) Indian students gathered in either the 
unventalized backroom or basement room of the Nanking Restaurant in the Bloomsbury 
neighborhood of London to discuss the formation of a new Indian literary organization 
devoted to literary realism, left-leaning politics, and the re-creation of the Indian nation. 
The meeting was held to either write or review the manifesto for the new organization to 
be named the All India Progressive Writers’ Association. While we know that Mulk Raj 
Anand, Sajjad Zaheer, and Ali Sardar Jafri were there, most of the attendees were 
unknowns there to indulge their interest in literature, Indian politics, or both. The new 
organization had connections to the progressive (left) leanings of the Bloomsbury group 
in London, the Paris Progressives, and the Communist Party, and wanted to recommit 
Indian literature to the pursuit of meaningful resistance against what the gathered Indian 
student authors saw as the rising tide of reactionary politics—both on the side of the 
imperial British and the well-known anti-colonial movements.349 According to Zaheer 
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and Ali Sardar Jafri, the draft of the manifesto was revised after the meeting at the 
Chinese restaurant and an “All Indian” movement was born in London and in English.350 
In January 1935, Zaheer traveled to India with copies of the manifesto in search of 
compatriots for the movement. He found a mix of Indian authors and friends who had 
spent their lives working in the Indian medium and reconnected with Indian friends he 
had meet abroad. The All India Progressive Writers’ Association (AIPWA) manifesto 
was published in February 1935, in English in the Left Review. In September 1935, the 
famous Hindi language author Premchand published a Hindi language translation of the 
manifesto in his journal Hans.  
 By 1936, the organization had relocated to India entirely, held their first “All 
India” conference, and had begun to collect supporters and stories as well as reputations 
and animosities. Unsurprisingly, the AIPWA’s mission of remaking Indian society, 
which included both strident political and literary calls for the end of British imperialism 
and sharp criticisms levied at the leaders of the main Indian anti-colonial movements, 
meant that the AIPWA was tarred and feathered as anti-imperialist by the British and 
anti-national by independence-based movements. The British saw the group as 
destabilizing with an insistently anti-colonial political stance for their literary pretensions. 
The anti-colonial movements saw their willingness to criticize the independence 
movement and especially their focus on the failures of the anti-colonial movements to 
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address issues of poverty, caste and religion-based discrimination, and the foibles of 
power as prompting dissent and even disunity against the state.351 The unease that 
powerful people in India felt about the AIPWA led to the group and its mission to be 
discredited as foreign to India.  
Both the AIPWA’s political tracts and its fiction forcibly state that the 
organization was devoted to the Indian nation and its unity. The politics of AIPWA, 
while generally considered left and radical, were far from uniform. The authors involved 
in the AIPWA had a wide range of definitions of what “progressive” meant and what the 
political commitment of the organization was. Although the AIPWA members generally 
agreed with Zaheer that the goal of the organization was to support a radically remade 
Indian nation, the meaning of that assertion was never fully clear. Ahmed Ali has argued 
part of the movement’s political progressiveness was that the political commitment of 
remaking India was never simply about one ideal. Instead, it was “an intellectual revolt 
against the outmoded past, the vitiated tendencies in contemporary thought and literature, 
the indifference of people to their human condition, against the acquiescence to foreign 
rule, enslavement to practices and beliefs, both social and religious, based on ignorance, 
against the problems of poverty and exploitation, and complete inanity to progress and 
life.”352 The members of the AIPWA spanned a variety of political positions that broadly 
defined the Indian political left. Mulk Raj Anand represented members associated with 
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center left parties like the Congress. Zaheer, Ismat Chughtai, and Krishan Chander were 
active in the Communist Party of India. Premchand professed a certain form of Gandhian 
ideology. Ahmed Ali argued that progress was the relentless and ever shifting push for 
the expansion of freedom. The common thread of the AIPWA was that the progressive 
author’s politics, and by extension his or her literary output, should foreground Indians 
who the government and its more prominent citizens tended not to see, either because of 
their class, caste, religion, or gender.353 Despite their differences, the AIPWA members 
all argued that the subjects considered in literature should challenge the simple and often 
exclusionary vision of India, with which citizens who identified with the political and 
social majority, felt comfortable.354  
 The AIPWA defined its “All India” commitment in terms of privileging a politics 
of recognition.355 The organization argued that the realization of the unified Indian nation 
relied on the government seeing and responding to minorities, not only as people in need 
of help, but also as active participants in the national project. Given this political 
statement, from the first conference in 1936 through Independence in 1948, the AIPWA 
connected literature to the creation of an “All Indian” nation that disrupted the singular 
and static image of an ideal Indian, seen as an upper-caste, upper-class, male, with the 
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wider recognition of Indian difference.  Beginning with a discussion of contemporaneous 
and historiographic accounts of the AIPWA as somehow foreign to India, I will discuss 
the organization’s national outlook and commitment. I will argue that from the first 
presidential address offered by Premchand, the AIPWA has focused on the way that 
progressive literature could be a critical depiction of the realities of life in India and push 
for both recognition of minorities in India and a catalyst for social change. In the next 
section, I will analyze a short story “Do Furlong Lambi Sadak” by the progressive author, 
Krishan Chander, which uses exemplary characters to depict the failure of the nation to 
recognize and support its minorities. By using characters as examples of minor groups in 
society, Chander argues that the minorities are the people of the nation, not just people in 
the nation, and that they need to be recognized. Finally, I will offer a reading of the 
novel, Twilight in Delhi, by the progressive writer Ahmed Ali, which creates characters 
who are irreducible to examples of types of national misfits in order to argue that the 
minority—even amongst the trappings of good fortune—is unrecognizable to the 
nation.356 
Nationalism and the All India Progressive Writers Association 
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The AIPWA’s history has often been written using two main narrative frames, both of 
which are important to understanding its role in the anti-colonial movement and its place 
in the national aftermath of both India and Pakistan.357 The first frame traces the 
association’s international connections to left leaning literary movements in the 1930s, 
such as the Bloomsbury group in London and the Association of Revolutionary Artists 
and Writers in France. The AIPWA was initially formulated in London and it consciously 
modeled itself after international progressive authors organizations.358 Descriptions of the 
AIPWA with an ‘internationalist’ angle often explain that many of the writers initially 
involved in the movement were members of the upper-class movement of Indian young 
men, who were educated aboard and therefore, focused on India as it related to itself and 
to the world.359  
 The second frame is the role that Communism, and perhaps more correctly the 
Communist Party of India (CPI), played in the production and articulation of the 
AIPWA.360 The connection between the AIPWA and the communist party is undeniable. 
Several of the founders of the AIPWA were members of the CPI, while others in the 
organization were clearly sympathetic to the CPI program.361 Indeed, the idea of radically 
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remaking the state structure of India was something that resonated with the agendas of 
both the Indian Communists and the AIPWA.  Although many members of the CPI and 
the AIPWA stressed that the two groups were entirely separate from each other, their 
shared tendencies toward the goals of national reorganization and oppositional politics, 
the government crackdown on the Communist Party after Independence, and the deep 
connection between the AIPWA and the communist-directed Telangana movement 
tended to make nationalist scholars skeptical of claims that the two movements were 
really different.362 Indeed, the resignation of several prominent writers from the 
movement was attributed to the feeling that the political character of the organization was 
overwhelming the literary goals and seemed to indicate that the communist party was 
deeply involved in later definitions of what “progressive” writing meant.363  
Clearly, both of these frames are founded in a certain degree of historical 
accuracy, and more importantly, both highlight the ideas of minority and political 
engagement that structured the AIPWA’s activist writing. At the same time, these 
narrative frames try to emphasize the AIPWA as something foreign and without a deep 
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connection to the Indian nation. Focusing on the international origins of the association 
and its generally English-educated class of authors separates the AIPWA from the main 
focus of their literature: the potential Indian nation and its citizens—from both the 
majority and minority groups. While many active participants in the movement were 
internationally focused and had international educations, this is far from the case for all 
authors involved in the AIPWA. The AIPWA would have been unsuccessful without the 
help of writers, who were only associated with India rather than a broader international 
presence. Premchand published the AIPWA manifesto in his Hindi literary journal Hans, 
while authors in India effectively spread the movement to different language areas.364 
After the founding of the organization, authors including Krishan Chander and Faiz 
Ahmed Faiz, who at the time had no high-profile international ties, were the main 
producers and proponents of the AIPWA.365 
While the Nanking Chinese restaurant anecdote emphasizing the English and 
International roots of the AIPWA at the opening of this chapter is both commonly heard 
and probably true, a large part of the AIPWA success as a literary movement was due to a 
sustained “progressive” style among writers working in Indian languages and in the 
Indian social milieu, like Premchand. Indeed, especially in the Urdu literary scene, to 
which most of the early members of the AIPWA belonged, the idea of realism and social 
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change as the basis for literary engagement was well-established. In addition to the 
proclivity toward realism among Urdu writers before the AIPWA’s manifesto, Shabana 
Mahmud and others have argued that the real beginning of the AIPWA was not the 1935 
Nanking meeting and early manifesto, but the 1932 publication of Angare, a book of 
short stories with a realist and critical bent by Ahmed Ali, Sajjad Zaheer, Rashid Jahan, 
and Mahmuduzzafar.366 All four authors became early members of the AIPWA, though 
only Sajjad Zaheer was suffering in the unventaliated back room (or basement) of the 
Nanking restaurant at the organization’s founding in 1934/5. 
In the second frame, the AIPWA was characterized as working as the literary 
wing of the communist party, which was also used to discredit the AIPWA as somehow 
foreign to India. Communism and the Communist party has been depicted as a non-
national force in Indian nationalist history. The naming of communism as somehow both 
foreign and anti-national is largely based on the antipathy between the Communist party 
and the first Indian government. Although the Indian communist movement was largely 
theorized in India around the meaning of Indian poverty and society, Indian communists 
were often targeted as either duped peasants or students attempting to import Western 
ideas whole cloth into Indian society. Other ostensibly western ideas, especially 
democracy, were reengineered to be authentically Indian and came to be seen as integral 
in proving a person’s claim of sympathy for nationalism; communism, however, failed to 
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translate into an authentically Indian movement because of its strong critique of the state 
structure and its criticism of early independent Indian governments.367 
The AIPWA aligned with the communists in their organizational insistence that 
the structure of the nation be remade to help the poor, but was not an exclusively 
communist movement even though several important Progressive authors were members 
of the Communist Party of India, including Sajjad Zaheer, Krishan Chander, and Ismat 
Chughtai. Scholars have also disputed the claims of an established relationship between 
the AIPWA and the CPI, arguing for instance that “the history of the PWA is a history of 
struggles and contestation and not of the unilateral triumph of authoritarianism.”368 
Pointing to the participation and endorsement of the AIPWA of Gandhian authors, 
including Premchand, Anand, and Tagore, scholars like Russell, have concluded that the 
movement’s wide definition of progressive activism needs to be interpreted more broadly 
than a simple label of Communism.369 However, most if not all of the writing by AIPWA 
authors had an element of revolt against a lack of freedom attached to strong class and 
caste barriers and an allegiance to difference broadly defined.370 The AIPWA had much 
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in common with the CPI in their desire to acknowledge the deficiencies of the Indian 
state, but the AIPWA was never a cadet association to the Communist Party of India. 
  Having acknowledged both the usefulness and disorienting effect of these frames, 
I argue that the AIPWA and its authors were deeply invested in India as both the ideal 
progressive nation and in their critique of the existing Indian state that informed their 
‘progressive’ literature. What even scholars who recognize the deep national connection 
of the AIPWA movement fail to emphasize is that the organization named itself the ‘All 
India’ Progressive Writers’ Movement, quite purposefully.371 Indeed, Ali Husain Mir and 
Raza Mir’s book Anthems of Resistance, a virtual love letter to the AIPWA and its 
national ideas, states in its early pages: “the attendees had resolved to formalize their 
group as an institution, which would be called the All India Progressive Writers’ 
Association (henceforth, the PWA).”372 Unlike any of the organizations highlighted in 
this dissertation, the AIPWA is very often talked about without its “All India” prefix, 
despite the fact that it was almost always used it as the official name of the organization. 
The problem, even for scholars who value the AIPWA’s nationally grounded literary and 
social message, was that the organization was fundamentally focused on advocating for 
the Indian people rather than explicitly lauding the Indian state. The AIPWA’s concept of 
national unity depended on a sustained concern for and recognition of those groups who 
failed to be recognized by the Indian state. If the state structure failed these Indians, then 
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the organization’s loyalty was with the people rather than the structure. One of the 
reasons that the AIPWA is often seen as only “questionably” “All Indian” is its focus on 
the minor voices of the nation. 
For most of the authors of the AIPWA, the goal of “progressive” literature was to 
highlight the ways in which “the present in which we live is rotten.”373 Progressive 
writing, as such, often highlighted the troubles of the poor, religious minorities, and 
women, leading to some commentators likening it to literature in the reformist vein, a 
claim that was thoroughly rejected by the members of the AIPWA. The language of 
reform had a clear place in the anti-colonial struggle, as an acceptable way for minorities 
to raise grievances, first to the British and by the 1940s to the Congress Party, both of 
which came to stand in for the idealized Indian majority. But the language of reform was 
not a functional one for the authors trying to define progressive literature because reform 
only attempted to redirect the aid of the state rather than reimaging the nation’s 
relationship with its minority citizens.374 The politics behind the AIPWA (whether they 
were expressed in terms of Communism or not) called for a structural reinvention of what 
it meant to be Indian, rather than an attempt to make the situation better by degrees. As 
Ahmed Ali argued, “Without felling a rotten structure we can never build anew. It is only 
through opposition that our literature can acquire a new life.”375  
 The problem with rejecting the label of reformist literature while embracing a pro-
national stance was that the AIPWA did not fall into any readily available category. 
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Several members of the organization called the movement “oppositional,”376 except 
unlike the Congress, the AIPWA opposed not only the colonial state but also the lack of 
proper recognition afforded to all Indian citizens. The best way to describe the AIPWA’s 
stance is that it was a minority organization speaking in the language of the majority. By 
this, I mean that the AIPWA was staking out a claim to the discussion of the nation and 
emphasized its commitment to the nation by speaking in the language that the majority 
could recognize and support. At the same time, their advocacy of radically changing the 
system to include invisible Indians, who did not speak to the majority, meant that the 
organization could only speak from the minority position. That is, the AIPWA used their 
literature and activism to claim the right to speak back to both the colonial state and the 
post-independence Indian state, both of which they saw as failing to adequately address 
the entire nation. 
 The AIPWA saw itself as encouraging participation in the nation through the 
demand for systematic change—both politically and socially—for minorities of all sorts. 
As such, many of the most important stories and novels from the organization dealt with 
the problem of deeply set cultural, political, and national failures to see the reality of 
discrimination. Mulk Raj Anand’s novella, Untouchable, follows a day in the life of its 
main character Bakha, a member of an untouchable caste, during the 1930s. In the novel, 
Bakha is offered several visions for getting away from his subjugation as an untouchable. 
He is presented with the emulation of white soldiers, the reformist desire of a Christian 
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missionary, the nationalist rhetoric of Gandhi, and the figurative language of poetry.377 
After hearing all of the various options for his “uplift,” Bakha and the reader remain 
unconvinced by any of his options, but the experience forces reader to think about what 
kind of global change would allow for “uplift” of untouchables in India.378  
 Untouchable, one of the AIPWA’s most influential novellas, spoke directly from 
the position of a lower-caste person.379 The idea of the book was to see the life of an 
untouchable, who was struggling to reject his status, and to create discontent with the 
options available to untouchables in the contemporary society.380 In the novella, as Bakha 
rejects religious conversion, British service, and nationalist, Gandhian rhetoric, he is 
critiquing both the quality and kind of recognition and active citizenship, which are 
available to a person of his caste. The novel ends with the sense that the available options 
all fail to create Bakha as a citizen of the Indian state, but in their presentation, prove 
Bakha as an Indian deserving of national recognition. 
 The AIPWA’s attempts to use literature to point out sites of failure by the British, 
the nationalist parties and leaders during the anti-colonial fight of the 1930s and 40s, and 
after 1947 the independent Indian government caused the group to be criticized as anti-
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national by others associated with majority anti-colonial movements and as a threat to 
security by the British colonial government.381 Moreover, the establishment of the Indian 
government and that government’s failure to take material steps to alleviate poverty and 
recognize minorities effectively, as well as the commencement of governmental martial 
aggression against tribal and peasant movements in various areas of India, caused the 
AIPWA to push back strongly against repression whether the decision makers were 
British or Indian. In a real way, the AIPWA’s opposition to the continuation of repressive 
political power defined its national commitment. The AIPWA was resolutely working 
toward national independence and was therefore unwilling to accept the political transfer 
of power as sufficient for the definition of that ideal. As Faiz’s famous poem says, 
August 15th, India’s independence day, did not represent the kind of national ideal that 
Indians had been promised.382 
 The nation, radically rebuilt, offered the kind of vague foundational site that 
allowed for the coming together of several different agendas and criticisms. In her book, 
Gopal borrows a term from Aijaz Ahmed to argue that the nation “was a ‘terrain of 
struggle’” for the AIPWA,383 by which she meant that the nation offered a key concept, 
upon which a series of important critiques could be levied.  The AIPWA was nothing if 
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not deeply committed to the nation, but their national idea was not a simply agreed upon 
set of parameters that defined India, Indian unity, and the Indian citizen’s responsibilities 
to the nation. Instead, the nation functioned as a mutually agreed upon set of 
circumstances that allowed for the opening of debate and discussion about the above 
issues. As the idea of the nation was discussed, it was almost a conceit, a placeholder 
word that paved a path to the discussion of what the word did and should mean. This 
discursive nature of the national idea meant that the AIPWA was deeply committed both 
to the nation as a concept, but also to a deeply democratic process to define that concept. 
The AIPWA did align itself with the anti-colonial struggle in their 1935 
manifesto. The manifesto’s preamble called explicitly for supporting the struggle for 
independence from Britain, but not over the need to support radical changes in the 
structure of Indian society. The manifesto argued, “While claiming to be the inheritors of 
the best traditions of Indian civilization, we shall criticize ruthlessly, in all its political, 
economic, and cultural aspects the spirit of reaction in our country; and we shall foster 
through interpretive and creative work (with both native and foreign resources) 
everything that will lead our country to the new life for which it is striving.”384 The goals 
of the manifesto clearly stated that not only national independence, but more importantly 
a certain kind of nation was the goal of the organization. More specifically, the manifesto 
argued that the goal of nationalism had to be the best of what it meant to be Indian, 
without the accompanying social, political, and cultural repression, defined by the 
AIPWA authors as ‘the spirit of reaction.’ The AIPWA very specifically took care not to 
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define what was Indian as good and what was foreign as bad, but rather pushed for 
defining the best of India as whatever made India a nation that could be defined as strong, 
democratic, and responsive to its population. 
 With the nation both as the common ground and the site of dispute, the AIPWA 
was very concerned about the production and sustainability of the “All India” ideal. 
Being a literary organization, the manifesto of the AIPWA pointed to two seemingly 
contradictory commitments needed to preserve unity. They argued that Indian democracy 
could only be sustained by a commitment to speaking to one another, while at the same 
time the manifesto stressed the importance of preserving and expanding literature in all 
Indian languages through the creation of regional AIPWA branches that corresponded to 
linguistic zones. In order to reconcile these two goals—both key to the production of 
Indian democracy—the AIPWA resolved “to produce and translate literature of a 
progressive nature and high technical standard.”385 In the language of the manifesto, the 
production and translation of literature were of equal value to the organization and the 
nation because they enabled progressive ideas to be established and spread, and perhaps 
more importantly: both production and translation created a vocabulary to define the 
change that progressive writing was aiming to produce without trampling on local and 
regional commitments that were equally important to the stance of foregrounding 
minority concerns. 
 The AIPWA sought to foster conversations about the nation and follow the 
progressive ideals of assessing life and recognizing the minority through the production 
and translation of literature. These goals were quite different from those of several other 
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literary organizations in India at the time because they were interested in supporting 
literature for India rather than defining a singular idea of Indian literature.386 For the 
AIPWA, translation and the support of Hindustani in both the Hindi and Urdu scripts was 
meant to create a space that could define both the ideal and the shortcomings of the 
Indian system. 
“The Object of Literature”: Defining a Call to Action 
Premchand is one the best known Hindustani language authors of the twentieth 
century.387 He was born Dhanpat Rai in Lamhi, a village outside of Banaras388 to a family 
of Kayastha recorders and postal servants in a village largely inhabited by lower-caste 
Kumari farmers.389 In 1921, Premchand resigned from government posts in sympathy 
with the ideals of Gandhi’s non-cooperation, and he became a full time author. 
Premchand founded both the Saraswati Press in Banaras and the literary monthly Hans, 
both highly influential in the production and promotion of literature in Hindi.390 He was 
popular during his lifetime for his realistic portrayals of village life and his sympathy for 
the trials of the poor, women, and lower-caste people—albeit written from his position in 
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the city of Banaras. Premchand died shortly after delivering the Presidential Address at 
the first AIPWA conference.391 
In the presidential address at the first Indian conference of the All India 
Progressive Writers’ Association (AIPWA) in 1936, Premchand attempted to define the 
goals of the new organization through a sustained consideration of the object of 
literature.392 Over the course of the speech, “The Object of Literature,” Premchand 
defined the main terms of the organization: progressive, literature, and the role of the 
author in the context of India’s historical needs and the social situation in the late 1930s. 
The speech presents progressive literature as an imperative for authors, whose duty it is 
to make clear the failures of national and social justice. Premchand argues for the 
importance of literary representations of the indignities of contemporary life, pointing out 
that beauty—a primary concern of literature—can only be promoted by not turning a 
blind eye to ugliness of modern life.  
The speech and the meeting were important for representing the AIPWA as more 
than a cadet branch of the global trend toward progressive writing, but rather as a 
progressive writing movement for South Asia in general and for the current moment in 
Indian society in particular. The choice of Premchand to give the first presidential address 
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forwarded this agenda. He was an early supporter of the AIPWA,393 he printed a Hindi 
translation of the AIPWA manifesto in his influential magazine Hans, and he was one of 
the first high profile authors to sign the manifesto. Perhaps even more importantly, 
Premchand was deeply associated with Hindi literature and with the kind of realism and 
socially responsible writing that the AIPWA supported. 
Premchand began his address ruminating on the historical place of literature and 
literary organizations in India, connecting various literary movements to their historical 
period and to their authors and audiences. Specifically, Premchand argued, “literature is a 
reflection of its time,”394 and as such, literature reflects the class status and societal values 
of the authors and readers. He argued that because literature is always about the 
production and exploration of beauty, Indian literature, which had been dominated by 
upper class and high Hindu caste writers and readers, had imagined beauty around themes 
of love and in the form of magic and spiritual stories. Premchand argued that these stories 
acted as both escapist pleasure written for the wealthy and as attempts to consolidate 
power in the political elite and in religious teachings. 
For Premchand, the extreme gap between the life of the rich and powerful and the 
life of the everyday person in the middle of the twentieth century required a different 
kind of literature. He argued that authors and readers needed to think beyond escapism 
and reinscribing power with authorities like religion and the political elites, who had 
failed to recognize the dire position of the population. This did not mean giving up on the 
presentation of beauty, but rather thinking about the kind of beauty that they wanted to 
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support. He asked whether it was enough to describe a beautiful garden with the clear 
understanding that the description merely propped up a system that perpetuated the most 
ugly tendencies of society. Premchand argued that progressive writers needed to 
recognize that continuing to define beauty outside the experience of “real life” was 
supporting the oppression and willful ignorance of the state, and as such is “ugly, is 
indecent, is a deprivation of the human.”395 Instead, Premchand wrote that literature, 
history, and the nation were best served when authors described the life of the least, as 
these descriptions forced recognition on those with power and in the end, could spark 
change. 
 Given this position, Premchand argued two strongly related points that helped to 
define the goals of the progressive writer. First, he argued that “the best definition of 
literature is ‘an assessment of life.’ …it should explain our life’s assessment.”396 For 
Premchand, literature that could be called such was both a reflection of life and a critical 
analysis of its broader scope. This critical nature defined progressive literature as more 
than merely stories in the realist style without a clear sense of purpose. Instead, 
Premchand placed literature that merely parroted situations back to the audience without 
meaning in the same category as escapist tales of well-heeled wealth and pleasure or 
religious morality plays.397 Critical assessment meant that authors should express the 
world with its follies and miseries and suggest, at the very least, the empty place where a 
solution may exist, if not the solution itself. 
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 Premchand’s related argument was that authors, by their own self-assessment, had 
a progressive character because they perceived themselves “as lacking inside…and 
outside.” 398 The lack that authors feel in themselves and their writing is “his imagination 
of a person and a society that is not visible to him.”399 Using the author’s ability to see 
the society, person, or reality that did not yet exist gave the author a chance to imagine 
society’s flaws and the way to suggest action and change. Indeed, for Premchand, the job 
of literature is to project a “message of action”400 that defines the world, assesses the 
spots that are lacking, and offers action by way of making the loss clear. Literature that 
creates this message of action is necessarily based on the kind of critical assessment of 
life that progressive writing demands.  
 Premchand’s call to name progressive literature as literature that responds and 
reacts to failures, absences, and casual evil in everyday life, defined the quality 
‘progressive’ for the organization. For Premchand, the progressive quality in literature 
was based on a belief in the ability of recognition to prompt solutions, and ultimately to 
create a society, if not a government, that placed more value in caring for those most in 
need of care. For authors, it was a political act to point to casual mistreatment of the poor, 
lower caste, or women either through neglect or willingness to turn a blind eye to 
suffering. The minor status of the poor village dweller or neglected woman was 
exacerbated by the failure of those witnesses to suffering to notice that suffering was 
happening. In turn, Premchand defined beauty as the ability to see the people that the 
                                                 
398
 Ibid., 80. 
399
 Ibid., 80. 
400
 Ibid., 80. 
  220 
state failed to see and progressiveness as the characteristic that made the minority part of 
everyday life. 
In connection with the AIPWA manifesto circulated and translated into Hindi in 
1935, what Premchand argued for was a literature that defined the nation through the 
notice of and response to minor characters in the national story without associating the 
organization with any particular minority community.401 In general, authors associated 
with the AIPWA followed Premchand’s exhortation to assess and act by presenting 
societal lapses and representing the effect of the failure to notice. These stories point to 
their characters as examples of society’s indifference, with a common theme in the life of 
these characters being the sense of being passed over. But not all of the AIPWA’s 
members saw the politics of progressive literature as the chance to increase the society’s 
ability to care for the unrepresented. 
The AIPWA used the idea of greater India as a way to define both the ideal and 
the failures of a just society. The goal of the AIPWA was always to prod the nation—
though not necessarily the national government—into recognizing the casual exploitation 
of people meant to be under its care. As such, the literary goals of the organization were 
always to create high quality short stories, essays, poems, and novels that depicted Indian 
life. The question of how best to understand the exhortation to represent Indian life was 
answered in two different ways. First, authors created “national” characters to act as 
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examples of the injustice of modern life in the Indian subcontinent. These characters were 
meant to stand in for particular categories of minority life. Their stories while often quite 
moving, were also written to tap into what could be generalized as a national failure to 
care for the minorities within it. Some examples of this kind of writing include Budhiya, 
the dying/dead wife of Premchand’s “Kafan” (The Shroud) or the courtesan in Saadat 
Hasan Manto’s “A Girl from Delhi,” or the All India Radio singer in Qurratulain Hyder’s 
Agle Janam Mohe Bitiya Na Kajo (In My Next Life Don’t Let me be Born a 
Daughter).402 In the next section, I will look at how Krishan Chander, one of the most 
popular authors in the AIPWA created an example where the story was entirely meant to 
expose the national unconcern by presenting the reader with examples of national 
neglect. 
Do Furlong Lambi Sadak: Creating an Allegory of National Indifference 
Krishan Chander was a prolific writer of fiction and an early member of the AIPWA. He 
completed an English language education, though unlike many of the other early authors 
in the movement, he was not educated aboard. Like many Indian authors of fiction, 
Chander worked as a journalist after college and was invited to join the All India Radio 
as a ‘features’ writer, where he produced many well-regarded radio plays.403 After 
Independence, Chander became wary of the national government, and consequently left 
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All India Radio to become a screenwriter for Bombay films.404 Although Chander has 
never been as critically acclaimed as many of the better-known authors of the AIPWA, he 
was one of the most popular and prolific of the group.405 Chander’s stories were often 
written in a simple street style, which was accessible to a wide population, and his 
association with both radio and films showed he took seriously the progressive 
admonishment to reach the people and make changes with literature. In her set of 
autobiographical sketches, Ismat Chughtai, another member of the AIPWA, said that in 
response to the violence of partition, Chander “became a rectifier of wrongs. At a time 
when we needed a leader more urgently than an artist, he did what was necessary, what 
was proper.”406 Though extremely popular in South Asia—both in India and in 
Pakistan—as well as being a key and lifelong member of the AIPWA, very little 
scholarly material has been written about Chander in English. 
Chander’s short story, Do Furlong lambi sadak (A Street Two Furlong Long), is a 
prime specimen of the genre of stories where the characters were mostly meant as 
exemplars of national indifference to poverty and minorities, who focused instead on the 
faulty machinery of the state, the courts, the army, and the political class. Written after 
independence, the story shows the nation failing its minorities from the British times 
through the emergence of an Indian government. The story is told about the street that 
connects the law courts to the law college. The story is told by an unseen narrator, who 
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lives “in the neighborhood of the College”407 and travels each day along the title street to 
his office “near the Law Courts.”408 The narrator recounts some of the people and events 
he has seen in the nine years that he traveled the road. Using this frame, Chander lays out 
an array of stock characters including: a line of poor beggars who are all injured in some 
way (either physically or hampered by children); a wealthy man in a car who fails to 
notice the beggars, focusing on a rich woman and her servant; a rickshaw driver who first 
is forced to give all of his earnings as a bribe to a policeman and then is savagely beaten 
by an Englishman; two men who are thinking of going into the army to get food and 
medicine from the hakim409 for their families; two poor women: a mother and daughter 
who are both working too hard and have become hard on each other; three middle class 
girls who are planning to go to the movies;  and a group of schoolboys who are lined up 
along to road without water for several hours, waiting to greet a short procession of VIPs. 
The story is short and each characters appears only briefly, yet each story lingers on long 
enough that the “unseen and unheard” members of society in the story speak, and the 
reader is forced to focus on them. Still, without a plot or consistent characters, the real 
main character of the story is the street itself, and more clearly, the national structure for 
which the street stands as a proxy. 
“Do Furlong Lambi Sadak,” was written after independence and highlights many 
of the main critiques that the AIPWA focused on in defining their commitment to the 
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nation. Specifically, the story calls for the nation to be more attentive to its minor 
characters and highlights the way that the Indian system directly after independence, a 
hold-over from the British system, functions not only by ignoring its minorities, but by 
creating unbridgeable gaps between them. In the story, Chander puts forward characters 
whose lives were exactly the kind of lives that often went unregarded and argued that 
these lives should be seen. His story is both a critical assessment and a call for the 
remaking of the nation to better respond to its citizens. As such, Chander’s story 
describes the oppositional literature that defined the AIPWA’s commitment to India and 
its minorities. 
The street is perhaps the most completely described character of the story. 
Chander begins his story by musing about the street’s visual and tactile sense. The road is 
described as “level, straight, and hard,”410 built by a “Eurasian contractor.”411 It is utterly 
unchanged and unaffected by the people and events that use it. Later in the story, the 
street is described as a silent witness by the narrator saying, “what event and accidents 
[this street] must have seen. But no one has seen it smile, nor has it cried.”412 At the end 
of the story, the narrator imagines himself as a madman blowing up the road and breaking 
its indifference apart. He describes himself ranting, “I don’t want the freedom of these 
roads.”413 In the end, however, the narrator describes the road as continuing completely 
unaware and indifferent to the narrator’s feelings.  
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It is obvious that the street is a proxy for the national government. The street’s 
location as the path between national justice (in the form of the courts) and civil service 
education (in the form of the college) structures the street as the infrastructure of the 
nation. Moreover, the description of the road, and its creation by a Eurasian contractor 
clearly delineate it as the structure of the government. Therefore, the nation stands as the 
silent witness in the story to innumerable struggles of its citizens. The action of the 
stories stretches from about 1938 to after independence in 1947, but the character of the 
road, and by implication the nation, pointedly does not change despite the transfer of 
power from the British to an Indian national government.414 
Thus, the nation is described and condemned in the description of the road for its 
inability to recognize the needs of the inhabitant. It has no shade, water, or sympathy. In 
addition, the story clearly delineates the people who are meant to be on the street because 
they are interacting with the nation, such as the VIP politicians at the end of the story, or 
the narrator, whose job forces him to interact with the structures of the nation (in the form 
of the courts and the college). Then, there are the beggars, who are there hoping in vain to 
get some kind of relief from the nation, and women going home with the fuel, whose 
situation is so desperate that they are merely passing through the nation. While the street 
almost participates in the welcoming of the VIP politicians by housing the students there 
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to welcome them, the structure of the nation is unable to recognize the needs or desires of 
everyone else. In other words, the nation is resolutely separate from its citizenry. 
If the nation is represented by the character of the street, the nation’s failure to 
protect and care for its minorities is witnessed over and over by the hardships endured by 
the characters populating the street. Chander is careful about his character’s space, 
drawing them in sufficient detail that the reader does not merely pass over their 
individuality and giving almost all of them a chance to speak, but at the same time not 
dwelling on their stories, assuming that the reader will be able to imagine the wider 
details of the life depicted. In this way, the characters are both stock characters, depicting 
discrimination based on wealth, race, and gender, while at the same time not reinscribing 
the national silencing of minorities the story is built to fight against. At the end of each 
vignette, the narrator returns to sum up the failure of the nation, the inability to recognize 
and help its citizens whether they be the victims of poverty, gendered discrimination, 
race, or status. 
The body of the story begins and ends with voice of a beggar begging for some 
small change. At the beginning of the story, the beggars are all starving, malformed, or 
crippled in some way. While they are described in a way to make the reader sympathetic, 
the response from the only people to notice them is derision. For the most part, however, 
the structure of poverty and wealth in the nation, defined by the street, does not force or 
even allow for contact between those with money and power and the beggars. A rich man 
who comes through the street “idly” watches the beggars, but fails to notice that he has 
crushed a street dog under the wheels of his car, and is easily distracted by a wealthy 
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woman.415 By the end of the story, a beggar is lying dead on the street, with no one 
noticing.416 The ability to see the poor is severely curtailed by a systemic difference 
between wealthy people who are able to move quickly and without difficulty through the 
road, and the poor who need the most help, but receive the least benefit. 
Indeed, the worst vignettes in the story are the three in which the poor come into 
contact with the state machinery directly: the story of the beating the tonga driver for 
declining to take an English man to the Cantonment for a reduced fee,417 the two poor 
laborers who were forced into the army because they have no money to live on,418 and the 
schoolboys who have no access to water while waiting for hours to ‘greet’ the VIP 
politicians.419 In each of these vignettes, the poor person is at the mercy of the nation and 
its representatives, in the form of the police, army, and the government servants, and in 
each, the poor person is less well off because of the interaction. The tonga drive is 
savagely beaten by the Englishman for declining the unfair rate and is then forced by the 
police apologize for audacity of claiming fair treatment.  
In the case of the army-bound laborers discussing the clearly imminent World 
War II, they correctly point out that they are being recruited because of the coming war. 
Speaking of the war, one suggests, “I only know that it is us, the poor, who’ll get 
killed.”420 Still, at the end of their conversation, despite the clear knowledge that they are 
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being asked to be cannon fodder, the two men agree that the army is their best chance at 
keeping their families alive.  
In the third instance seemingly set around 1947/48, schoolboys are being kept at 
the roadside in such conditions that they are unable to make a connection between their 
being there and the goals and conditions of the nation. They are thirsty, unable to 
understand their role in the proceedings, and completely disconnected from the nation. 
Even their flags, clearly representative of the nation, fail to connect them to the nation in 
the form of the VIPs they are there to greet. Indeed, the VIP does not look at them, and as 
soon as he is passed, the boys are “crumpling up and throwing away the paper flags.”421 
The nation is not responsive to their needs for water and for connection, and in the end 
they are uninterested in the nation. 
What draws these cases together is the disregard that people have for each other, 
and that the government has for its citizens. While the road is well-kept, it fails to provide 
necessities for the people who are forced to look to it for some kind of support or shelter. 
In many cases it produces indifference or even malevolence in people who ask for help, 
as with the beggars, or in a later case of a mother and daughter attempting to bring home 
cowdung cakes for fuel. The daughter, seeing her own burden of cooking the dinner for 
the family, fails to recognize her mother’s inability to shoulder her burden of cowdung 
cakes.422 The problem is that the daughter, so burdened by her responsibilities, cannot 
care for another set. As with the other minorities mentioned, there is no help forthcoming 
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for these two. In the end, one of the successes of the story is that it highlights the way that 
the nation failing to help the minor makes them unable to see and support each other. 
The unspoken idea behind the story is two-fold. First, the nation as it stands is no 
different from the pre-independence nation in the sense that it fails to care for its 
minorities in precisely same way. Second, the nation under its current governmental 
system will never be accountable to its minorities without the kind of momentous change 
that the narrator suggests at the end. The story’s vignettes urge the reader to see more, 
feel more, and work harder toward being sympathetic, while stressing the futility of 
making smaller changes. In addition, the story points to the way that the current 
government system splits people apart by making burdens too burdensome and not 
allowing dialogue between people.   
For Chander, a committed communist, the unseen—even invisible—minority is 
the poor. Much like Premchand’s progress, Chander is committed to the problem of 
creating a situation in which the public sees and cares for those left without opportunities. 
Unlike Premchand, Chander points to the failure not only of the society and neighbors to 
see and care, but also to the failure of the state to provide an equal playing field for the 
minority—mainly the poor—to succeed. For Chander, recognizing that the callousness of 
everyday life hinges particularly on recognizing the complicity of the state in failing to 
bring the poor into the nation in a real way. 
In stories like “Dani,” Chander points to societal barriers that the poor faced in 
their attempt to gain a measure of recognition—let alone equality—from the state. Dani, 
a pavement dweller is promised a house by a government swindler, and through a series 
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of losses while waiting on the street for his house to be built, he loses his wife, child, all 
of his belongings, and ultimately his mind. When the state finally looks in at Dani, he has 
defined his pavement spot as his ‘house,’ rendering him nothing more than a crazy 
pavement dweller too far gone for rescue.423 Similarly, in his story “The Jamun Tree,” 
Chander recounts how a famous but poor poet dies after being trapped for days under a 
Jamun tree on the premises of a government building. Government officials worry about 
the effect of cutting down a tree in the midst of a “Grow more trees” campaign and 
mourn over the loss of the delicious jamun fruit, but fail to recognize the agony of the 
poet under the tree. After having his file studied from all sides, the man is presented with 
a membership to the Sahitya Akademi, but not saved from an agonizing painful death.424 
The government, unable to contemplate the life of the poor, fails not only to include them 
in the system, but fails to see them as citizens of the nation. 
Twilight in Delhi: Reading the Individual Citizen  
Although the more common tool used by progressive writers in establishing the state and 
its failure to see or respond to the minority character was by creating an example, there 
was another less common tact of creating a character or world that could not be reduced 
to an example. In this genre of progressive writing, the author consciously crafts 
characters who are not stock characters to draw attention to the multitude of ways that 
people are unseen in the nation or unsure of the national context.425 Ahmed Ali’s novel, 
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Twilight in Delhi, published in 1940, is of this type of fiction.426 Ali separates his 
characters from the reader by setting the novel in the early 1900s and by making it clear 
from the introduction that the world of Delhi depicted in the novel is no longer existent. 
He argues that the changes that Delhi went through between the turn of the century and 
the 1940s rendered Delhi utterly changed. In 1993, Ali wrote, “Since its publication, the 
Delhi of the novel had changed beyond nostalgia and recognition.”427 The distance in 
time and recognition between the time of the novel, the time of the author, and the reader 
forbid the reader from pushing their ideas about the nation and national minorities onto 
the characters of the novel. The use of a historical perspective is also important in placing 
the events of the novel in a personal space, but outside the reader’s own memory.428 By 
cutting the clear connection between the characters and their class, racial, and religious 
status in the India of the 1940s, Ali is able to explore deep ambivalences about the issues 
of nationalism, the nation, and the system of the government under debate as he was 
writing the novel by allowing the reader to engage with 1940s themes through the 1900-
1920 setting. 
 Placing the novel outside the realm of the contemporary fit well with Ahmed 
Ali’s ideas of a progressive art form. For Ali, as with Premchand, the goal of progressive 
literature was “the betterment of our social life.”429 Therefore, the kind of art appropriate 
to the title of progressive in any society necessarily changed as the society moved. 
However, Ali believed that progressive literature took on a particularly historical view of 
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the world. He argued that in order to be effective, progressive writers needed to 
comprehend, “what we are, what we were, and what we should or can be.”430 The past 
plays two distinct and contradictory roles for Ali. Looked at directly, the past is the 
“outmoded” precedent for the present pain and as such needs to be discarded in favor of 
new solutions. At the same time, the idealized past suggests a time when “we were not in 
the mire.”431 The reconciliation between these seemingly contradictory positions is the 
requirement for both continuous change toward a goal of more complete freedom and the 
retention of memory for consciousness of society without nostalgia. Consciousness of the 
past, especially in the novel Twilight in Delhi, represents the failure of the present to 
really see the present and future of the Muslim minority that made up the Delhi of the 
past.  As such, it is impossible for the minority group to be part of the vision for the 
future the state.432 Indeed, the novel presents the failure of the representative claims made 
by the nationalist movement, especially by the Congress, as a failure to see the Muslim 
minority by relegating their status to past and gone.433 
 Ahmed Ali joined together with Sajjad Zaheer, Rashid Jahan, and 
Mahmuduzzafar to write the short story collection Angare, often considered the first 
publication describing the ethos of the AIPWA. Ali argued that the publication was 
meant to speak to the Indian Muslim community as a way to rouse them from their 
deeply conservative traditions, kept in reaction to the failure of the nation to recognize 
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their difference. Ali also joined the first conference and wrote a foundational essay, “A 
Progressive View of Art,” for the organization’s founding document, Toward a 
Progressive Literature. While Zaheer and some of the other founders were declaring their 
manifesto over Chinese, Ali was teaching literature at the University of Lucknow.434 
After Independence, Ali migrated to Pakistan.435 However, even before he migrated, Ali 
broke with the AIPWA, claiming that the organization had failed to keep its faith in the 
pluralistic progressive politics, opting instead in for ideological conformity to the 
Communist Party of India. Ali’s migration to Pakistan has caused problems for the 
classification of his most well-known novel, Twilight in Delhi. While Pakistani authors 
claim Ali as a founder of their own literary movement, the loving discussion of Delhi in 
the novel marks it as geographically specific. At the same time, Ali’s critique of the 
failure to recognize the Muslim community as an integral part of Indian nationality and 
his subsequent move to Pakistan make him a controversial figure in the nationalist history 
of Indian literature.  
 Twilight in Delhi focuses on the life and death of an old Delhi Muslim family 
headed by Mir Nihal. The family history is such that it had ties with the old Mughal 
empire, and Mir Nihal sees himself and his friends as emblematic of a time and place that 
have slipped away. The novel is set in four parts: the first part follows the drama of the 
family’s youngest son, Asghar, who wants to marry a woman, Bilqeece, who because of 
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her family’s class status, his father find unacceptable. The second section focuses on a 
series of deaths affecting Mir Nihal, including his prize pigeons, his mistress, and his 
sense of the city and the world. The third section again follows Asghar through his 
wedding to Bilqeece and Asghar’s growing indifference to his new family. The third 
section also focuses heavily on changes being made to the city and the nation, especially 
in the announcement of Delhi as the new imperial capital in 1911, and the unease that it 
creates among the long-time residents of the city. The final section focuses on the effects 
a fever epidemic that swept through the city in 1918, which killed one of Mir Nihal’s 
sons and Asghar’s wife Bilqeece, and left Mir Nihal in a comatose state. 
In the end, the novel is uncertain about the state and place of the Muslim minority 
in the nation. The city of Delhi is being restructured and its distinctive Muslim culture is 
being changed from the top down. The unique character of the city is being undermined 
by the push to make Delhi emblematic of the nation. The failure of the state in Krishan 
Chander’s short story, where exemplars of various groups fail to be recognized by the 
state, is different from the failure in Twilight in Delhi, in which the state’s attempt to 
change without recognition of the present and past fails to recognize and retain the 
change. The novel suggests that the Indian nation and national unity forged through 
forcing people to be examples of categories fails to recognize the differences that make 
up Indian life. Twilight in Delhi is as much an effort at remembering difference as it is a 
lament of the loss of it. The distinction between Chander’s street and Ali’s Delhi is 
texture. For Chander, the street represents the utter failure of the state to recognize and 
aid, drawn back in time through the present. Chander’s street does not change, except in 
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the apocalyptic moment of mad destruction. Ali’s Delhi is ever changing, often against 
the will of the its inhabitants, whose visions of past and present do not preclude the 
imagination of a future different from that or any other moment. Moreover, the novel was 
written approximately twenty years after the time it describes, which suggests not only 
the necessity of knowing the past, but also of the uncertainty of the claim to know the 
present. 
The novel opens with a wide framing device, describing the history and present 
state of the city, Delhi. The city is described as lying in a state somewhere between sleep 
and death.  The patronage and stately grandeur of the city has disappeared under the 
neglect of the British rule and loss of status of the previous Muslim rulers. In the 
introduction to the novel, Ali writes that the mood of the novel tries to capture a moment 
of rebellion in the life of the city, in that it shows the moment in which the Delhi culture 
attempted to fight against the coming changes. He writes, “my purpose in writing the 
novel was to depict a phase in our national life and the decay of a whole culture, a 
particular mode of thought and living, values now dead and gone before our eyes.”436 
Still, even as he regards the old Delhi of the novel dead, Ali points to the possibility not 
only for renewal, but also for reconciliation. He explicitly discusses the myth of Delhi’s 
mutability. He writes, “Seven Delhis have fallen, and the eighth has gone the way of its 
predecessors, yet to be demolished and built again. Life, like the Phoenix, must collect 
the spices for its nest and set fire to it, and arise resurrected out of its flames.”437 Thus, 
Ali sets Twilight in Delhi at the point in which the conflagration of the ‘old’ city seems to 
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be necessary for the future to be built. For a novel from a progressive writer, the 
emphasis on loss and retaining older traditions seems odd, but the emphasis on the lack of 
finality even in death makes the novel both present and oppositional. Still, the general 
tone of loss and the slipping away of tradition makes Ahmed Ali’s novel an uneasy 
addition to the AIPWA canon.  
In Krishan Chander’s story, the state is described as one static thing, even going 
as far as to point out that the title street remained the same as it was from the day it was 
built. By contrast, the city, the families, and the nation of Twilight in Delhi are all in a 
permanent state of change. Despite Mir Nihal’s lament, “what is done cannot be 
undone,”438 even events with a degree of finality are consistently undermined by Ali. The 
novel’s structure itself seems to mirror the subversion of completion as each section and 
the novel itself ends with an ellipsis rather than a full stop. Attempts to subvert the 
permanence of loss and change are peppered throughout the novel. One of the best 
examples is the scene at the 1911 colonial darbar parad, in which he watches the 
procession Mir Nihal remembers from 1857 and the call to arms in the Jama Masjid. He 
remembers the bravery of the Muslims at the moment in which the choice before them 
seemed to be submission to the regime or death. In choosing death, he reasons with 
himself, the Muslims were able to remain alive. “The Mussalmans had no guns and most 
of them lost their lives, the rest came away…”439 The choice to stand up and fight against 
what was seen as an outside force, a repressive regime, allowed for a societal reprieve. 
The decision to fight meant that those who did not die were able to come away, and those 
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that did die lived on as martyrs. In the happiness around the parade, Mir Nihal sees a 
different kind of death.  He feels that the procession viewers are too ignorant to know the 
meaning of the sacrifice they are making by choosing not to fight. They do not burn with 
a flame that consumes them, and as such, “they feel dead, so dead.”440 Still, the scene 
ends on a note of hope and life as Mir Nihal attempts to reassure both himself and his 
crying grandson that in the future colonial oppression will be “driven out of the 
country.”441 Though he knows that he will not be alive to participate, Mir Nihal assumes 
for his city a life beyond what he can know. 
Despite the optimism of the possibility of a future resistance against imperial 
domination, Mir Nihal and many of the characters in the novel feel uncertain about the 
place that the city of Delhi and Muslim culture will have in the new India. The novel 
references the growth of the Indian anti-colonial movement several times pointing to the 
growth of the “terrorist” Swadeshi movement in Bengal in 1912442 and the beginning of 
the home rule movements in 1917.443 Mir Nihal feel disconnected from each of these 
movements, recognizing they are both for the best of the nation and not part of his ethos. 
Mir Nihal places his rejection of these movements in terms of a sense of displacement. It 
does not seem that there is a place for a unique Delhi in terms of imperial rule, which 
threatened to turn Delhi into New Delhi with its building projects, or in nationalist 
rhetoric, which wanted one united nation—not many differentiated states. Similarly, the 
character of Delhi in the novel feels oppressed by the plans to remake the city out of fear 
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that the ‘new’-ness of New Delhi would uproot the city’s life. The city would become full 
of living people, essentially living in a different Delhi. The site of Delhi, important as a 
marker of history—personal and national—loses its ability to represent Mir Nihal and his 
interests by losing its specificity.444 
 Ahmed Ali’s Twilight in Delhi should certainly be considered a progressive novel 
because of its sustained engagement with the feeling of oppression, loss, and 
misrecognition. The novel’s care in defining the city of Delhi through both the 
characterization of the city and its characters is something that is both mutable and in 
danger of being overrun, which illustrates the deep ambivalence that Ali had about the 
ability of the anti-colonial movement to make changes that respected people and their 
lives. Clearly, imperialism and the changes it wrought were an ill in the novel, but the 
anti-colonial movement seemed unable to move forward while embracing the difference 
of the national context. If Krishan Chander’s “Do Furlong lambi sadak” operates as a 
blunt instrument in “assessing and critiquing life” and showing in graphic detail the ways 
that the state fails its minorities as a whole, Twilight in Delhi is wary but unsure of its 
outcomes, even asking whether it is possible to embrace the past while moving forward. 
The inability of any character to represent even themselves means that the reader is 
forced to question traditionalism, imperialism, and nationalism without a clear answer as 
to any of their merits. In many ways, this open-ended assessment is as fundamental to the 
project of the AIPWA as the strictly oppositional Do Furlong lambi sadak. 
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Conclusion: Defining A Variety of Radical Politics 
The definitions of progressive literature for Premchand, Krishan Chander, and Ahmed 
Ali were all quite different. One way to consider the implications of their progressivism 
is to look at the target of their critique. For all three, the goal of a radically remade—not 
just reformed—society was a main concern, yet their definition of the source of that 
redefinition was not the same. For Premchand, the target of his critique was the society in 
general. He argued through his stories and his speech that the goal of progressive critique 
was to increase society’s care and recognition of the poor, as well as women and lower 
caste people. For Premchand, authors should feel the lack of concern in society most 
acutely and were also more responsible to make the circumstances of these often unseen 
characters visible. Authors who focused on frivolities in the face of suffering failed in 
their duty to create and represent beauty while continuing society’s casual cruelty toward 
those who could not change their situation.445  
 Krishan Chander represented a different kind of radical politics through his 
writing. Targeting his critique mainly at the workings of the government and its failure to 
recognize and encourage the citizenship of minorities in general, and poor people in 
particular, Chander’s stories often focused on the failure of the government to act equally 
in the interests of its citizens—poor and wealthy.446 Krishan Chander’s Do Furlong 
Lambi Sadak emphasizes how the nation inscribes its minorities, especially its poor, as 
peripheral, almost unrecognizable to the nation by placing the minor characters outside 
the notice or care of the street, which stands in for the government.  Chander’s critique 
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was most biting when it showed the indifference of the state to its most vulnerable. 
Although not without a critique of society’s willful indifference to each other, Chander’s 
stories tended to focus on how the failure to have adequate food, drink, and health led 
people to disregard the needs of others, perhaps even those worse off than themselves. 
The politics of progress for Chander emphasized the remaking of the government as the 
best way to adequately address the needs of the society. 
 For Ahmed Ali, the purpose of progressive literature was to critique the system, 
both as it had grown and what it seemed like it could become. Ali’s novel, Twilight in 
Delhi, emphasizes the role of history, place, and time in Ali’s critique of the social and 
political system. The main characters, Mir Nihal and his family, are central to the 
construction of their time and place, but because of the historical setting and the overall 
ambivalence and feeling of loss, the novel emphasizes the way that difference was 
glossed over in the creation of a modern nationalist movement.  Ali believes that not only 
the minority (in this case, the religious minority) are unrecognized, but also the 
relationship between the past, present, and potential future in the creation of a more free 
society. Thus, Ali suggests, “progressive should not be taken as synonymous with 
revolutionary,” but rather as a consideration and rejection of “that which stands in the 
way of attaining freedom.”447 For this reason, Ali argues that progressive politics can 
never be tied something as static as a set political ideology, but rather needs to be free to 
be oppositional as it sees fit.448  
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By placing the unheard, unseen, or unrecognizable at the center of their ideas 
about the value of a progressive literature, albeit with different techniques of doing so, 
Premchand, Chander, and Ali argue for the creation of an oppositional literature that 
responds to the national failure to recognize its minorities. The political differences 
among what variations of progressive literature critiqued and how those critiques 
benefited the nation made the AIPWA more—rather than less—able to articulate a vision 
of “All Indian” unity. Because progressive authors like Premchand, Chander, and Ali all 
made their critiques of the state and its people from a desire to remake the nation into a 
body that recognized, cared for, and included minorities of all kinds, the AIPWA was 
able to articulate a vision of the nation that promised unity based on the politics of 
recognition. 
 Although the AIPWA has often been described as somehow not Indian enough, 
the organization has been focused throughout its life on the creation of an Indian nation 
that better reflected its citizens. While supporting the anti-colonial movement’s call for 
independence from Britain whole-heartedly, the AIPWA argued that the nation needed to 
be entirely remade in order to be a just society for its vulnerable citizens. As such, the 
AIPWA defined its commitment to the ideal nation as a commitment to be critical of 
ways that the current nation failed to adequately respond to its minorities and the realities 
of life for those who were not recognized by the nation. Thus, for the AIPWA, the Indian 
nation and Indian unity functioned as a representation of the life of the nation’s minor 
characters. 
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Conclusion: The Goals and the Ends of Indian Unity 
In 1961, during the height of the fight for linguistically organized states, enduring 
communal tensions, and regional independence movements in the Northeast section of 
India, Jawaharlal Nehru instated the National Integration Council. The National 
Integration Council was charged with “review[ing] all matters pertaining to national 
integration, and to make recommendations thereon.”449 Since its original inception the 
National Integration Council has met twelve times, each time after an incident of 
particular violence.450 In April 2010, Manmohan Singh reconstituted the National 
Integration Council.451 Although Singh’s reasons for reinstating the National Integration 
Council have not been disclosed, its recall is almost certainly linked to the recent surge in 
the violent confrontations between Indian Maoists and the Indian State. Indeed, Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh has recently declared that the Maoists, often called Naxalites, 
were the “greatest internal security threat to our country and that… the government was 
taking adequate steps to deal with the menace.”452 The fight between the government and 
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the Maoists rages on in part because the Maoists, since their Naxalbari days, have argued 
that the national government was only as good as its recognition of India’s poorest 
citizens.  
 At the same time that the government focuses on the Maoist movement in some of 
India’s poorest regions, India’s minorities are still looked on with suspicions that have 
recently turned into violence. In early 2009, several women in Mangalore, a city in 
Andhra Pradesh, were attacked for going to a bar, drinking, and wearing western style 
clothes. The leader of the group who claimed responsibility for the attack, the Ram Sena, 
argued that it was against Indian values for women to go into bars.453 Similarly, women 
on college campuses, especially in Delhi and Bombay, have been threatened and attacked 
for wearing western-style clothing and drinking. College women’s hostels have reacted to 
the threats by instituting curfews to protect women’s safety. The government response to 
attacks like these has been broadly dismissive, with government officials largely 
unwilling to comment. The questions that Indians protesting these and other attacks pose 
are, “Who gets to define India, and Why?454” Certainly the Hindu right, in this case the 
Ram Sena, have argued that their commitment to conservative Hinduism gives them right 
to police behavior that they find objectionable, and police it violently if necessary. At the 
                                                                                                                                                 
original naxalite movement, especially adivasi movements for land rights. However, the term has been 
applied to all manner of groups that had little or no connection to the political and social uprising in 
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peasant/ student collaboration. For that reason I use the term Maoist instead, though that term is also 
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same time, women and their allies have been arguing for an Indian national identity that 
includes their rights and participation. 
 On the surface the government’s fight against the Maoists and the attack on 
women wearing jeans and skirts in bars have very little in common. But what they both 
point to is a narrowing of the acceptable ways to explain Indian national difference and 
belonging. At least part of the government’s decades-long fight against the Maoist is an 
attack on the Maoist idea of regional and local participation in the nation.455 The Maoist 
concept of the nation, and their place in the nation, directly contradicts a concept of 
Indian national identity, where the state, derived from formative traits held in common by 
all Indians, can both represent and define the national culture of India. The fact that the 
government, in response to growing strength of the Maoist rhetoric, reinstated the 
National Integration Council suggests that the government sees the threat from the 
Maoists in terms of a threat to the structure of Indian unity, commonly defined. In a 
different way, the men who are part of the Hindu Nationalist party, the Ram Sena, 
asserted that their party and its affiliates knew what defined Indian-ness and that they 
needed to impose it. In their policing of women acting against their reactionary ideals, the 
Ram Sena and other Hindu Nationalist groups loosely associated with them have argued 
that there is a singular concept that underlies any definition of Indian womanhood, and by 
extension, Indian-ness in general. These two attacks by very different sources, the Ram 
Sena and the Indian Government, waged in the name of Indian national life, both indicate 
a continued discomfort with Indian unity and the threat posed to it by vocal minorities. 
                                                 
455
 The Maoist movement has been violent, but even relatively mainstream media have argued that attacks 
like the one in 2010 where 76 Indian soldiers were killed have been relatively rare. Maoist violent protest 
has most often been more subtle, aimed at commercial targets, or not deadly. 
  245 
The struggle over how the Indian nation and Indian unity is defined is by no means only a 
present day struggle. The historical precedents, both for the assertion of a single 
fundamental concept of Indian unity and for the fight for a wider definition of Indian-ness 
by national minorities inform the present day struggle. 
 During the 1940s and early 1950s, India and Indians who cared about 
independence and nationhood experienced a crisis of unity. Fearing that a potential 
Indian nation was unattainable and unsustainable without a clear and definable unifying 
factor, mainstream anti-colonial actors, especially those associated with the All India 
National Congress Party, argued that there was a fundamental unity in India that would 
manifest itself once the nation emerged from colonial domination. The idea behind the 
claim was that upon being freed from colonial meddling that attempted to convince 
Indians that they were fundamentally different from one another, Indian unity would 
emerge, albeit Indian unity superimposed with a set of superficial diversities. This claim 
of fundamental Indian unity was an important stance against the colonial power, but it 
also served to emphasize the relative uniformity of the Congress party’s vision of India 
and a future Indian state structure. Regional, religious, gender, caste, and class minorities 
all worried that a belief in a fundamental, natural, or organic Indian unity would leave 
them as at best second-class, and at worst as permanent outsiders. 
 Alternatives to the Congress approach concerning the viability of Indian unity 
were posited by influential and interested citizen’s organizations. One of the most 
interesting responses to the claim of a fundamental Indian unity with superficial diversity 
was the strategy of using the “All India” prefix in the names of organizations, especially 
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in groups organized by or for minority interests. The “All India” naming strategy is 
interesting both for its prevalence and for its commitment to the nation. During the 1940s 
and 50s hundreds of organizations took up the “All India” name. Given the sheer number 
of organizations claiming “All India” affiliation, it is impossible to think that each of 
these groups saw, or attempted to see, themselves as encompassing the whole of Indian 
life.456 What does seem to be clear is that these groups formulated the idea of “All India” 
as  ways to participate in both the definition and continued negotiation over the claim of 
Indian unity. The commonality between the groups that used the “All India” name was a 
commitment to participating actively in the way India defined itself as a nation and the 
attendant goals of that nation. One thing many of these organizations did not seem 
particularly attached to was rendering of a final answer to the question of what defined 
Indian unity and the Indian nation. 
 This dissertation has examined four of these “All India” organizations to explicate 
their claim about their “All India” status and the radical politics behind their argument 
about Indian unity. Each organization had a distinct way in which they defined their “All 
India” commitment, and all of them contradicted the simple idea that “All India” was a 
totalizing way to describe Indian unity. Each of these organizations was devoted to an 
idea that both encouraged thought and discouraged authoritarian solutions about the way 
Indian unity incorporated difference. 
 Two of these organizations, All India Radio and the All India Women’s 
Conference, tried to redefine the idea of national participation in the construction of 
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Indian public life and citizenship. Both organizations attempted to imagine local and 
national life as equally influential in defining the stakes and requirements for Indian 
unity. All India Radio attempted to imagine a nation where each locality literally heard 
the nation differently, but in which each iteration was equally part of the overall Indian 
vision. The All India Women’s Conference similarly argued that both local and national 
agitation by women on behalf of women’s rights and responsibilities to India helped to 
create a place in India for women’s active citizenship. In both instances, the idea of 
Indian unity was a fractured one where the hierarchical relationship between local and 
national was disrupted, making both local and national action part of an Indian definition 
of itself. 
 The other two organizations highlighted, the All India Newspaper Editors’ 
Conference and the All India Progressive Writers’ Association, defined their commitment 
to Indian unity in terms of contingent or incomplete unity. Both the organizations argued 
that national citizenship was contingent on a commitment to India prefaced on a national 
state structure that was built on the ability, even a responsibility, to express dissent. The 
All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference argued that as long as each citizen was able to 
agree on a limited set of fundamental principals, actual pragmatic Indian unity could be 
built on debate and negotiation. The All India Progressive Writers’ Association argued 
that the concept of a nation that recognized its citizens should be the basis for constant 
redefinition of national identity and Indian unity. 
In the end, each of the more radical solutions to the problem of Indian unity and 
the meaning of “All India” failed these particular institutions. In the transition from 
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colonial state to national government, the importance of asserting a nationally unified 
country intensified, while at the same time the space for redefining the nation became 
slimmer. Support for concepts like democracy and nationalism came to mean support for 
the Indian state government and its policies. In part the problem was the intensification of 
the crisis of unity after independence, as anti-colonial activists realized that the departure 
of the colonial government and the moment of partition did not erase caste, class, gender, 
religious, and regional conflicts. In this new climate, two of these four “All India” 
organizations, All India Radio and the All India Women’s Conference, became more 
centralized and focused on governmental actions. The All India Newspaper Editors’ 
Conference, started in opposition to colonial government repressions, had fought its own 
idea of ideologically defined unity since its founding in 1940, but after independence, it 
was unable to either support unity based on ideology or unity based on pragmatic 
unanimity. Finally, the All India Progressive Writers’ Association fell victim to a 
combination of partition and increasingly dogmatic political expression.  
Together these four organizations, which were all well-known and important 
groups in their fields, suggested some of the many ideas for redefining Indian unity and 
democracy in the decade just before and just after Indian national independence. These 
four organizations were far from the only “All India” organizations proposing radical 
solutions to the crisis of Indian unity, and they were not necessarily the organizations 
proposing the most radical solutions. Instead, these four organizations are case studies of 
ways that Indian unity was thought through outside the most commonly described 
“Congress” model.  None of these “All India” organizations initially supported a single, 
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fundamental characteristic that described India or Indian unity definitively. Instead, they 
all argued that the Indian nation and Indian citizenship should be constituted by a 
commitment to India and continued negotiation about the Indian state. The Indian nation 
was the space set aside to draw Indians into a relationship, and not an uncontested one, 
with each other.  
Since the 1950s in India, the national dialogue has often centered on tapping into 
the fundamental Indian unity, that elusive Bharat Mata moment that Jawaharlal Nehru 
described so enduringly in his Discovery of India.457 Failures have been attributed to, 
among other things, internalized definitions of colonial difference, an explanation often 
used in nationalist historiography, insufficient Indian-ness, an explanation favored by the 
Hindu Nationalists, or a general adoption of western culture and attitudes, an explanation 
used by both groups among others. Whole scale failures of unity, like the anti-Sikh riots 
after the death of Indira Gandhi, have prompted countrywide stock-taking and blame 
assigning, and have often resulted in central government committees of experts, like the 
National Integration Council, to make suggestions on ways of exposing the innate 
national unity.  
What is not often explored in these countrywide soul-searching missions is the 
possibility that national unity might be better defined through negotiation and recognition 
of Indian difference. Non-governmental organizations from the 1940s and 1950s through 
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today have tried to rethink Indian unity and the Indian nation in ways that make it more 
accessible to more and different kinds of Indians. However, the results of their attempts 
are, by design, less totalizing, less ideal, and less finished that the exclusive style of 
Indian nationalism often favored by the state machinery. Although all four of the 
organizations profiled in this dissertation failed at instituting their ideals in state, they did 
succeed in raising debate about active participation, national inclusion, local and regional 
determination, and recognition of minorities, that continue to be sites of debate in the 
Indian public through today. Moreover, the continued popularity of the “All India” 
naming strategy indicates that the pull toward active citizenship and negotiated unity has 
lived through the state’s attempt to unilaterally define the Indian nation. This dissertation, 
in thinking through the question of the meaning of “All India,” democracy in India, and 
the concept of Indian unity, is an attempt to imagine committed Indian negotiations 
around a definition of the nation as themselves a legitimate definition of the Indian 
nation. 
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